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:Gwen Gadson and her pooch Ch•·Chi beat the 
)!eat under an umbrella while waiting in line to 
:get Ch1-Chi vaccinated against rabies Sunday 
•at the fire station located at 5600 Franklin 
Ave. The New Orleans Rab1es Campaign IS 
sponsored by the Association of New Orleans 
Vetennarians and the Louisiana SPCA 
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Pair want class, textbooks banned 
SHREVEPORT - Two 
Shrevep<~n women say textbooks 
for a high school cour~e in 
envirnnmt>ntal science promote 
communism, ev ution and abor-
tion, and they want the Atate to 
deny approval of both the books 
and the elective course offering. 
The two, Sandy McDadt> and 
Kay Rt>iboldt, have made the 
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home economics. histnry and 
science books. 
On April 23, a committeE' of 
the Board of Elementary and 
Secondary Education will review 
the boolui, and the full board will 
vo~ on them dn April 24. 
"It's a OOUJ'IIe that could proba-
bly be taught in six weeks •... " 
Reiboldt eaid. "First, I don't see a 
nef'd for the whole course. Sec-
ondly, none of the books I 
reviewed are acceptable." 
The women said they object to 
the books ~use they promotA! 
p<~pulation control and evolution 
and denounce Ameru:il'and free 
enterprise. 
One book. "Global Science," in 
a discussion of free enterprise 
cited by McDade, says, "argtt· 
menta against the market sya· 
tem" include thoae that "the free 
market can allow the rich to hold 
on to economic and political 
power" and that "free market 
forcrs by themselves do not pro-
vide for social nl't'da." 
A. T/JC 0..•-
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May 2, 1986 Conference 
L is t 1, s h ee t 1 
No. 85-1513 ~ 
EDWARDS , e t al • ( gov' r) from CA 5 (!3-z:'.own ~ 
Poli , ,lolly) (~, .~ark, s 1f25' 
_,-'-""'-'.,.. ley, Ga i\-?ood , - ~.,, 
vfi igginbotham, .Hill, Janes, 
diss~al of petn 
for reh g en ban~) 
v. 
AGUILLARD, et al. (public schools) Fed./Civ. Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs argue that the CAS erred by affirming 
the invalidation of a state statute on Establishment Clause 
grounds. __ __, 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: In 1981, the Louisiana 
legislature enacted a statute known as the "Balanced Treatment 
for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act." See La. Rev. 
J·. 't 
:,t::-:;1;~ ,'tt ,.. 
-
- 2 -
Stats. §§17:286.1 to 17:286.7. The lav-1 provides that oif the 
l ~ 
public schools address the origin of life, they must g ,~ ve 
balanced treatment to evidence for both the evolution and the 
creation theories of life, and refrain from misrepresenting 
either as a proven fact. A group of parents, educators, and 
others now appellees -- brought suit in federal court, seeking 
a declaratory judgment that the Act violates either the Louisiana 
Constitution or the Establishment Clause of the Federal 
Constitution, and a permanent injunction against implementation 
r 
of the Ac/ 
~he DC initially ruled that the statute violated the 
~ 
Louisiana Constitution. On appeal, the CAS certified the 
question to the Louisiana Supreme Court which found no violation 
of the state constitution. Aguillard v. Treen, 440 So.2d 704 
(La. 1983). The CAS remanded with instructions to address the 
federal constitutional issue. Aguillard v. Treen, 720 F.2d 676 
(CAS 1983). 
On remand, appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that the Act was simply another effort by fundamentalist 
Christians to attack the theory of evolution and to incorporate 
in the public school curricula the Biblical theory of creation. 
Appellant state officials countered that the purpose and effect 
of the Act is to promote the legitimate secular purpose of 
....--
academic freedom. The DC granted summary judgment in favor of 
appellees. It observed that under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 
602, 612 (1971), a statute violates the Establishment Clause if 
it (1) has a religious purpose, (2) has a primary effect of 
- 3 -
advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) fosters an e»cessive 
government entanglement with religion. 
l 
The ..... coyrt reasb d that 
because the doctrine of creation-science necessarily involves 
teaching the existence of a divine creator and because the ..... -
concept of a creator is an inherently religious tenet, the 
of the Act was to promote religion in violation of the 
first prong of the Lemon test. The court expressly declined to 
review the legislative history. 
The~5 affirmed. After noting that the Lemon test controls 
this case, the court observed that "the theory of creation is a 
religious belief" and that "evolution has historically been 
offensive to religious fundamentalists because the theory cannot 
be reconciled with the Biblical account of the origin of man." 
Against this background, the court concluded that the plain 
language of the statute demonstrated that it had no secular 
legislative purpose. To support this holding, the court examined 
the statute's potential secular purposes and concluded that it 
did not promote them. The statute was counterproductive to its 
stated purpose of promoting academic freedom because its effect 
is to restrict rather than to expand free choice. Nor does the 
statute promote academic freedom by overcoming a misperception 
among school teachers that teaching creation-science is against 
the law. The court reasoned that "[n]o court of which we are 
aware has prohibited voluntary instruction concerning purely 
scientific evidence that happens ••• to be consistent with 
religious doctrine belief," apparently to show that such a 
misperception of the law among school teachers is unlikely. The 
- 4 -
Act also fails to promote creation science as a genuine academic 
' 
interest because it does not require the teaching of s+ch science 
unless evolution science also is taught. The intended effect of 
the Act "is to discredit evolution by counterbalancing its 
teaching at every turn with the teaching of creationism, a 
religious belief. For these reasons, we hold that the Act fails 
to satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test and thus is 
unconstitutional." 
Appellants filed a petn for a rehearing en bane, whic~ was 
denied over a dissent by Judge Gee. The dissent argued that 
there is nothing pernicious about a state requirement that 
educators present a balanced view of the scientific evidence 
concerning all theories of the origin of life and that they not 
misrepresent as established fact views which are theory only. 
The panel has no basis other than its extra-record hunch that the 
statute was enacted for a religious purpose. But even if this 
hunch were true -- that the statute was motivated by parents who 
resent having the theory of evolution misrepresented to their 
children as scientific fact -- there is nothing illiberal in 
forbidding either of two bona fide theories to be taught as fact. 
Moreover, the argument that religious motivation invalidates a 
statute proves too much. Not only is it inconsistent with a 
recent decision upholding Louisiana's Sunday closing laws, but it 
would result in the invalidation of laws such as those 
prohibiting bigamy, which "carry tell-tale indicia of having been 
passed with a motive to favor the Judea-Christian religious 
preference for monogamy, singling it out for adoption over the 
. . 
- 5 -
equally workable Moslem view." Unlike statutes involving school 
l prayer, the statute here has no direct religious refer~nce. The 
dissent ended by saying, "It comes as news to me that the 
Constitution forbids a state to require the teaching of truth." 
In a heated response to the dissent, Judge Jolly wrote: 
"First, as writer of the panel opinion, I offer my 
apologies to the majority of this court for aligning it 
with the forces of darkness and anti-truth. Second, I 
do not personally align myself with the dissenters in 
their commitment to the eternal search for truth 
through state edicts. Third, I commend to the 
dissenters a serious rereading of the majority opinion 
that they may recognize the hyperbole of the opinion in 
which they join. And, finally, I respectfully submit, 
the panel opinion speaks for itself, modestly and 
moderately, if one will allow its words to be carefully 
heard. n 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appellants argue that the statute involved 
here does not fail under the "purpose" prong of the Lemon test 
because it was not motivated by a purpose to advance religion. 
Under Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 u.s. __ , __ , a law does not 
violate the purpose requirement unless it is "entirely motivated 
by a purpose to advance religion. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 u.s. 668, (1984) (statute fails "purpose" prong only if 
"motivated wholly by religious considerations"). Moreover, the 
Court has stressed its "reluctance to attribute unconstitutional 
motives to the states, particularly when a plausible secular 
purpose" appears on "the face of the statute." Mueller v. Allen, 
463 U.S. __ , 394-395 (1983). TheCA misapplied these principles 
by simply assuming that the legislature had an impermissible 
religious motive and by assuming that only statutes with a 
predominantly secular purpose survive the Establishment Clause. 
Creation science is as scientific and nonreligious as 
- 6 -
evolution science, and simply describes theories involving abrupt 
appearances of life in complex form. It is associate ~ with such 
theories about the origin of the universe as big bang, 
inflationary universe, and continuous creation, as well as the 
directed panspermia theory of life. The concept of a creator is 
not a necessary part of creation science because evidence of 
creation need not include speculation about a source. Just as 
the theory of evolution does not resolve the question of who or 
what originated matter and energy in the cosmos, and what 
mechanism brought about macroevolution, creation science does not 
address the source or cause of creation. An overwhelming number 
of scientists including avowed evolutionists and agnostics 
acknowledge that creation science is a viable alternative theory 
supported by significant evidence. See, e.g., Lipson,~ 
Physicist Looks at Evolution, 31 Physics Bull. 138, 138 (1980); 
Gould, Evolution's Erratic Pace, Natural History, May 1977, at 
12. 
Even if creation science were to involve references to a 
creator, that does not automatically involve it with religion or 
render it violative of the Establishment Clause. The concept of 
a creator is not necessarily religious, but often is 
philosophical or metaphysical. The Establishment Clause does not 
prohibit references to creation as a scientific theory just as it 
does not prohibit references to God, so long as they are not 
designed to propagate religious doctrines. See Engel v. Vitale, 
370 u.s. 421, 435, n.21 (1961). References to creation in a 
science class are no different from the references to God in the 
- 7 -
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Star Spangled 
• ,, 
Banner, the Pledge of Allegiance, and the National Mo.,to. 
This Court has stressed that a law's stated purpose should 
not lightly be disregarded. The stated purpose of the statute at 
issue is to promote academic freedom by providing additional 
scientific information about the origin of life. La. Rev. Stat. 
§17:286.2. In the famous Scopes trial, which challenged a policy 
to teach only creation theory to the exclusion of evolution, 
Clarence Darrow stated that it is "bigotry for public schools to 
teach only one theory of origins." The statute in this case 
recognizes that this statement has as much force with respect to 
evolution as it does to creation theory. The CAS's decision 
should be summarily reversed. 
Appellees argue that the decision below should be summarily 
affirmed. Impressionable high school students will interpret the 
statute as an official endorsement of religion. The clear 
purpose behind the statute is the promotion of the religious 
theory of creation. Most teachers perceive it in this manner 
rather than as a means of promoting a secular purpose. 
4. DISCUSSION: In Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 
2490 (1985), this Court stated that "a statute that is motivated 
in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the [purpose prong of 
the Lemon test] , " but "a statute must be invalidated if it is 
entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." In -------------
determining whether the statute in Jaffree was "entirely 
motivated" by a religious purpose, the Court asked "'whether the 
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of 
... 1 
- ~ -
religion.'" Ibid. The Court determined that the an~wer was 
"yes" in Jaffree because "the record not only provide, t us with an 
unambiguous affirmative answer, but it also reveals that the 
enactment of [the statute] was not motivated by any clearly 
secular purpose." Ibid. 
This case is distinguishable from Jaffree because the lower ~ 
courts cited no evidence from the record in the form of 
legislative history or otherwise that "unambiguously" ~ 
~7· 
demonstrated that the statute was designed to endorse religion or  
.:::..._ __ ,___.............. ... -
that it lacked a secu ose. Indeed, the only legislative 
history mentioned stated that the purpose of the statute was to 
promote academic freedom. The CAS's alleged reliance on the 
"plain language of the statute" is unper suasive bee ause nothing 
in the language of the statute unambiguously demonstrated a -------
design to endorse religion. It would be an extension of Jaffree 
to hold that a statute fails the purpose prong of Lemon simply 
because a court's view of "common sense" suggests that a statute 
was enacted primarily for a religious purpose. 
I therefore think that this case raises a substantial 
federal question. Of course, if ever there are cases in which a 
"common sense" argument is persuasive, this is one of them. Not 
much common sense is required to conclude that this statute was 
enacted primarily to benefit religious views about the creation 
of life. Nevertheless, since this Court has upheld Sunday 
closing laws in the face of such "common sense" arguments, see 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-453 (1961), they 
apparently are not sufficient by themselves to establish an 
- 9 -
impermissible religious purpose under the Lemon test .' I believe 
• . jl 
that noting probable jurisdiction would allow the Cot.i't t to set 
forth the appropriate means for finding a religious purpose when 
it is not unambiguously obvious from the statutory language or 
legislative history. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend noting probable 
jurisdiction. 
There is a response. 
April 25, 1986 Guynn Opn in ptn 
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Dear Lewis, 
John Newton Thomas 
107 Berkshire Road 
Richmond, Virginia 23221 
August 2, 1986 
Let me repeat the oral apology I made to you Sunday 
for my failure to respond to your gracious and thoughtful 
letter, with your opinion, on the Alabama prayer case. 
Upon reading your letter and opinion, I agreed immediately 
your decision. Given the Court's position on neutrality, 
think you had no other option. Please forgive my lack of 




At the time your letter was received I was active on a 
Citizens' Committee appointed to celebrate the 200th Anniversary 
of the Virginia Statute on Religious Freedom. The contrast 
between that document and the Court's interpretation of the 
First Amendment, as presented in your letter and opinion, has 
engrossed me e ver since. I decided - how mistakenly - to send 
you some thoughts on the general subject along with my response 
to your letter. The fact that they are forthcoming only now, after 
some thirteen or fourteen months, indicates how many problems I 
have faced and how slowly my mind works at age 83. 
What I am sending is an outline of some major ideas. 
If I could issue a command to you, it would be to leaf through 
it hurriedly, throw it in the waste basket and send no answer. 
Sincerely, 
lliE VIRGINI( r:::tD~ r::..~:;NDMENT 
The preamble of the Statute, drafted by Thomas Jefferson in 1777 and 
adopted by the Virginia Assembly in 1786, begins with the following words: 
"Whereas Almighty God hath created the mind free ... all attem{i:sto influence 
it by temporal punishments or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only 
to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan 
of the holy author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet 
chose not to propagat e it by coercions on either, as was in His Almighty power 
to do ... " These words are reminiscent of Jefferson's earlier statement in the 
Declaration of Independence, that all men are "endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable rights •.. " 
What is said in these statements is enough to convince me that Jefferson, 
while not an evangelical Christian and probably a deist, believed in the Judea-
Christian God and attributed human rights to Him. 
The fact that he refers once in the Statute to one's having a "natural 
right" and once to "the natural rights of mankind" is enough to lead some to 
the conclusion that he based human rights on natural law, following his philo-
sophical mentor, John Locke. However, the idea of natural law is historically 
associated in philosophy with the theistic position and there is no contradiction 
in holding that God is the author of natural law. I believe therefore that we 
are safe in saying that Jefferson >who wrote the Statut~ and the members of the 
majority in the Assembly who voted for it believed in God as the author of our 
right to freedom. 
/6 e, Establishment Clause 
It is generally agreed that the definition of freedom enacted in the 
Virginia Statute became the basis of the First Amendment. This would suggest 
2 
a very close relationship between the Statute and the Amendment, close enough, 
I should think, to place the burden of proof on those who find significant 
divergencies in them. For instance, the absence of any mention of God in the 
Amendment or elsewhere in the Constitution and the refusal of its framers to de-
clare the Christian faith as official, while admittedly posing a question, 
should not be interpreted as a rejection of religion or even as betokening a 
waning of religious belief among the political leaders of the late 18th century. 
Accordingly, I cannot agree that the establishmen·i-. clause was originally 
conceived as an effort to separate the state from religion. Rather it was de-
signed to prevent the state from elevating any particular religious institution 
as "the established Church." Mr. Jeffer5on, in his letter to the Danbury 
Baptists as late as 1802, made it clear that the "wall of separation" was 
between church and state. It is important also to remember that while forbidding 
"an establishment of religion," the Amendment said nothing about religion as 
such, except in the "free exercise" clause. 
In ruling that the establishment clause requires the state to assume a 
position of neutrality- i . e . , non-commitment- toward religion, we have come 
full circle from the theology of those two great pre-Constitutional documents, 
the Declaration of Independence and the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. 
Furthermore, we have moved beyond the First Amendment's silence in regard to 
religion to a position which definitely forbids any recognition of or commitment 
to religion. In short, we have become a secular state . 
Having used the term, I should say that I understand secularism as 
designating any position or attitude which leaves God out of the picture. It may 
take the form of anything from atheism, agnosticism, refusal to yield to God or 
simple neglect of Him . It hardly needs to be added that the real struggle today 
----- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
is no longer between churches seeking establishment but between religion and 
secularism. 
The Concept of Neutrality 
3 
I must apologize for discussing the Court's use of this principle when 
I am ignorant of the reasoning which led to its adoption. 
First, let me clarify the sense in which I understand it. After sorting 
through the variant definitions of the term in Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, 
the following seems to me to be the common factor in them all: to be neutral 
means "not being engaged on either side; not taking part with or assisting 
either of two or more contending parties." 
According to this definition, neutrality presupposes the existence of 
at least two contending parties and consists in not being engaged with or 
committed to either party, thus according equal treatment to both. A position 
favoring one party against one or more others, such as the judgment in the 
Alabama school prayer case, would of course not be neutral in the light of this 
definition, however justified on other grounds . But are we to conclude that, 
in calling for the state to be neutral toward religion, the Court did not intend 
to include those acts of the state embodied in judicial decisions regarding 
religion? 
I should think that most Court decisions would fall short of neutrality 
in Webster•s sense, since they are usually bound to side with one party against 
the other . There are also the cases where the positions of the contending 
parties are mutually contradictory, such for instance as religion versus · non-
religion, as a result of which there is no neutral ground between them. 
To affirm one is to deny the other and vice versa. Jesus' words might be 
appropriate, "He that is not for me is against me . " 
4 
The Court certainly has a right to define its own terms. One thing 
which inclines me to think it has done this is the fact that it apparently 
reserves the term, neutrality, for religion alone, not religion in relation to 
any contending party. On this basis neutrality might be thought of as being 
neither for nor against religion, but this is not the position of the Court. 
The one invariable in its opinion, as I understand it, is that the state must 
not be for religion. Your letter and opinion, I think, make this perfectly 
clear . 
This is the essence of the interpretation of the establishment clause as 
requiring separation of religion and state. The interpretation can be stated 
in plain English, as you have done in your letter. There is thus no need for 
the dubious concept, neutrality, since it is neither the source of the Court's 
understanding of the establishment clause nor a necessary or effective means 
t 
of clarifying its interpret~ 
~In ~n ~o;;_d like to ~z-~at the American state is 
. . t)r'"'- -/_., -J-Lu -S . +o h . 
the unique position of being ne~ther Marx~st:~~lcomm~ttea;at e~sjA.,. 
in 
nor, 
like the nations of Western Europe, nominally Christian. Our secularism leaves 
us in a none-too-enviable situation. Our forefathers fled Europe where religious 
states denied, or limited, religious freedom and came to our shores where they 
proclaimed religious freedom on the basis of religious faith. Today a secular 
American state still proclaims religious freedom, having inherited the free exercise 
clause, but, like the ACLU, without reference to God. This means that our cele-
brated rights, religious and otherwise, are no longer "unalienable" endowments 
bestowed by the Creator on every human individual but only civil rights bestowed 
by the government and revocable at its pleasure. 

'. 
September 16, 1986 
EDWARDS GINA-POW 
8S-1Sl3 Edwards v. Aguillard(Appeal from CAS) 
MEMO TO CLERK: 
This case that has received a great deal of 
publicity - involves the validity of the Louisiana statute 
entitled "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and 
Evolution-Science Act", enacted by the Louisiana 
Legislature in 1981. 
The Act, applicable to all public secondary and 
elementary schools, is described in CAS's opinion as 
follows: 
"The statute requires the public schools to 
give balanced treatment to creation-science and 
to evolution-science. Creation-science and 
evolution-science are similarly defined in the 
statute as "the scientific evidences for 
creation (or evolution) and the inferences from 
those scientific evidences." Under the Act no 
school is required to give any instruction Tn 
the--sws--j~!n "of manKTnO, buf" if a 
scho ol c hoosest o t eaeh -either e V5n:i tion-science 
or creation-science, it Fs€:!:~both ~ and it 
must give balanced treatment to eac t eory. In 
addition, the statute prohibits discrimination 
against any teacher "who chooses to be a 
creation-scientist or to teach scientific data 
which points to creationism."FR3 










The plaintiffs and defendants in the case below were 
a "mixed-bag". The plaintiffs included a group of 
Louisiana Legislators, religious leaders, parents, and the 
Louisiana Board of Elementary and Secondary Education. 
The defendants (now appellants before us) included the 
governor, attorney general and the State Department of 
Education. The DC found the Act violated the Louisiana 
Constitution. On appeal CAS certified the state 
constitutional question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. 
It found no violation of the Constitution. The case then 
went back to the DC with instructions to address the 
federal contitutional questions. The DC sustained the 
plaintiffs summary judgment motion despite the fact that 
there were conflicting affidavits expressing opinions with 
respect to "creation-science" and "evolution-science". 
On appeal, a panel composed of Judges Brown, Politz and 
Jolly affirmed the DC's decision. On a suggestion for 
rehearing en bane, by vote of 8 to 7 en bane rehearing was 
denied. Judge Gee, who has a distinctive and attractive 
writing style, dissented from the denial of en bane 
rehearing. His dissent was joined by 6 other CA judges, 
including 2 whom I particularly admire: Chief Judge Clark 
and Judge Higginbotham. Judge Gee's opinion heaped 
~ N ' .. 
ridicule on the panel decision, and - at least on its face 
- was a very persuasive dissent. Judge Jolly was prompted 
to respond in a brief (A-6) paragraph in which he invited 
the dissenters to reread the panel opinion that speaks for 
itself, "modestly and moderately". 
Judge Jolly's opinion (referred to herein as the CA 
opinion) is certainly framed in moderate language. It is 
brief and well-written, focusing on the "sole issue", 
namely, whether the Balanced Treatment Act violates the 
religious clauses of the First Amendment. The case was ---disposed of by CAS's negative answer to the question 
II. '\ 
"whether the Act has a secular legislative purpose"? The 
CA, largely ignored the legislative history that it viewed 
as having been tailored specifically to establish a 
"secular purpose". The court properly recognized that 
normally a state prescribes the academic curriculum of its 
public schools, and that courts should "exercise great 
care and restraint when called upon to intervene in the 
operation of public schools" - a view with which I warmly 
agree. But the CA further said that a states' right "to 
prescribe its public school curriculum is limited to the 
extent that it may not compel or prohibit the teaching of 




Arkansas, 393 u.s. 97, 107. Citing our decision in the 
Alabama "moment of silence" case, Wallace v. Jaffree, the 
CA noted that "no consideration of the second or third 
criteria [of the Lemon test] is necessary if a statute 
does not have a clearly secular purpose". It recognized, 
as I said in my Wallace concurring opinion - and also as 
stated in the Court opinion - a statute that does have a 
clearly secular purpose is not invalidated simply because 
it may also have religious implications. 
The CA, after citing and quoting from several of our 
decisions, examined the Act "to determine whether it, in 
reality, establishes a religious belief. We must 
recognize that the theory of creation (the Book of 
Genesis) is a religious belief. We cannot divorce 
ourselves from the historical fact that the controversy 
between the proponents of evolution and creationism has 
religious overtones". Finally, having rejected the 
legislative history as pretextual, CAS looked to the 
"plain language of the Act to determine whether it 
embodies a secuJ.ar purpose". Although its stated purpose 
was "to protect academic freedom", CAS rejected this and 
other "self-serving statements" as being a deliberate 
effort to establish that the legislation was truly secular 
6. 
in its primary purpose. Rather, the plain language of the 
statute makes apparent "its predominantly religious 
purpose". Finally, the CA concluded as follows: 
"Not only does the Act fail to promote 
academic freedom, it fails to promote creation 
science as a genuine academic interest. If 
primarily concerned with the advancement of 
creation-science, the Act, it certainly appears 
to us, would have required its teaching 
irrespective of whether evolution was taught. 
Thus a primary academic interest in creation-
science would seem to be gainsaid because the 
Act requires the teaching of the creation theory 
only if the theory of evolution is taught. 
"Finally, this scheme of the statute, 
focusing on the religious bete noire of 
evolution, as it does, demonstrates the 
religious purpose of the statute. Indeed, the 
Act continues the battle William Jennings Bryan 
carried to his grave. The ~ct's intended effect 
is to di~credi t e_yo.lut :lQ.rl · ill' co!:!_nterbalaocing 
it~cfi f v u with the teaching of 
c , a religious belief. The s atute 
therefore is a law respecting a particular 
religious belief. For these reasons, we hold ~ 
''-that the Act fails to satisfy the first prong of 
the Lemon test and thus is unconstitutional." ~~ 
~ AA-t!>* 
~k 
~~-* * * 
The briefs of the appellants and the appellees are 
long and contentious and there are a dozen or more amici 
briefs. I will not undertake in this memo to summarize 
the long and tedious arguments made by the parties. I do 
make a few observations. 
We should have rejected the form in which the 
questions are "presented", as they are unnecessarily long 
and argumentative. The state's first argument is that 
summary jud ment should not have been en ered because the 
"uncontroverted \affidavits" on behalf of the state - if 
taken as true (as the Rule requires) - created "genuine 
issues of material fact." These five affidavits are 
included as Appendix B (A7-A47). I have scanned several 
of these, and I am inclined to think the DC was correct in 
not regarding the views expressed as "facts" for purposes 
of ruling on the summary judgment motion. I had never 
heard of "Creation-science" prior to this case. In 
simplistic terms, as I understand it, a school of thought 
has developed in recent years to the effect that the 
Genesis account of the creation is "as scientific as 
evolution", and that there are even "substantial reasons 
for doubting the truth" of the presuppositions of 
evolution. Relying on these affidavits, the state argues 
that "creation-science is non-religion", is "scientific", 
and "can be taught in public schools without religious 
concepts and in fact can be taught as feasibly as 
evolution." 
8. 
The state's brief on the merits relies, quite 
properly upon Judge Gee's "forceful dissent" that was 
joined by six other CAS judges. It quotes Judge Gee's 
statement that the "statute which concerns us today is 
quite different" from Lemon v. Kurtzman, Wallace v. 
Jeffrey, etc.; this statute has no direct religious 
reference whatever and merely requires that "the whole 
scientific truth be taught on the subject if any subject 
is taught". Neither Judge Gee's oipinion nor the 50 page 
brief of the State Attorney General cites any decision of 
this Court that lends substantial support for the validity 
of the Act. I do think, as Judge Gee emphasizes, that 
customarily we rely heavily on the legislative history in 
determining the intent and purpose of a statute. This was 
rather critical, for example, to my opinion in Wallace. 
And on its face, perhaps one's first reaction is that the 
Louisiana Legislature has adopted a fair and balanced 
approach that should assure the presentation in the 
classrooms of both points of view with respect to the 
Biblical view of creation and evolution. 
Appellees brief, although prepared by a fine law 
firm, is unattractive to me. It is sarcastic - and even 
anti-religion - in its tone. It ridicules the view that 
there is anything "scientific" about the "creation" view. 
Indeed, the brief argues that "creation-science" 
forecloses scientific inquiry. The unifying principle of 
"creationism is not the law of nature but of divinity".FR2 
2. One unattractive feature of the appellees brief is 
that it invariably refers to the Act as the "Creationism 
Act", which of course is not the title of the Act at all. 
··~· 
I find the amicus brief on behalf of the National 
Academy of Sciences to be more persuasive than that of the 
appellees. It makes a frontal attack on the view that 
there is such a thing as "creation-science". The Academy 
created a committee in 1981 on "Science and Creationism". 
The committee's report (1984) was reviewed and approved by 
the Governing Council. Among other things, the conclusion 
reached was as follows: "The Academy states unequivocally 
that the tenents of "creation-science" are not supported 
by scientific evidence, that creationism has no place in a 
science curriculum at any level, that its proposed 
teaching would be impossible in any constructive sense for 
well-informed and conscientious science teachers, and that 
its teaching would be contrary to the nation's need for a 
scientifically literate citizenry .•. ". 
* * * 
The case is troubling for me because, having served 
on the Virginia State Board of Education for eight years, 
I feel rather strongly that courts should leave to the 
states the determination of the curriculum of the public 
schools. Although I am not up-to-date, I am certain that 
it was considered permissible - though not required - for 
courses on the Bible to be taught in the public schools 
:, 
''I 
just as they are in universities. Nor would it ever have 
occurred to me as a Board member that students also could 
not be taught that there is a strongly held scientific 
view as to evolution. I personally have thought that the 
book of Genesis and the theory of evolution do not 
necessarily conflict. There is abundant room for 
interpretation of the books of the Old Testament that were 
written in light of the rather limited universe of 
knowledge at that time. But we need not get into this in 
this case. 
I do not think the case itself is of vast importance 
because few states would enact comparable legislation. 
But this case will receive enormous publicity, however we 
decide it. inclined tentatively to affirm 
on ground that this particular statute despite the 
"legislative history" - does not have a primary secular 
purpose. But Judge Gee's opinion cannot be brushed aside 
lightly. I therefore will welcome the views of my law 
clerk. 
I believe "comparative religious" courses lawfully 
could be taught in high schools just as they are in 
colleges. My clerk should request the Library to examine 
the catalogs of several colleges. 
LFP, JR. 
To: Justice Powell ks 1//J. I December 5, 1986 
From: Leslie 
No. 85-1513, Edwards v. Aguillard 
The affidavits filed in this case define creation-science 
as "origin through abrupt appearance in complex form." A-19. 
The affidavits then state that creation-science, as thus defined, 
is a scientifically accepted theory of origins. Petrs introduced 
these affidavits to preclude summary judgment. The DC granted 
summary judgment despite the affidavits. Petrs argue that summa-
ry judgment was improper because the affidavits create a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether the Louisiana legislature had a secu-
lar purpose in enacting the statute. 
The proper question appears to be whether the affidavits, 
created 11 '' as they were after enactment of the Louisiana statute, 
page L.. 
fairly put into issue the intention of the , legislatu~e in requir-
jl 
ing that creation-science be taught. There is a st;t ng argument 
that the affidavits demonstrate that creation-science can be con-
sidered secular. If it can, then the legislature arguably had a 
secular purpose in requiring that this aspect of "science" be ----
taught. It would ~ be difficult to write an opinion stating C~ 
that 
1
iummary judgm:n"'i ~ improp::--; iven -;;:--dispu~ed i~e of ~. 
~ 
legislative intent. Such a decision would not define the limits ~-
. · · b~t .. ~ .. /n~ of the Establishment Clause respecting creation-science, u
would remand the case for trial. This Court could then late§rv T~ 
review findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. This 
approach may be most in accord with your position that a court 
should not second guess a legislature's stated secular purpose. 
I will not present the arguments in favor of this result in de-
tail. Instead, I will present the strongest argument in favor of 
affirmance. If you are unconvinced, then a remand is appropriate 
based on the fact that the affidavits fairly put the purpose of 
the legislature in issue. 
The other side of the argument is that post-enactment 
statements made for the purpose of litigation should not put the 




~ ~ as to the purpose of the Louisiana Legislature in enacting the 'S'~ 
~~ statute in the first place. You have expressed skepticism of ~ "'}~ · 
~st-enactment statements as to legislative intent, especially by ~~~ 
Interested parties. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2495 
(1985). These statements create a genuine issue of material fact 
only if they bear on the legislative understanding of creation-
science at the time of enactment. The relevant 
legislative intent are the words of the statute 
tive history. The statute itself does not 
science. Thus, the legislature's definition of 
gleaned from the legislative history. 
page J. 
' 
indiQators of the 
~ 
and l he legisla- 1U> ~ 
define creation~~ 
J•~ 
the term must be~,· 
There is a strong argument that creation-science is a 
term of art. Under normal principles of statutory construction, 
the legislature should be presumed to ascribe the ordinary mean-
ing to such a term. ' \.Creationism':· is ~~ed \ n the dictionary ~~411 ____... - / J. -=--
as "The doctrine ascribing the origin of all matter and living ( / 
forms as the now exist to distinct acts of creation by God." ) 
New American Heritage Dictionary at 311. Since the statute does 
not contain a definition of creationism, it is questionable 
whether the legislature can escape the dictionary definition by 
submitting affidavits after the fact. A lower court has found 
that "concepts concerning .•. a supernatural being of some sort 
are manifestly religious ..• These concepts do not shed that re-
ligiosity merely because they are presented as philosophy or as a 
science ... " Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 (D.N.J. 
1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F. 2d 197 (CA3 1979) • 
. f . 11 ~ .8--C.. Spec1 1ca y, ~a court has found, after an 8-day trial, 
that the four tenets of creation-science are: 
(1) that a divine Creator created the world "from noth-
ing" (ex nihilo); 
(2) that the Creator fashioned distinct "kinds" (or 




( 3) that a "worldwide flood" or ''Deluge" fqrmed fossils 
1 ,., 
and other paleontological and geological phenomena; and 
(4) that the universe had a "relatively recent inception" 
(within the last 10,000 years). 
~ v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1264 
(E.D. Ark. 1982) (quoting Arkansas statute invalidated in that 
case). McLean is cited a number of times in the CAS's decision 
in this case. This case goes into a detailed analysis of the 
na~re ce and its relationship to science. The 
court examined testimony of some of the same witnesses who testi-
fied before the legislature, and who offer the affidavits in this 
case. If the question of whether creation-science is viewed as a 
question of law, then the affidavits offered in this case do not 
preclude summary judgment. This view makes some sense, because 
it would seem odd to require an entire trial each time some group 
contends that creation-science is science. A copy of the McLean 
opinion is attached. 
In addition to McLean, there is authority for the propo-
sition that creation-science is not scientifically accepted. The 
problem is that this evidence is not in the record. The National 
Academy of Sciences has recently stated: ..-----
.. ~.'· 
It is ... our unequivocal conclusion that creationism, 
with its accounts of the origin of life by supernatural 
means, is not science. It subordinates evidence to 
statements based no authority and revelation. Its doc-
umentation is almost entirely limited to the special 
publications of its advocates. 
And its central hypothesis is not subject to change in 
light of new data or demonstrat o rror. Mo eover, 
wh~nce for creationism has been subjected to 
the tests of the scientific method, it has been found 
invalid. National Academy of Sciences, Science and 
-
page !). 
Creationism: A View from the National Academy of Sci-
ences 26 (1984). ,.) 
Although it would be convenient, this statement does not appear 
nc-f~h.-,~k 
to be the proper subject of judicial notice. ~ ~~ 
In contrast, the history of religious fundamentalists' 
efforts to discredit the theory of evolution may well be an ap-
propriate subject of judicial notice. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 
(Q 
393 u.s. 97 (19 ~6}; Crowley v. Smithsonian Institution, 636 F. 
2d 738, 741-743 (CADC 1 9Se>) ; McLean, supra; Wright v. Houston 
Independent School District, 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1209-1211 (S.D. 
Tex. 1972}, aff'd per curiam, 486 F. 2d 137 (CAS 1973}. This 
statute specifically ties the teaching of evolution to the teach-
ing of creation-science. This could well be viewed as an effort 
~
to do indirectly what the Court held could not be accomplished 
directly -- prohibit the teaching of evolution because it con-
flicts with certain religious beliefs. 
The "sequence and history" of a statute's enactment is 
~
probative as to legislative intent. Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2495. 
--------~------~--~--------
Note that the historical sequence of the statute's enactment in 
similar to this case. There, the Court stated: ~~~~~J 
is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction ~A It~ 
was and is the law's reason for existence. Its ante- SZ5il 
cedent, Tennessee's "monkey law," candidly stated its ...Jt. _._~ 1 ~ 1 ' 
purpose: to make it unlawful "to teach any theory that ,...,~f4.1,/ 
denies the story of the Divine Creation of man as k.Ae-4..._..:;
1 taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has __,., ~- /-
descended from a lower class of animals." Perhaps the -, ---~ 
sensational publicity attendant upon the Scopes trial 
induced Arkansas to adopt less explicit language. It 
eliminated Tennessee's reference to "the story of the 
Divine creation of man" as taught in the Bible, by 
there is no doubt that the motivation for the law was ) 
the same: to suppress the teaching of a theory which, 
it was thought, "denied" the divine creation of man. 
page 6. 
393 u.s., at 109. The creation-science tenets listed in the Ar-
~~ 
'·I 
kansas statute invalidated in McLean were originally listed in 
the Louisiana statute as the definition of the phrase "the scien-
tific evidences for creation and inferences form those scientific 
evidences." After suit was filed challenging the Arkansas stat-
ute with the same definition, the definition from the Louisiana 
statute was deleted. According to a committee member, the dele-
tion was "intended to try to produce some good for the bill and 
not intended to try to gut it in any way, or defeat the purpose 
[for] which Senator Keith introduced his bill." Epperson may 
provide authority for the Court to look to the Arkansas statute 
and the decision in McLean to determine the true meaning and mo-
tivation behind the Louisiana statute. 
There is evidence in the legislative history as to the 
religious nature of creation-science, but most of it relates to 
the 1980 version of the bill that contained the four tenets. Ac-
cording to Senator Keith, creation-science "relates ... scientif-
ic origins to a creator," App. E-29, and involves "the truth 
about those evidences that support the concept of special ere-
~ion." App. E-36. Testimony on behalf of the first bill often 
linked creation-science to a "creator." The following are selec-
tions from the ~~islative history} j~J(l) 
It is inherent in the basic tenet of uniformitarian 
evolution that special creation by a supernatural in-
telligence is not only unnecessary, but is not to be 
believed. Furthermore, evolutionists invariably main-
tain that creation is religion 'merely because the only 
basic reference to it is in the Bible.' App. E-130. 
page 7. 
The creation model postulates that all the bas.~c sys-
tems of nature, including elements, stars, B'f!- anets, 
life and the major kinds of organisms, including man, 
were created fully developed by super-natural creative 
processes during a primeval period of special creation, 
following which conservative (rather than creative) 
processes were established to govern the completed cre-
ation. App. E-169. 
1~~ 
~ 
The Institute for Creation Research is working to bring 
about a revival of belief in special creation as the 
true explanation of the origin of the world. the evo-
lutionary philosophy has dominated the world's scien-
tific and political establishments for several genera-
tions, and there is urgent need for our nation to re-
turn to belief in a personal, omnipotent Creator, who 
has a purpose for His creation) nd to whom all people 
must eventually give account. n the past, the cre-
ation concept has been promote mainly on theological 
and moral grounds. ICR, on the other hand, is now 
showing that creation is a better scientific concept 
than evolution for explaining the origin of the world 






Although this testimony was on behalf of the first bill, 17 ,p1!) 
~~--- ' d ' . h h 1 . 1 . not the second, there IS no 1n Ication t at t e egis ature In-
ation theory by deleting the tenets. Dr. Boudreaux who was the 
primary authority to testify on behalf of the second bill, empha-
sized "the number of people today in America alone numbering 
something like a thousand who are members of th~reation Re- ~;;:t( 
search Society who hold doctorate and masters degrees in all  
areas of science and equally affiliates wi~nstitution of Cre-
ation Resear cb ." App. E-503-504. The legislative history con-- ... tains evidence as to the nature of these two creation-science 
organizations. The Institute for Creation Research is an affili-
ate of the Christian Heritage College in San Diego, California. 
The Institute was established to address the "urgent need for our 
page B. 
nation to return to belief in a personal, omnipotent ,Creator, who 
~ 
'I has a purpose for His creation and to whom all people must even-
tually give account." App. E-197. A goal of the ~a 
revival of belief in special creation as the true explanation of 
the origin of the world." Therefore, the Institute concentrates 
on the "development of new methods for teaching scientific 
creationism in public schools." App. E-197-199. The Creation 
Iesearch Society is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. A member 
must subscribe to the following statement of belief: "The Bible 
is the written work of God, and because it is inspired through-
out, all of its assertions are historically and scientifically 
true." App. E-583. T~ study "creation-science" at the Society, 
a member must accept "that the account of origins in Genesis is a 
factual presentation of simple historical truth." App. E-583. 
If it is possible from the legislative history to find 
that the purpose behind the Louisiana statute was to advance re-
ligion, then whether or not there are certain "facts" to support 
. . 
the creation-science view should not matter. The CAS specifical-
ly stated, "We do not deny that the underpinnings of 
creationism may be supported by scientific evidence." The pur-
pose of a legislative action alone can invalidate it. For exam-
ple, a legislature could pass a statute stating that the history 
of Australia not be taught. Absent an invalid purpose, this 
would be within the legislature's domain. But, if a statute pro-
hibiting the teaching of a particular subject is motivated by a 
desire to advance religion, it is constitutionally invalid. 
Epperson, supra. The Court does not have to deny that some sci-
page 9. 
entific evidence may exist to support ·creation-science to find 
·lj 
that the particular statute was motivated by solely l y religious 
concerns. If the motivation was solely religious, then the stat-
ute is invalid. 
Another argument in favor of affirmance is the rule that 
"[w] hen both courts below are unable to find an arguably valid 
secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to find 
one." Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 249 5 (Powell, J. , concurring) • -Moreover, this Court normally "accept [s] a reasonable construe-
tion of state law by the Court of Appeals 'even if an examination 
of the state-law issue without such guidance might have justified 
a different conclusion." Haring v. Prosise, 462 u.s. 306, 314 n. 
8 (1983) (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 346 (1976)). In 
light of the legislative history, the lower court's finding that 
creation-science is inherently a religious concept as embodied in 
the Louisiana statute and thus that the legislature's purpose was 







To: Justice Powell December 5, 1986 
From: Leslie 
No. 85-1513, Edwards v. Aguillard 
~ 
•'j 
You wanted to know whether comparative religion classes or 
Bible study classes were taught in Louisiana universities and 
secondary schools. A number of universities offer such courses. 
v-Northwestern State University of Lo. offers a course in Bible 
history. ~Lo. Tech. offers two courses: History of the Christian 
Church and Philosophy of Religion. ~rambling State University 
offers Philosophy of Religion. ~McNeese State University offers 
"Religions." 'io. State University at Baton Rouge offers seven 
courses: Introduction to Religion, Old Testament, New Testament, 
Faith and Doubt, Jesus in History and Tradition, Eastern 
Religions, Philosophy of Religion . 
...... . 
It is more difficult to determine what courses s~condary 
'I schools offer because they do not have published catalogs and I 
did not want to authorize the library to make phone calls on this 
sensitive subject. There is nothing specifically from Louisiana, 
but there are many general teaching materials that indicate that 
.......... - - ,........ 
many secondary schools offer such courses. For example: The 
Religion in Elementary Social Studies Project presents materials 
for grade 1-6 emphasizing religion in nature, ethnic studies, 
world religions, religion in North America; The Bible in the 
English Program; Teaching the Old Testament in English Classes; 
Comparative World Religions (plan for an elective course for 
grades 7-9); Milcreek Township School District, Erie, Pa. (two-
week comparative religion course for grade 2). 
People for the American Way publish a yearly edition of A 
Consumer's Guide to Biology Textbooks. This guide is published 
in response to the perceived watering-down of biology textbooks 
across the country in response to religious fundamentalists. The 
Guide examines all available secondary biology textbooks and 
makes selected critiques. Let me know if you would like to see 
this. 
RNAL TUESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1986 * * * 



























































By To:vt BETHELL 
Tomorrow the Supreme Court will hear 
oral arguments on the constitutionality of a 
1981 Louisiana law mandating the "bal-
anced treatment" of evolution and "cre-
ation-science." The law says that schools 
do not have to teach anything about the or-
igins of life; but if evolution is to be 
taught, then so must creation-science-un-
derstood to mean evidence for the "sudden 
appearance of highly developed forms of 
life." 
Legal maneuvering to date shows how 
readily the federal courts now exclude reli- ; 
gion from public life. In July 1985 a nar-
rowly divided (8-7) Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that the statute violates the 
establishment clause of the First Amend-
ment because it "would have the effect of 
promoting religion"- hardly what the 
framers had in mind when they proscribed 
religious establishment. 
The Louisiana law makes no reference 
to any specific religious doctrine (such as 
the Flood). The appeals court majority 
noted that "the theory of rreation is a the-
ory embraced by many religions," thereby 
(one would have thought) minimizing the 
likelihood that the statute would tend to 
favor any one religion. The appeals court 
objected that "the scheme of the statute, 
focusing on the bete noire of evolution as it 
does. demonstrates the religious purpose of 
the statute." Thus "self-serving state· 
ments" as to its secular intent made in leg· 
islative hearings could safely be ignored. 
Qualms Expressed 
In an amusing dissent joined in by al-
most half the court, Circuit Judge Thomas 
Gibbs Gee wrote: "I await with interest 
the application of this new mode of consti· 
tutional analysis to other statutes. The big-
amy laws, for example, carry tell-tale indi-
cia of having been passed with a motive 
to favor the Judea-Christian preference for 
monogamy .... Perhaps our court, con-
sulting its intuitive knowledge about what 
motivates legislators, will presently deter-
mine that there can be no secular purpose 
in such a preferment of one model of the 
marital relationship over another." 
Still, one has qualms about the Louisi-
ana law-or any other law that tells 
schools what they must teach. Having 
failed to score the necessary intellectual 
victory, creationists are attempting a 
forced entry into the academic citadel 
with, as it were, police escort. If success-
ful, this will only provoke greater intellec-
tual resistance to their ideas in the fu-
ture. 
The problem stems, I believe, from an 
unwarranted dogmatism about evolution 
that is pervasive in the biology profession. I This, in turn, has driven parents and (no 
doubt about itJ religious groups to pressure 
legislators into providing a legal remedy. 
The Arkansas Legislature acted first, but 
its equal-time law was effectively laughed 
out of court with much guffawing about 
fundamentalists and rednecks, and endless 
jocular references to the Scopes trial. 
We are repeatedly told that evolution is 
"not a theory but a fact." This is little 
more than whistling in the dark. There has 
been a persistent campaign by evolution-
ists to bully the lay public into accepting 
evolution by adopting an authoritarian pos· 
ture inappropriate to science. The fact is 
that we k.!!Q;V ~ry little about evolution-
far less than IriOsf educated people real-
ize. --
-"Colin Patterson, a senior paleontologist 
at the British Museum of Natural History, 
California Supt. Bill 
Honig has been depicted 
as something of a latter-
day Galileo, bravely stand-
ing up to the forces of re-
action. But the truth is 
there is great uncertainty 
about what (if anything) is 
known about evolution. 
remarked at a public lecture in New York 
in 1981 that there was "not one thing" that 
he knew about evolution. "Question is," he 
went on, "can you tell me anything you 
know about evolution, any one thing that is 
true? I tried that question on the geology 
staff of the Field Museum of Natural His-
tory and the only answer I got was si-
lence." 
I so quoted him in a Harper's m~azine 
article in February 1985, 'and Mr.atter-
son seems not to have recanted the heresy. 
In a recent issue of the Creation I Evolution 
Newsletter, he writes: "The awful ques-
tion: 'can you tell me anything you know 
about evolution ... ' Well, I still think it's 
a reasonable one." 
In the Louisiana case Dean Kenyon, a 
professor of biology at San Francisco State 
University, has submitted an affidavit in 
which he attests to his belief "that a scien-
tifically sound creationist view of origins is 
not only possible, but is to be preferred 
over the evolutionary view." 
Mr. Kenyon, who has a doctorate in bio-
physics from Stanford University, is the 
author of a 1969 book, "Biochemical Pre-
destination." He taught undergraduate 
courses on evolution and the Darwinian 
revolution to undergraduates at San Fran-
cisco State, but he was reassigned appar-
ently when he began to raise questwns 
about the subject. 
Another professor who has raised ques-
tions about evolution is G. Lawrence Van-
kin of Williams College, in Massachusetts. 
According to Mr. Vankin, after he assigned 
to his students two articles from the presti-
gious Journal of Theoretical Biology that 
questioned the plausibility of evolution by J 
random processes, the Williams biology 
department told the library to cancel its 
subscription to the journal. Mr. Vankin 
was subsequently reassigned to the col-
lege's history of science department. 
In conversations with me, more than 
one professional staff member at the 
American Museum of Natural History in 
New York has expressed frustration at the 
dogmatism and aiilllOi'iTaflaiilsffifharsatu-
tare evolutionary biology. One day Gareth 
~an of the ichthyology 
department at the museum, characterized 
the typical paleontologist's search for an-
cestral species in the rocks as follows: 
" 'We've got to have some ancestors. We'll 
pick those.' 'Why?' 'Because we know they 
have to be there, and these are the best 
candidates.' That's by and large the way it 
has worked. I am not exaggerating." 
'Controversial' Issue 
In light of such comments, there is a 
certain irony l!L!!cent decisions, both by 
the Texas and the Cahfornia state boards 
of education, to reject science textbooks 
on the ground tlfat they "water down..,. in-
str':f£@n on evo(ullon. Ill Cahforma thil su-
permtendent of public instruction, Bill 
Honig, has been depicted as something of a 
latter-day Galilee, bravely standing up to 
the forces of reaction by insisting that "we 
must send a message to the publishing in-
dustry that we cannot tiptoe around cer-
tain subjects just because they are contro-
versial." New texts will be more assertive 
about evolution than were their predeces-
sors, and perhaps ultimately more mis-
leading for that reason. Nonetheless, Mr. 
Honig vows: "We are going to establish 
policy for the rest of the country." 
Mr. Honig's use of the word "controver-
sial" suggests that we must not shrink 
from the truth just because some parents 
don't like it. But the truth is that there is 
gr~nytmngJ 
is -lai'UW_..__ at.Q!!! evol_!!l.jon. ose who em- ~ 
br'lrCeCOriTfoversy should be fearless in 
pointing this out. Louisiana's unsatisfac-
tory "balanced treatment" law and the le-
gal contest surrounding it show what can 
happen when we too timidly submit to sci-
entific authoritarianism. 
Mr. Bethell, a media fellow at the Hoo-
ver lnslilulion and a contrilmtor to the 
American Spectator, has been at work on 
a book about evolution. 
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Tomorrow the Supreme Court will hear 
oral arguments on the constitutionality of a 
1981 Louisiana law mandating the "bal-
anced treatment" of evolution and "cre-
ation-science." The law says that schools 
do not have to teach anything about the or-
igins of life; but if evolution is to be 
taught, then so must creation-science-un-
derstood to mean evidence for the "sudden 
appearance of highly developed forms of 
life." 
Legal maneuvering to date shows how 
readily the federal courts now exclude reli-
, gion from public life. In July 1985 a nar-
rowly divided (8-7) Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that the statute violates the 
establishment clause of the First Amend-
ment because it "would have the effect of 
promoting religion"-hardly what the 
framers had in mind when they proscribed 
religious establishment. 
The Louisiana law makes no reference 
to any specific religious doctrine (such as 
the FloodJ. The appeals court majority 
noted that ''the theory of creation is a the· 
ory embraced by many religions,·· thereby 
(one would have thought) minimizing the 
likelihood that t.he statute would tend to 
favor any one religion. The appeals court 
objected that "the scheme of the statute, 
focusing on the bete noire of.evolution as it 
does, demonstrates the religious purpose of 
the statute." Thus "self-serving state· 
ments" as to its secular intent made in leg-
islative hearings could safely be ignored. 
Qualms Expressed 
In an amusing dissent joined in by al· 
most half the court, Circuit Judge Thomas 
Gibbs Gee wrote: "I await with interest 
the application of this new mode of consti-
tutional analysis to other statutes. The big-
amy laws, for example, carry tell-tale indi-
cia of having been passed with a motive 
to favor the Judea-Christian preference for 
monogamy .... Perhaps our court, con-
sulting its intuitive knowledge about what 
motivates legislators, will presently deter-
mine that there can be no secular purpose 
in such a preferment of one model of the 
marital relationship over another." 
Still, one has qualms about the Louisi-
ana law-or any other law that tells 
schools what they must teach. Having 
failed to score the necessary intellectual 
victory, creationists are attempting a 
forced entry into the academic citadel 
with, as it were, police escort. If success-
ful, this will only provoke greater intellec-
tual resistance to their ideas in the fu-
ture. 
The problem stems, I believe. from an 
unwarranted dogmatism about evolution 
that is pervasive in the biolog-y profession . 
This, in turn. has driven p trent:; and 1 no 
doubt about itl religious groups to pressure 
legislators into providing a legal remedy. 
The Arkansas Legislature acted first, but 
its equal-time law was effectively laughed 
out of court with much guffawing about 
fundamentalists and rednecks, and endless 
jocular references to the Scopes trial. 
We are repeatedly told that evolution is 
"not a theory but a fact." This is little 
more than whistling in the dark. There has 
been a persistent campaign by evolution-
ists to bully the lay public into accepting 
evolution by adopting an authoritarian pos-
ture inappropriate to science. The fact is 
that we know very little about evolution-
far less than most educated people real-
ize. 
Colin Patterson, a senior paleontologist 
at the British Museum of Natural History, 
California Supt. Bill 
Honig has been depicted 
as something of a latter-
day Galileo, bravely stand-
ing up to the forces of re-
action. But the truth is 
there is great uncertainty 
about what (if any thing) is 
known about evolution. 
remarked at a public lecture in New York 
in 1981 that there was "not one thing" that 
he knew about evolution. "Question is," he 
went on, "can you tell me anything you 
know about evolution, any one thing that is 
true? I tried that question on the geology 
staff of the Field Museum of Natural His-
tory and the only answer I got was si-
lence." 
I so quoted him in a Harper's magazine 
article in February 1985, and Mr. Patter-
son seems not to have recanted the heresy. 
In a recent issue of the Creation I Evolution 
Newsletter, he writes: "The awful ques-
tion: 'can you tell me anything you know 
about evolution ... · Well, I still think it's 
a reasonable one." 
In the Louisiana case Dean Kenyon, a 
professor of biology at San Francisco State 
University, has submitted an affidavit in 
which he attests to his belirf "that a scien-
tifically sound creationist view of origins is 
not only possible. but is to be prf'ferred 
over the evolutionary view." 
Mr. Kenyon, who has a doctorate in bio-
physics from Stanford Umversity, IS the 
author of a 1969 book. "Biochemical Pre-
destination." He taught undergraduate 
courses on evolution and the Darwinian 
revolution to undergraduates at San Fr.tn· 
cisco State, but hr was rPas~igned .q P.u·-
ently when he began to raise questions 
about the subject. 
Another professor who has raised ques-
tions about evolution is G. Lawrence Van-
kin of Williams College, in Massachusetts. 
According to Mr. Vankin, after he assigned 
to his students two articles from the presti-
gious Journal of Theoretical Biolog-y that 
questioned the plausibility of evolution by 
random processes. the Williams biology 
department told the library to cancel its 
subscription to the journal. Mr. Vankin 
was subsequently reassigned to the col-
lege's history of science department. 
In conversations with me, more than 
one professional staff member at the 
American Museum of Natural History in 
New York has expressed frustration at the 
dogmatism and authoritarianism that satu-
rate evolutionary biology. One day Gareth 
Nelson, the chairman of the ichthyology 
department at the museum, characterized 
the typical paleontologist's search for an-
cestral species in the rocks as follows: 
" 'We've got to have some ancestors. We'll 
pick those.' ·Why?' 'Because we know they 
have to be there, and these are the best 
candidates.· That's by and large the way it 
has worked. I am not exaggerating." 
'Controversial' Issue 
In light of such comments, there is a 
certain irony in recent decisions, both by 
the Texas and the California state boards 
of education. to reject science textbooks 
on the ground that they "water down" in-
struction on evolution. In California the su-
perintendent of public instruction. Bill 
Honig, has been depicted as something of a 
latter-day Galileo, bravely standing up to 
the forces of reaction by insisting that ··we 
must send a message tc •.he publishing in-
dustry that we cannot ptoe around cer-
tain subjects just becau~e they are contro-
versial." New texts will be more assertive 
about evolution than were their predeces-
sors, and perhaps ultimately more mis-
leading for that reason. Nonetheless. Mr. 
Honig vows: "We arf\ going to establish 
policy for the rest of t)le country." 
Mr. Honig's use of u·e word "controver-
sial" suggests that Wt must not shrink 
from the truth just bec,~use some parents 
don't like it. But the tn~th is that there is 
great uncertainty about. what (if anything) 
is known about evoluti.\n. Those who em-
brace controversy sho1uld be fearless in 
pointing this out. Louisiana's unsatisfac-
tory "balanced treatmP ~t" law and the le-
gal contest surroundil ; it show what can 
happen when we too ti 1idly submit to sci-
entific authoritarianis d. 
Mr. Belilell, a 1ne1t 1 fellow at tile Hoo-
L'f'r lnstitution llnli ll 'contributor to tile 
American Spectator, il1 tS been 111 1rurk on 
11 book llhout f!L'u/ution .• 
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Edwards v. Aguillard Outline for Conference 
I. Summary Judgment was appropriate 
A. The question of legislative purpose is a question of law 
for the court. 
B. The relevant indicators of legis~tive purpose are the 
words and structure of t~ statute and th~legislative history. -- -C. Affidavits created after the statute's enactment by 
interested parties do not raise a genuine issue of material fact 
as to the question of the legislature's intent. 
II. On the merits, this statute fails the first "purpose" prong 
of the Lemon test. 
A. The words of the Act require that the scientific 
evidences supporting creation-science be taught -- the Act does 
not define creation-science. The common dictionary meaning of 
"creationism" refers to creation by~ng. 
B. The legislative history of the 1980 version of the Act 
demonstrates that creation-science, as understood by the 
legislature, is a discipline designed to support a religious 
belief; the legislative history of the 1981 version of the Act 
does not indicate a change in the fundamentally religious nature 
of creation-science as understood by the legislature. 
C. The sequence and history of an Act's enactment is 
probative as to legislative intent. This Act originally 
contained 4 religious tenets to define creation-science. These 
were removed only after an identical Arkansas statute was 
challenged. The Arkansas case (McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ.) 
is instructive. A£ter a I O=day trial, the DC determined that 
creation-science is fundamentally religious. Many of the same 
individual~ testified in support of the Arkansas statute who 
would testify in support of this Act. 
D. The history of the opposition for religious reasons to 
the teaching of evolution is sub'ect to judicial notice. E.g., 
Epperson v. Arkansas. The structure of t e c 1ndicates not 
only an intent to teach creation-science, but an intent to 
counter the teaching of evolution. 
E. These facts indicate that the Louisiana legislature 
wanted the scientific evidences of creation-science taught in the 
public schools solely for the purpose of advancing a particular 
religious belief. 
III. The inquiry in this case must focus on the intent of this 
particular legislature. ~ 
'1 
A. Public schools are free to teach facts that tend to 
support certain religious beliefs if there is a demonstrable 
secular purpose for teaching the material. 
B. Courses on the Bible or on comparative religion are 
constitutionally permissible so long as they are offered for a 
literary or historic purpose and not primarily to advance a 
particular religious belief. 
C. The history and structure of this particular Act 
indicate that the legislature sought to advance the theory of 
creation-science and discredit the theory of evolution for a 
solely religious reason. This religious purpose renders the Act 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. 
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If you think the justices of the 
Supreme Court lack a sense of humor, 
consider this: last Wednesday, they 
bent their learned ears to a whole 
hour's discussion of ·"creation sci· 
ence." 
It came about because, in 1981, the 
Louisiana legislature passed a law , 
requiring high school biology classes 
to teach that pseudoscience alongside 
' standard evolutionary theory. Crea-
tionists believe that the Book of Gen-
esis offers the same sort of informa .. 
'· tion you might find in a biology 
textbook-albeit stated in different 
terms, with sharply different· coriclu· 
. sions. , , 
. But the Louisiana law represents 
progress of a sort. Louisiana anti-evo· 
lutionists have apparently given up 
trying to cut modern biological teach-
ing out of the curriculum. But in 
exchange, they insist that creationism 
be taught as an alternative "science."• 
There might be little constitutional 
harm in informing biology students 
that some people entertain remark· 
ably odd beliefs about the origins of 
life. As creationists view the matter, a 
witty Creator coined many thousands 
of finished and immutable life forms 
' during a single October afternoon 
, about 4,000 years ago, mankind 
among them. Then, to snare sinners, 
this crafty Creator rigged a mislead· 
' ing 'fossil record to suggest to errant 
eyes a very different course of natural 
history. 
This seems odd? Well, say creation 
scientists, Darwinism is, after all, only 
a theory. Right. "Only" is the catch. 
All scientific propositions are "theo-
ries," provisional in Lhe sense that all 
are subject to revision in the light of 
new findings. But the expanding fron· 
tiers of science, microbiology and as· 
· trophysics confirm, rather than con-
found. lht' t>vol1!thn1rv thPorv 
The problem for creationists is not 
intellectual. but emotionaL Scratch a 
creationist ·and you find someone 
who's insulted to be associated with 
"lower" animals. True to form, a 
sponsor of the Louisiana law was 
quoted as warning: "If you teach chit· ' 
dren that they're evolved from apes, . 
then they will start acting like apes." . 
, That is not what Darwinian theory 
; ·teaches, but. what if it did? One re· 
grettable consequence of the anti· 
. . evolutionary frenzy· has been to slan-
1 der other animals, the better to but-
tress a theory of. the natural goodness' 
'of mankind, This theory is curiously! 
antithetical to Biblical teaching about • 
the sinfulness of flesh and often re-
quires the unlearning of cruel super· 
stition about our fellow creatures. 
· In England, a small boy recently fell! 
over a fence at a zoo into a pen of\ 
' giant gorillas. Onlookers held their! 
breath as the animals gathered beside' 
the unconscious child. Then, to their 
relief, one of the apes began to caress 
it as tenderly as if it had been one of' ' 
its own offspring. Tarzan, it would• 
seem, could tell creationists a thing orl 
two about the "lower" animals. 
The ~ob of Supreme Court justices 
can be diverting. It would be more so 
if the court were a scientific debating 
club. That's the way it sounded dur· 
ing the arguments over the Louisiana 
law, but the court's role is more 
prosaic. It has tQ decide whether Lou· 
isiana's "balanced teaching" law falls 
afoul of the Establishment Clause by 
implicating the state in the propaga· 
' tion of particular religious views, 
To casU<ll onlookers, the answ~J. 
seems obvious. It is hard to imagine 
how "creation science" could be 
taught (except as an intellectual curi· 
' osity) without placing the state in the 
position of indoctrinating students. 
Isn't that the whole point? And as a 
probing question by Justice Powell 
• suggested, it would be hard to moni-
tor the teaching of "creation science" 
for signs ·of indoctrination without an 
"entanglement" of church and state, 
which, according to prevailing judicial 
doctrine, is a no·no. . 
.It is one 9f the glories of this 
republic that people may believe, and 
teach their children, any fool thing 
they ·tike-even creation science. 
What they can't do, so far, and 
shouldn't be allowed to do, is compel 
schools to teach religious faith in the 
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Religion: It Should Be Taught 
CREATIONISTS and conservative textbook promoters across the country are calling attention to a study prepared by one of their 
traditional adversaries. People for the American 
Way, an advocacy organization concerned with 
preserving the separation of church and state, 
produced the report that gives some comfort to 
those who are often on the other side of a 
courtroom battle. Although the organization and 
the religious right strongly disagree about almost 
everything, neither disputes an important point 
made in the study: the treatment of religion as a 
force in U.S. history continues to receive short 
shrift in the schools. 
We were reminded of this conclusion when we 
first read an article by Kenneth Daniel that was 
published in t~y. Mr. Dan· 
iel, a computer scientist who lives in Arlington, 
wrote that his 5-year-old son brought home from 
school a newsletter dealing with December holiday 
traditions. The entire newsletter contained not a 
single mention of Christmas. Is it now public policy, 
Mr. Daniels asked, not to mention religious holidays 
in the public schools? If so, he argued, it is an 
unwise decision from a secular point of view, since it 
will provide children with an incomplete, even a 
distorted understanding of history. 
People for the American Way would agree. That 
organization's study of th~ history textbooks used in 
American schools revealed that religion is hardly 
mentioned at all. The absence of any discussion of a 
subject that has motivated, inspired and, at times, 
torn apart important elements of the population is 
ridiculous. The five-member panel of historians and 
educators who reviewed these books believe that 
publishers may be reluctant to allow any mention of 
religion for fear of alienating a single religious group 
or upsetting civil libertarians who would object to 
the kind of indoctrination the creationists, for exam-
ple, would impose. But neither reaction would be 
justified if educational material presented straight-
forward accounts of the country's various religious 
traditions and the impact they have had on Ameri-
can history. 
A student who has no curiosity about the beliefs 
of others will never be an educated person. This 
doesn't mean that public institutions should pro· 
mote a particular set of religious beliefs, encourage 
religious observance or practice, or indoctrinate 
children in a creed or dogma. But school systems 
that seek to avoid controversy by ignoring religion 
entirely are shortchanging the public and the stu· 
dents. They are not helping to conquer ignorance, 
but perpetuating it. 
To: 
From: Leslie 
No. 85-1513, Edwards v. Aguillard 
a-''~, ... ? 
Cert. to CAS (Brown, Politz, Jolly} 
(Gee, Clark, Reavley, Garwood, Higgenbotham, Hill, Jones, 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane} 
Wednesday, Dec. 10, 1986 (first argument) 
I. Summary 
The question presented in this case is whether a 
Louisiana statute that requires that if a public school 




.JTe give balanced treatment to 
11 
the Establishment Clause of the 
-
II. Background 
In 1981, the Louisiana legislature enacted th ~ "Bal-
anced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science 
Act." La. Rev. Stat. §17:286.1 et ~- The Balanced Treat-
ment Act provides: 
[P] ublic schools < i thin [the] state 'shall .. give 
balanced treatment to cr ea~ion-sc tence arur-to ~0-
lution,.:_§.cience. Balance~treatment of these two 
models shall be given i~lass~m lectures taken 
as a whole for each course, in~x~ok materials 
taken as a whole for each course, i~ibrary mate-
rials taken as a whole for the scien~ and taken 
~ a whole for the humanities, and i~ther educa-
tional programs in public schools, to the extent 
that such lectures, textbooks, library materials, 
or educational programs deal in anl y y wi th_ the 
su · f t r' in of an, 11re , the earth, or 
the universe. When creation or evo ution is 
taught, each shall b t u t s a ''theory·: rather 
than as proven scientific fact . .... 
Id. at §17:286.4. "Balanced treatment" means "providing 
whatever information and instruction in both creation and 
evolution models the1~lassroom teacher determines is neces-
sary and appropriate to provide insight into both theories 
in view for the textbooks and other instructional materials 
' ~ creati' on-sci' enc ... ,e" d~_L~-_.~ 1 -available for use in his classroom." -~----~ 
means "the scientific evidences for creation and inferences 
. , '-l 
from those scientific evidences." Evolution-science" means 
"the scientific evidences for evolution and inferences from 
those scientific evidences." The Act further provides: 
No~r in public elementary or secondary 
school or instructor in any state-supported uni-
ve iana, who choosestobe a---cre-
a~ or to teach scienti IC data w Ich 
points to creationism shall, for that reason, be 
discriminated against in any way by a ny school 




A _)e - • • •- ' • ,.e-------? ---~..-t~ 
La. Rev. Stat. §286.4.C. 
Appellants are state officials. Appellees a~~ indi-
'd 1 ~- 1' h 1 h d h . v1 ua pub 1c sc oo teac ers, parents, an ot er Interested 
ind i v i d u a 1 s . Appellees brought suit in DC (E.D. La., 
Duplantier, J.) challenging 
V' 
Act. The DC granted summary 
the constitutionality of the 
~~1~c2d"· 
judgment. The CAS affirmed. 
~ 
The State contended that the purpose and effect of the Act 
is to promote academic freedom. But the CAS disagreed. 
The CAS found that "irrespective of whether it is fully sup-
r:orted by scientific evidence, the theory of creation is a 
religious belief." It found that the Act does not promote 
academic freedom because it in fact removes a teacher's dis- ~~ --------------· " 
cretion to teach what he chooses. The CAS found that the 
" { 
Act was to discredit evolution 
1/ 
by requiring the teaching of creation-science, a religious --,, belief. It therefore concluded that the Act violates the 
Establishment Clause. 
Judge Gee, joined by six other judges, dissented 
from the denial of rehearing en bane. The dissent recog-
nized that the Act was advocated by religious people, but 
concluded that the result was "modest" and did not violate 
the Constitution. It found that the affidavits proffered by 
appellants established that there are two bona fide views of 
creation, and the Louisiana statute merely requires that 
both be taught. The dissent criticized the panel opinion 
{ 
~~ 
for "mak[ing] a farce of the judicial exercise of discerning ~~ 
/t legislative intent." The dissent argues that the panel went ~ .. 
l_ TM:<- w ~~-~t...l- R>J ~ t9j ~ . 
JM-~·~-11-Vz.~~r-r~, ~~~·. 
behind a neutral statute and invalidated it on the qasis of 
a presumed intent. According to the dissent, "After ,~ today, 
it does not suffice to teach the truth; one must also teach 
it with the approved motive." The dissent thus would have 
} \ "" found that the Act had a secular purpose and did not violate ----the Establishment Clause. 
III. Analysis 
Appellants first argue that the DC's entry of summa-
ry judgment was erroneous because the DC failed to accept as 
true the uncontroverted affidavits proffered. The crux of 
their argument is that the DC did not accept the statements 
\ 
in the affidavits that creation-science is scientific and 
not religious. It appears, however, that the DC accepted 
II ~I 
the facts in the affidavits as true. The CAS accepted the 
allegation that 's cientific evidence '' supported the theory of 
creationism. This is a ' tactual allegatio~ that must be ac-
cepted as true on a summary judgment motion. The CAS never-
J( "' 
theless found that the theory is relig.!_ous. Although the 
affidavits state that the theory is not religious, this 
would appear to be a legal judgment under the Establishment 
~
Clause, similar to a judgment that an action was a proximate 
cause in tort law, that is proper for a court to make on the 
basis of the facts in uncontroverted affidavits. Moreover, 
the basic question involves statutory interpretation which --.. 
involves questions of the court. 
thus appears proper. 
A.) c.. 
~~1-uL­














On the merits, the proper inquiry in this pase is 
of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 60 ~ , 612-
613 (1971}: 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect 
must be one that neither advances not inhibits 
religion, ... ; finally, the statue must not foster 
'an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion. ' 
The focus in this case is on the @~ -- whether the 
statute has a secular legislative purpose. 
Appellants' argument, condensed and paraphrased, is 
-----------
that creation-science is a science, and that a statute that 
merely requires that scientific truth be taught has the ob-
vious secular purpose of promoting academic freedom. Affi-
davits from creation-scientists support appellants' argument 
that creation-science is science. Numerous portions of the 
legislative history support appellants' argument that the -------------- __. 
purpose of the statute is academic freedom. --
There are two methods to question the allegedly sec-
ular purpose of the statute. First, one may look behind the 
legislature's articulated purpose to determine if it is gen-
uine. As you and Justice O'Connor have explicitly recog-
nized, "[A] law will not pass constitutional muster if the 
secular purpose articulated by the legislature is merely a 
'sham.'" Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2494 (1985). 
In this case, both the panel and the dissenters recognized 
i l I' 
that there was a great deal of religious motivation behind 




noted that a statute need not be devoid of religious , motiva-
t ion. You have stated that yot wo u l=..d.:.:__...:.:u~p...:ch:...:oc..:;l=-=d"--'a;;;,._"-s ...:.t..::a..;::.t...;;q4~ :...:e=---- t hat I L1 Jl-1.-
has a "clear secular purpose," even if that secular purpose r 
is not exclusive. Id. 
------ ---
Here, the articulated purpose -- to advance academic 
freedom -- is secular. Under one view the Act achieves that 
end in a facially valid manner by requiring that more, rath-
er than less, information be presented to school children. 
One problem with this view is that in no other instance does r 
the legislature mandate what theories within a single disci-
pline must be taught. This deviation renders the legisla-
ture's articulated purpose suspect. In fact, the religious 
,, •' 
p.trpose of the Act is obvious from the legislative history 
and from the general tenets of creationists. Thus, the only 
1-..-----~----------
question is whether the Act has a secular purpose in addi-
tion to the religious purpose. 
The articulated secular purpose does not appear 
clearly supported by the mandate of the statute: by requir-
ing equal time for two theories and by in fact labeling the 
~~ two theories as competing, the legislature appears to have 
~
7
Z.~~-J. diminished academic freedom by reducing the discretion of 
~~sch~ol boards and individual teachers to choose their cur-
~ riculum. ------1'Ul~ [ science 
( teachers 
Moreover, the Act protects teachers of creation-
from discharge, but does not similarly protect 
of evolution-science. Thus, the Act is not truly 
its purpose. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), 
y~ 
thi~Court held that a state may not constitutionally forbid 
' 
the teaching of evolution because the theory confliqi s with 
certain religious beliefs. Where a statute treats creation-
scientists more favorably than evolution-scientists, espe-
cially in the area of pr?tection from discharge for their 
teachings, it appears that the State may be attempting to 
achieve indirectly what it cannot do directly. It can also 
be argued that the Act's purpose is to deter the teaching of 
evolution-science by placing on it the unpalatable condition 
of balanced treatment to a scientifically unaccepted theory. 
Finally, you have previously found it of "critical impor-
tance that neither the District Court nor the Court of Ap-
peals found a secular purpose, while both agreed that the 
purpose was to advance religion." Id. at 2495. In this 
case, a finding that there was no secular legislative pur-
pose is supported by the findings of the lower courts. 
The the purpose of the Act 
is to assume that the legislature's articulated intent to 
increase academic freedom is genuine, but to determine 
whether it is nevertheless constitutional. The Establish-
ment Clause imposes a substantive 1 imi t on the extent to 
which the legislature can promote academic freedom. The 
legislature could not require that schools teach the "truth" 
about the Holy Trinity. Perhaps a more analogous example 
would be a statute that required that all facts supporting 
the literal truth of the Christmas story or the parting of 
the Red Sea be presented to school children along with evi-
r\_ 
dence that stars generally do not shine directly o~er sta-
bles or seas part. These statutes would have the vir~tue of 
presenting more, rather than less, information to school 
children. But, these statutes would appear to be unconsti-
tutional. The difficulty in this case is that appellants 
have labeled the information consistent with a certain reli-
gious belief as "science" and have offered affidavits sup-
porting this position. Since "science" is secular, appel-
lants argue that the statute has a secular purpose. 
I l 
The second determination is thus w_hether cr-eation-
~
\.... ' ' '"' science can properly be labeled a part of secular science or 
... , ,, 
whet~!__is intr~ic~y~igious. Here, it is impor-
tant to separate the pieces of scientific evidence from the 
theory itself. Almost every theory is supported by some 
7~ 
9 /.J- .._ f- c,.......> 
~---:- ,_,. 7 
~·
evidence, but this does not make it scientifically accepted. /.9-0 ~ ? 
Public schools generally teach scientifically accepted mate- / 
~ 
Creation-science is not scientifically accepted. --rial. 
This does not mean that there is any constitutional prohibi-
tion against its being taught. 
wide discretion in choosing 
States ani! ..J~litr~,.s have 
the school curriculum. But 
where a State chooses to require by statute that all schools 
teach a particular "scientific" theory which is not accepted 
by the scientific community, the motivation behind the stat-
ute is at least suspect. I t '' Creationism stems from the Bible. 
. . ~ \. . . 
The B1ble lS a rellglOUS "' book and is only one of - many reli-
gious books. ---- Appellants refer to creation-science, but what they really seek to have taught are the facts that support a 





certain biblical theory. Yet if teaching theories that are 
not scientifically accepted is to be justified on tn~ basis 
of increasing academic freedom, there is no logical stopping 
point. Thus, the only apparent reason for the State to dis-
tinguish between creation-science and any other theory sup-
ported by some evidence is the link between creation-science 
and religious belief. Viewed in this light, the State's 
purpose is to advance religion in general, and the beliefs 
of a specific religious sect in particular. This motivation 
violates the Establishment Clause. 
It is important to distinguish the "study of reli-
gions and of the Bible from a literary and historic view-
---------------------------pgint, presented objectively as part of a secular program of - -------------- "- ·---- .__ ----------------------
education," which may be constitutionally permissible, with 
"programs or practices" adopted to "aid or oppose" religion 
in general or a particular religion. Epperson v. Arkansas, 
393 u.s. 97, 106 (1968). Religious beliefs can be presented 
as part of a curriculum if they are identified as such and 
if they serve some other educational purpose, literary or 
historic. But they cannot be presented in the guise of sci-
ence for the purpose of furthering religious belief. Thus, 
t L 1\ 
a survey__course on comparative religion or a literature 
-~-- ----.. --
class that included the Bible could be permissible in public - --
schools whereas the teaching of creation-science may not. 
The CAS did not go beyond the first prong of the 
Lemon test, and there does not appear to be a reason for 
this Court to do so. Moreover, the "purpose" and "effect" 
tests are closely related: if the Court is unwiLling to 
find a purpose to advance religion by requiring the t~aching 
of creation-science, it is unlikely to find a religious ef-
feet. Similarly, the entanglement issue depends on whether 
creation-science is viewed as religious or scientific. 
IV. Conclusion ~ 
/' 
Summary judgment in this case appears proper because 
the decision that creation-science is religious is a !_ega~ 
judgment. On the merits, the question is whether the Bal-
.._--- 1__ 
~ 0 
anced Treatment Act ~ a sesular legislative purpose. The 
articulated purpose is to increase academic freedom. When 
examined, it appears that the Act does not increase academic 
freedom but instead limits teachers' discretion to choose ~-
the ~ienti_0.c m~al to _!>e ~ught. Moreover, the special 
treatment of one theory within a discipline is suspicious, 
especially when the theory is not generally accepted and 
supports a particular religious belief. This special treat-
ment leads to an inference that the purpose of the Act is 
religious. Consequently, the Act violates the Establishment 
Clause. 
To: Justice Powell November 25, 1986 
From: Leslie 
No. 85-1513, Edwards v. Aguillard 
You asked me to determine how books are selected in 
Louisiana. It is the constitutional duty of the Legislature 
to "provide of the education of the people of the state and 
[to] establish and maintain a public educational system." 
La. Const. Art. 8, §1. Specifically, the Legislature "shall 
appropriate funds to supply free school books and other 
material so instruction prescribed by the State Board of 
Elementary and Secondary Education to the children of th[e] 
state at the elementary and secondary levels." La. Const. 
Art. 8, §13. The Legislature has the ultimate power to 
prescribe courses of study for the state's schools. Thus, 
-· 
(4-1~~) ; 
the Balanced Treatment Act does not unconstitutionally usurp 
~ ' the powers of the State or local school boards. Agui Ulard 
v. Treen, 440 So. 2d 704 (La. 1983). See also Faul v. 
Superintendent of Education, 367 So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 3d 
Cir. 1979) (state statute that mandates the teaching of 
French in public ~chools does not usurp the powers of the 
local school boards). 
The Constitution also creates the State Board of 
Elementary and Secondary Education. Its purpose is to 
-------------- :2---..... 
"supervise and control the public elementary and secondary 
schools, vocational-technical training and special schools 
under its jurisdiction." La. Const. Art. 8, §3. The Board 
consists of eleven members, who serve overlapping terms of 
six years. The duties of the Board include, "prescribling] 
---~
and adopt[ing] free school bo9ks and other materials of 
~ 
instruction for the children of th[e] state at the 
elementary and secondary levels and all other schools and 
programs under its jurisdiction for which the legislature 
provides funds, in accordance with law" and "prepar [ingl and r.~ 
adopt[ing] or approv[ing] courses of study and rules, by- ~~ 
!L~'' ---
laws, and regulations for the discipline of students and for 
the government of the public elementary and secondary 
schools and other public schools and programs under its 
jurisdiction, which shall not be inconsistent with law and 
which shall be enforced by the parish and city school boards 
and the parish and city superintendents." Because Louisiana 
has a central commission that chooses the text books for the -----
. ' 
entire state, it is known as an "~doption" .st~ 




the local school boards are vested with the authority to 
choose the text books. There are 22 adoption states. It is 
--~ 
unclear exactly how many books for a certain grade and 
subject that the State Board approves. It has the authority 
to prescribe an exclusive book for each grade and subject. 
Customarily, however, the 6 a !_e ~oar~d~t-~-!i_st of ~ ~ V ~ 1 
s~~ 
app~e~te~ oks and the superintendent of the parish ~
school board chooses from the list. Op. Atty. Gen. 1942-44, -~ 
le-d- . p. 266. 
The Constitution also provides for the creation of 
parish school boards and directs the Legislature to provide 
for the election of the members. La. Const. Art. 8, §9. 
Parish school boards generally have all necessary powers not 
entrusted to the Legislature or the State Board. 
Specifically, they set up the schools, hire and fire 
teachers, set taxes, hold meetings, discipline students, 
etc. Their authority to choose text books and the course 
study is limited by the rules of the Legislature and the 
State Board. X y 
I know that this case presents a particularly 
problem for you, because you have consistently emphasized 
that "the States and locally elected school boards should 
have the responsibility for determining the educational 
policy of the public schools." Board of Education v. Pico, 
457 U.S. 853 (1982). I~ you strongly dissented from 
~Y""" ~ f ~-~o  
~~~~~ 
' the Court's holding that local school boards could not 
i, 
exercise their discretion in a "narrowly partisan or ''I 
political manner" and remove books from the school libraries 
because of the ideas in them. In this case it is the state 
legislature, not the local school board, that made the 
relevant educational decision. Although you have pointed 
out the "uniquely local and democratic" character of local 
school boards, this does not appear determinative. You 
would accord great discretion also to a State in choosing 
its educational policy. Another problem for you is that you 
accord great deference to a Legislature's stated purpose in 
enacting a statute. You have stated that if a statute has a 
secular purpose, even if it also has a religious purpose, 
l-IA- ~. 
c.~ 
you will not invalidate it under the Establishment Clause. 
~~-/~. 
school &A.-w~ Despite the great discretion afforded States and '\,. . 
boards, there · is one overriding limitation -- the 
Constitution. States and local school boards cannot 
~~prescribe an educational policy that constitutes an 
establishment of religion. The ~estiqq in this case is 
whether you think that the purpose behind the Louisiana 
statute can fairly be said to be religious, not secular. 






pointed out in the previous memo, it is difficult to make 
J(~1· this finding from the legislative history, because the 
-~ 
~ history carefully refers only to the secular purpose of 
~~·n reasing academic freedom. To get around the stated 
~· 
purpo and to find the statute to have a religious purpose, 
rv j 
appears that you must be willing to find that creation-
I 
science is inherently religious. Instead ot getting into 
~ "= -------- --- · ~ · ~I 
the morass of analyzing the legislative history and d~lling 
the stated legislative history a "sham," you could find that 
even if the Legislature genuinely wanted to promote academic 
----··~----·~-~~---·~----
freedom, it cannot constitutionally do so in this way. By 
---~- ---·~-
looking at the nature of creation-science, you could find 
that the only purpose of the statute could be to mandate the 
teaching of facts consistent with a particular religious 
viewpoint. 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell January 8, 1987 
From: ' Leslie 
No. 85-1513, Edwards v. Aguillard 
I have not forgotten that you asked me to draft a 
concurrence in this case. I have spoken to Justice Brennan's 
clerk who says that he (the clerk) has just started work on the 
opinion and does not expect it to circulate for several we~ks. I 
would expect to have a draft of the concurrence to you next week, 
in time for it to be edited and ready for circulation shortly 




JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~nprtmt <!fottrt of tlrt :Jlnittb iltaite 
'ltae4htghtn. ~.<!f. 2Llbf'!~ 
:, ,., 
March 3, 1987 
Re: NO. 85-1513-Edwards v. Aguillard 
Dear Bill: 







cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.iuprmtt Cijouri of tift~ .itab.e' 
~lfin:gton. ~. Cij. 2tlc?ll~ 
March 
85-1513 - Edwards v. Aguillard 
Dear Bill, 
My present inclination is to write 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMI!IERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.l'upr~nu ~#Uri ..n ~~ .lltatt• 
,.._~ ~. ~ 2ll~~ 
March 5, 1987 
Re: 85-1513 - Edwards v. Aguillard 
Dear Bill: 




Copies to the Conference 
......... .....;... .... c....., 
. , I 
1 ; . FRIDAY,, MARCH 6, 198j 
Banned in Alabama 
T HE JUDGE'S DECISION in the Alabama with secular humanism, whatever that is, and he schoolbook case is, as lawyers say, pro- has baMed them from Alabama's public schools. foundly and irremediably wacko. It won't The judge convicted those books of the wrong 
survive appeal unless the Supreme Court chooses charge. Most of them are guiltl not of promotina 
to rewrite the First Amendment, But for all ita eecutar atandards, but rather o offering no stand-· 
eccentricity, the decision touches a serious ques- · ards at all. ·Tbeir publishers, terrified of offending 
tion: What moral values, if any, should a public any point of view, have stripped them down to a 
school reflect? Many schools have succeeded in level of vacuity and evasiveness that deserves to 
scrubbing all of the traditional religious refer- be considered criminal, if not in the legal sense. 
ences out of their curricula, leaving only a mushy While Judge Hand -is wrong abOut much, he is 
indecision on matters of basic morality. That is dead right in o~rving that it's impossible to give 
disquieting not only to fundamentalist- Christians a coherent account of American history, as some 
such as the parents in the Alabama case. You of these books attempt, without reference to 
don't have to read very far in the textbooks at religious belief. 
issue to see what the plaintiffs were complainiilg No religious community is ever going to be 
about. . satisfied with the · public schools' handling of the 
Legally, this whole proceeding iS a genuine deep questions of faith and ethics. That's why 
oddity. It began when a parent went into federal ·churches, aynagogues and m08ques usually run 
court six ·years ago to protest an Alabama law their own programs for children.- The Constitu-
that encouraged prayer in classrooms. After·giv- tion was not written by atheists. Jt was written by · 
. ing it long study, Judge W. Brevard Hand conclud- people who held deep convictions of their own and 
ed that the Supreme Court had been wrong all wanted to ensure that other faiths would never be 
these years and the Alabama law was constitu- able to use public institutions to oppress theirs. 
-tional. He· went on to say• that, if he were · That was a valid concern in the 18th century, and 
overruled and told that religion must be kept out it is no less valid now. · 
of the schools, he would reopen the !'hole ques- B.ut the Constitution does not require schools ~ 
tion to see whether secular humanism was not to-avoid all descriptive reference to religion or to 
also a religion that must be excluded. This auit auspend judgment on all questions of moral con-
was the consequence. judge Hand has now found duct. judge Hand has given a ludicrous answer, 
that some 40 common achoolbooks are infected but it's a real question. 
CHAM!!IERS 01'" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hprtmt <JI.nttt d tift 'Jn:ittb .ihdt• 
Jl'ul{ingt4tlt. ~. <JI. 2D,?'l~ ' 
Re: No. 85-1513, Edwards v. Aguillard 
Dear Bill: 




cc: The Conference 
March 9, 1987 
lfp/ss 03/10/87 AGM SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Leslie DATE: March 10, 1987 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
85-1513 Edwards v. Aguillard 
I have had an interesting afternoon reviewing the 
first draft of a concurring opinion, and commend you on 
doing this so well and so quickly. Apart from minor 
editing, and a suggested change in the first paragraph, I 
think the draft through Part I (pp. 1-17) is excellent, 
and I have no substantive changes or additions to suggest. 
You also have done quite well in incorporating 
many of my views in Part II, as we have discussed. I 
think, however, that some additions - either in the text 
or in notes - would strengthen the discussion of what 
2. 
properly can be taught and why. I now identify possible 
ideas or facts that may be included in the revision of 
Part II, either in the text or in notes. 
1. It would be interesting as well as 
educational to include more about the early history of our 
country. Certainly the Pilgrims, and perhaps others (my 
history is bit weak here!), came to America to escape 
religious persecution. The more relevant history, 
however, is that with which you are now familiar. I refer 
particularly to the history of the First Amendment. I 
have in mind Mason's Declaration of Rights followed by 
Madison's Bill of Rights, and I believe by one of his 
Federalist papers. It may be that the Declaration of 
Independence itself referred to religious freedom. I see 
no reason to go into Jefferson's historic role, as the 
··~· 
' '1 
Court has talked about it, and I think Bill Rehnquist 
wrote a long opinion in dissent. 
2. One of your quotes mentions the teaching of 
3 • 
comparative religions. This would be a good place to add 
a footnote, after you hear from the Library's research, as 
to the number of major religions now practiced in the 
United States with IRS exemptions. It could be argued, I 
suppose, that a statute such as Louisiana's could be 
viewed as discriminatory. Of course, this diversity of 
religions is of comparatively modern origin. 
3. We should at least say at some point that the 
Bible, quite apart from its prominence in the religious 
history of the Christian era, is widely recognized as one 
of the great works of literature read more widely than any 
other book. 
4. 
4. In a couple of his opinions, Chief Justice 
Burger referred to history and the prominence of religion 
in our history. I joined him in the Christmas pageant 
case, but probably not in others. 
* * * 
At this point, you are wondering whether I am 
expecting you to write 15 or 20 pages. I have no such 
thought and think the basic facts and ideas can be 
included quite summarily. 
I will discuss the timing on this with you. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
~1arch lJ, 1987 
85-1513 Edwards v. Aguillard 
Dear Bill: 
Please ioin me in your opinion fnr the Court. 
As I have some separate views, not inconsistent 
with your opinion, I plan to write a concurri.nq opinion in 
due time. 
SincerP-ly, 
Just ice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
•, 
' 
.i1t}trtm.t <lfourt ri tl{t ~ittb .ttaft,e-
JlMJtittgtou, Jl. Of. 2lJ~,.~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
March 16, 1987 
No. 85-1513 Edwards v. Aguillard 
Dear Bill, 
I join all but Part II of your opinion. I 
may add a few words depending on the additional writing. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMeERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
\ 
.:iup:rtm:t <!Jltltrl of tlrt ~b ~hdtll 
.. IUlfri:nghtn. ~. <If. 2ll&f'!.;l 
June 15, 1987 
Re: 85-1513 - Edwards v. Aguillard 
Dear Nino: 




cc: · The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.invrtm:t (!J1t1trt oJ tqt ~ittlt .itatt,g 
Jl~fti:ngtctt. ~. <q. 2!l,;t~~ 
June 16, 1987 
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~~ ,_;__ DON AGUILLARD ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
(3) ~ ~~ ""'· [March-, 1987] 
~·-/Oz.l~ JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
@ ~ .1'1-<' f The question for decision is whether Louisiana's "Balanced 
/ /~ . _ / L Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in 
~ ~~-I~ Public School Instruction" Act (Creationism Act), La. Rev. 
@ Stat. §§ 17:286.1-286.7 (1981), is facially invalid as violative of 
 . the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
f-t ;'J~W-s - I s- I 
The Creationism Act forbids the teaching of the theory of 
evolution in public schools unless accompanied by instruction 
in "creation science." § 17:286.4A. No school is required to 
teach evolution or creation science. If either is taught, how-
ever, the other must also be taught. Ibid. The theories of 
evolution and creation science are statutorily defined as "the 
~~scientific evidences for [creation or evolution] and the infer-
If--.::,.._- ences from those scientific evidences." §§ 17.286.3(2) and 
~ • L.-t-- .1-t:ro (3). 
~ ~ ~~-~.The respondents, who include ~arents of children attend-
..... .A • ..-.J.-ll ing Louisiana public schools, Louisiana teachers, and reli-
.J.r ~ .-,r-r--1 gious leaders, challenged the constitutionality of the Act in 
~~ ~ .,/- District Court, seeking an injunction and declaratory relief. 1 
~tr··~ 4 
~ ~ ~)'The defendants, the Louisiana governor, the Attorney General, the 
( J- ·~ 8'tate Superintendent, the State Department of Education and the St. 
"1., ·---~ ~'  Tammany Parish School Board, agreed not to implement the Creationism r;:;:;-~- Act pending the final outcome of this litigation. The Louisiana Board of 
J ~LcrYt-k~~~~ 
~. s~ ~ ..,...~-~ ~ 1-<.c.-
~::::;;;.., -~ ~ .t::::::~---:::;::;_1----<( ~, u.-~ .. ,tZ...,, 
~~~~.~~. ~~ · Sf//Jd.~~~~~~ 
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------------------
The defendants, Louisia fi.cials charged with implement-
ing the Act, ~on the ground that the purpose of the 
Act is to protect a legitimate secular interest, namely, aca-
demic freedom. 2 Respondents attacked the Act as facially 
invalid because it violated the Establishment Clause and 
made a motion for ummary 'udgmen The District Court 
granted the motion. Aguil ar . Treen, CTv. Action Li C::: 
No. 81-4787 (ED La., Jan. 10, 1985). The Court held that 
there can be no valid secular reason for prohibiting the teach-
ing of evolution, a theory historically opposed by some reli-
gious denominations. The Court further concluded that "the 
teaching of 'creation-science' and 'creationism,' as contem-
plated by the statute, involves teaching 'tailored to the prin-
ciples' of a particular religious sect or group of sects." Ibid. 
(citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 106 (1968)). 
The District Court therefore held that the Creationism Act f} c_, 
violated the Establishment Clause either because it prohib-
ited the teaching of evolution or because it required the 
teaching of creation science with the purpose of advancing a 
particular religious doctrine. Ibid. 
Elementary and Secondary Education, and the Oreans Parish School 
Board were among the original defendants in the suit but both later re-
aligned as plaintiffs. 
2 The District Court initially stayed the action pending the resolution of 
a separate lawsuit brought by the Act's legislative sponsor and others for 
declaratory and injunctive relief. After the separate suit was dismissed 
on jurisdictional grounds, Keith v. Louisiana Department of Education, 
553 F. Supp. 295 (MD La. 1982), the District Court lifted its stay in this 
case and held that the Creationism Act violated the Louisiana Constitu-
tion. The court ruled that the State Constitution grants authority over 
the public school system to the Board of Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion rather than the state legislature. On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
certified the question to the Lo~~ Court, which found the 
Creationism Act did ot violate the State """Constitution, Aguilr;a;:;:dV:Treen, 
440 So. 2d a. 1983). lie Court o pea s then remanded the case 
to the District Court to determine whether the Creationism Act violates 
the Federal Constitution. Aguillard v. Treen, 720 F. 2d 676 (CA5 1983). 
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The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court observed that 
the statute's avowed purpose of protecting academic freedom 
was inconsistent with requiring, upon risk of sanction, the 
teaching of creation science whenever evolution is taught. 
765 F . 2d 1251, 1257 (CA5 1985). The Court found that the 
Louisiana legislature's ~t ?was "to~olu­
tion by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the 
teaching of creationism, a religious belief." Ibid. Because 
the Creationism Act was thus a law furthering a particular 
religious belief, the Court of Appeals held that the Act vio-
lated the Establishment Clause. A suggestion for rehearing 
en bane was denied over a dissent. 778 F . 2d 225 (CA5 
1985). We noted probable jurisdiction, 4 76 U. S. --
(1986), and now affirm. 
II 
The Establishment Clause forbids the enactment of any 
law "respecting an establishment of religion. "3 The Court 
has applied a three-pronged test to determine whether legis-
lation comports with the Establishment Clause. First, the 
legislature must have adopted the law with a secular pur-
pose. Second, the statute's p~ect must 
be one that neither advances ~r ~ts religion. Third, 
the statute mus not result in an ex~ssive entanglement of 
government with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 
602, 612-613 (1971). 4 State action violates the Establish-
ment Clause if it fails to satisfy any of these prongs. 
3 The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion . . .. " Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
this "fundamental concept of liberty" applies to the States. Cantwell v. 
Connecticut , 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). 
•The Lemon test has been applied in all cases since its adoption in 1971, 
except in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), where the Court held 
that the Nebraska legislature's practice of opening a session with a prayer 
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause. 
The Court based its conclusion in that case on the historical acceptance of 
the practice. Such a historical approach is not useful in determining the 
proper roles of church and state in public schools, since free public educa-
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In this case, the Court must determine whether the Estab-
lishment Clause was violated in the special context of the 
public elementary and secondary school system. tates a_!ld 
local c ool boards afe generally afforded considerable dis-
cretion in operating public schools. See Bethel School District 
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.-S. --, -- (1.'986); id., at--
(BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); Tinker v. Des 
Moines :fchool Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 507 (1969). "At the 
same time . . . we have necessarily recognized that interven-
tions by States in matters of education must be exercised in a 
manner that comports with the transcendent imperatives of 
the First Amendment." Board of Education v. Pico, 457 
u. s. 853, 864 (1982). -
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring 
compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and 
secondary schools. Families entrust public schools with the 
education of their children, but condition their trust on the 
understanding that the classroom will not ur osel be used 
to advance religiOus views t t may conflict with the rivate 
beli~d his or er fami y. Stu ents in such 
institutions are imp~ionable and their attendance is invol-
untary. See, e. g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 
U. S. 373, 383 (1985);!-Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 60, 
n. 51 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 369 (1975); Ab-
ington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 252-253 
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). The state exerts great 
authority and coercive power through mandatory attendance 
requirements, and because of the students' emulation of 
teachers as role models and the children's susceptibility to 
peer pressure. 5 See Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fra-
tion was virtually non-existent at the time the Constitution was adopted. 
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 80 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring 
in judgment) (citing Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 
238, and n. 7 (1963) (BRENNAN, J ., concurring)). 
$The potential for undue influence is far less significant with regard to 
college students who voluntarily enroll in courses. "This distinction war-
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ser, supra, at--; Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 81 (O'CON-
NOR, J., concurring in judgment). Furthermore, "[t]he pub-
lic school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most 
pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no 
activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces 
than in its schools .... " Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board 
of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 231 (1948) (opinion of Frank-
furter, J.). 
Consequently, the Court has been required often to invali-
date statutes which advance re~n in public elementary and 
secondary schools. See, e. g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. 
Ball, supra (school.)iistrict's use of religious school teachers 
in public schools);"Wdllace v. Jaffree, supra (Alabama statute 
authorizing moment ·of silence for school prayer);v§tone v. 
Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (posting copy of Ten Command-
ments on public classroom wall);VEpperson v. Arkansas, 
supra (statute forbidding teaching of evolution); Abington 
School District v. chempp, supra daily reading of Bible); 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962) (recitation of "de-
nominationally neutral" prayer). 
Therefore, in employing the three-pronged Lemon test, we 
must do so mindful of the particular concerns that arise in the 
context of public elementary and secondary schools. We 
now turn to the evaluation of the Act under the Lemon test. 
III 
Lemon's first prong focuses on the~ that animated 
adoption of the Act. "The purpose prong of the Lemon test 
asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or 
disapprove of religion." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 
690 (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). A governmental in-
tention to promote religion is clear when the State enacts a 
rants a difference in constitutional results." Abington School Dist. v. 
Schempp, supra, at 253 (BRENNAN, J. , concurring). Thus, for instance, I 
the Court has not questioned the authority of state colleges and universi-
ties to offer courses on religion or theology. See Widman v. Vincent, 454 
U.S. 263, 271 (1981) (POWELL, J.); id., at 281 (STEVENS, J., concurring). 
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law to serve a religious purpose. This intention may be evi-
denced by promotion of religion in general, see Wallace v. 
Jaffree, supra, at 52-53 (Establishment Clause protects indi-
vidual freedom of conscience "to select any religious faith or 
none at all"), or-by advancement of a particular religious be-
lief, e. g., Stone v. Graham, supra, at 41 {1980) (invalidating 
requirement to post Ten Commandments, which are "undeni-
ably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths") (foot-
note omitted); Epperson v. Arkansas, supra (holding that 
banning the teaching of evolution in public· schools violates 
the First Amendment since "teaching and learning" must not 
"be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious 
sect or dogma"). If the law was enacted for the purpose of 
endorsing religion, "no consideration o{ the .second or third 
criteria [of Lemon] is necessary." Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, 
at 56. In this case, the petitioners have identified no clear 
secular pm:pose for the :Louisiana Act: := 
True, the Act's ~is top otect academic free-
dom. La. Rev. Stat.~ This phrase might, in com-
mon parlance, be understood as referring to enhancing the 
freedom of teachers to teach what they will. The Court of 
Appeals, however, correctly concluded that the Act was not 
designed to further .-that goal. 6 We find no merit in the 
6 The Court of Appeals stated that: "[a)cademic freedom embodies the 
principle tliat indi.viduat instructors are at li~ that which they 
deem to be appropriate in the exercise of their professional judgment." 
765 F . 2d, at 1257. But, in the State of Louisiana, courses in public I 
schools are prescribed by the State Board of Education and teachers are 
not free, absent permission, to teach courses differeiif from what is re-
qUired. Tr. of Oral Arg. 44-46. "Academic freedom, " at least as it is 
commonly understood, is not a relevant concept in this context. More-
over, as the Court of Appeals explained, th~ct ·~~ presumably 
upon risk of sanction or dismissal for failure to comply, the teaching of cre-
ation-science whenever evolution is taught. Although states may pre-
scrtbe public;choo~ing science instruction under ordi-
nary circumstances, the _mpu sion m ere in the Balanced Treatment 
Act is, on its face , inconsistent wtth t e 1 ea of academic freedom as it is 
universally understood." 765 F. 2d, at 1257 (emphasis in original). The 
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State's argument that the "legislature may not [have] use[d) 
the terms "academic freedom" in the correct legal sense. 
They might have [had] in mind, instead, a basic concept of 
fairness; teaching all of the evidence." Tr. of Oral Arg. 60. 
Even if "academic freedom" is read to mean "teaching all the 
evidence" with respect to the origin of human beings, the Act 
does not further this purpose. The goal of providing a more · 
comprehensive science curriculum is not furthered either by 
outlawing the teaching of evolution or by requiring the teach-
ing of creation science. · 
A 
While the Court is normally deferential to a State's articu-
lation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement 
of such purpose be sincere and not a sham. See Wallace v. 
Jaffree, supra, at 64 (POWELL, J., concurring); id., at 75 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Stone v. Graham, 
supra, at 41; Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 
223-224. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR stated in Wallace: "It is 
not a trivial matter, however, to require that the legislature 
manifest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian endorse-
ments from its laws. That requirement is precisely tailored 
to the Establishment Clause's purpose of assuring that Gov-
ernment not intentionally endorse religion or religious prac-
tice." 472 U. S., at 75 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
It is clear from the Wgtslativen1s! on:J that the pur2ose of 
the legislative sponsor, Senator Bill Keith, was to narrow the 
science curr~lum. During the legislative hearings, Sena-
tor '"Keith stated: "My preference would be that neither 
[creationism nor evolution] be taught." 2 App. E621. Such 
a ban on teaching does not promote-indeed, it undermines-
the provision of a comprehensive scientific education. 
Act actually serves to diminish academic freedom by removing the flexibil-
ity to teach evolutLon without also teaching creation science, even if teach-
ers determine that such curriculum results in less effective and comprehen-
sive science instruction. 
~4..-~--~ 
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'l 
It is equally clear that requiring schools to teach creation 
science with evolution does not advance academic freedom. 
The Act does not ant teachers a flexibility that they did not 
already possess to supplant the present science curriculum 
with the presentation of theories, besides evolution, about 
the origin of life. Indeed, the Court of Appeals' found that C:: ;1 ~ 
no law prohibited Louisiana RubJ!c schoolteachers from teach-
ing ap~ sc~--neory. 765 F. 2d, at 1257. As the presi-
dent of the Louisiana Science Teachers Association testified, 
"[a]ny scientific concept that's based on established fact can 
be included in our curriculum already, and no legislation al-
lowing this is necessary." 2 App. E616. The Act provides 
Louisiana schoolteachers with no new authority. Thus the 
state purpose 1S not rurt ere y 1 . 
The Alabama statute held unconstitutional in Wallace v. 
Jaffree, supra, 1s analogous. I,n Wallace, the State charac-
terized its new law~ designed to provide a one-minute 
period for meditation. We rejected that stated purpose as 
insufficient, because a previously adopted Alabama law al-
ready provided for such a one-minute period. Thus, in this 
case, as in Wallace, "[a]ppellants have not identified any sec-
ular purpose that was not fully served by [existing state law] 
before the enactment of [the statute in question]." 472 
U. S., at 59. 
Furthermore, the goal of basic "fairness" is hardly fur-
thered by the Act's discriminatory reference for the teach-
ing of creation science -aruragamst the teaching of evolution. 7 
While requirTr}gthat curricuhim guioes be aevefoped for cre-
ation science, the Act says nothing of comparable guides for 
7 The Creationism Act's provisions appear among other provisions pre-
scribing the courses of study in Louisiana's public schools. These other 
provisions, similar to those in other states, prescribe courses of study in 
such topics as driver training, civics, the Constitution, and free enterprise. 
None of these other provisions, apart from those associated with the 
Creationism Act, nominally mandates "equal time" for opposing opinions 
within a specific area of learning. See, e. g., La. Rev. Stat.§§ 17:261-281. 
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evolution. La. Rev. Stat. § 17:286. 7A. Similarly, research 
services are supplied for creation science but not for evolu-
tion. I d., at § 17:286. 7B. Only "creation scientists" can 
serve on the panel that supplies the resource services. Ibid. 
The Act forbids school boards to discriminate against anyone 
who "chooses to be a ·creation-scientist" or to teach 
"creationism," but fails to protect those who choose to teach 
evolution or any other non-creation science theory, or who 
refuse to teach creation science. Id., at § 17:286.4C. 
If the Louisiana legislature's purpose was solely to maxi-
mize the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of science in-
struction, it would have encouraged the teaching of all scien-
tific theor·es about the or1 ·ns o humankind. ut under the 
Act's requirements, teachers who were once free to teach { 
any and all facets of this sub· ect are now unab e o do so. 
Moreover, the Act fails even to ensure that creation science 
will be taught, but instead requires the teaching of this the-
ory only when the theory of evolution is taught. Thus we 
agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Act does 
not serve to protect academic freedom, but has the distinctly 
different purpose of discrediting "evolution by counterbalanc-
ing the teaching of evolution at every turn with the teaching 
of creation science .... " 765 F. 2d 1251. 
B 
Stone v. Graham, supra, invalidated the State's require-
ment that the Ten Commandments be posted in public class-
rooms. "The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred 
text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative 
recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that 
fact." 449 U. S., at 41 (footnote omitted). As a result, the 
contention that the law was designed to provide instruction 
on a "fundamental legal code" was "not sufficient to avoid 
conflict with the First Amendment." Ibid. Similarly Ab-
ington School Ditrict v. Schempp held unconstitutional a 








the school day of verses from the Holy Bible and the recita-
tion of the Lord's Prayer by the students in unison," despite 
the proffer of such secular purposes as the "promotion of 
moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of 
our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teach-
ing of literature." 374 U. S., at 223. 
As in Stone and Abington, we need not be blind in this case 
to th~e-eminent reh ·ous ur ose in enacting 
this statute. There is a historic and contemporaneous link 
between the teachings of certain religious denominations and 
the teaching of evolution. 8 It was this link that concerned 
the Court in Eppers?n v. Arkansas, supra, which also in-
volved a facial challenge to a statute regulating the teaching 
of evolution. In that case, the Court reviewed an Arkansas 
statute that made it unlawful for an instructor to teacn evolu-
tionor to use a textbook that referred to this scientific the-
ory. Although the Arkansas anti-evolution law did not ex-
plicitly state its predominate religious purpose, the Court 
could not ignore that "[t]he statute was a product of the up-
surge of 'fundamentalist' religious fervor" that has long 
viewed this particular scientific theory as contradicting the 
literal interpretation of the Bible. ld., at 98, 106-107.9 
Mter reviewing the history of anti-evolution statutes, the 
Court determined that "there can be no doubt that the moti-
vation for the Arkansas law was the same [as other anti-evo-
8 See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Ed., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258-1264 
(ED_A:r:k. ~82) (reviewing historical and contemporary antagonisms be-
tween the theory of evolution and religious movements). 
9 The Court evaluated the statute in light of a series of anti-evolution 
statutes adopted by state legislatures dating back to the Tennessee statute 
that was the focus of the celebrated Scopes trial in 1927. Epperson v. Ar-
kansas , 393 U. S. 97, 98, 101, n.8, and 109 (1968). The Court found the 
Arkansas statute comparable to this Tennessee "monkey law," since both 
gave preference to "religious establishments which have as one of their te-
nets or dogmas the instantaneous creation of ml;ln." !d., at 103, n.ll 
(quoting Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 126, 289 S. W. 363, 369 (1927) 
(Chambliss, J. , concurring)). 
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lution statutes]: to suppress the teaching of a theory which, it 
was thought, 'denied' the divine creation of man." I d., at 
109. The Court found that there can be no legitimate state 
interest in protecting particular religions from scientific 
views "distasteful to them," id., at 107 (citation omitted), and 
concluded "that the First Amendment does not permit the 
State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored 
to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or 
dogma," id., at 106. 
These same historic and contemporaneous antagonisms be-
tween the ~certain religious denominations and 
the teacliin o evolution are esent in this case. The pre-
eminent purpose of the Louisiana legis ature was clearly to 
advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being 
created humankind. 10 The term "creation science" was de-
fined as embracing this particular religious doctrine by those 
responsible for the passage of the Creationism Act. Senator 
Keith's leading expert on creation science, Edward 
Boudreaux, testified at the legislative hearings that the the-
ory of creation science included belief in the existence of a su-
pernatural creator. See 1 App. E421-422 (noting that "cre-
ation scientists" point to high probability that life was 
"created by an intelligent mind"). 11 Senator Keith also cited 
10 While the belief in the instantaneous creation of humankind by a su-
pernatural creator may require the rejection of every aspect of the theory 
of evolution, an individual instead may choose to accept some or all of this 
scientific theory as compatible with his or her spiritual outlook. During 
oral argument, Jus~~E STEVENS pointed out that an individual may ac-
ceptorreJect different aspectsof the theory of evolution depending on his 
or her particular religious beliefs. Tr. of Oral Arg. 23-29. 
11 Boudreaux repeatedly defined creation science in terms of a theory 
that supports the existence of a supernatural creator. See, e. g. , 2 App. 
E501-502 (equating creation science with a theory pointing "to conditions 
of a creator"); 1 App. E153-154 ("Creation . . . requires the direct involve-
ment of a supernatural intelligence"). The lead witness at the hearings 
introducing the original bill, Luther Sunderland, described creation science 
as postulating "that everything was created by some intelligence or power 
external to the universe. " !d., at E9-10. 
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testimony from other experts to support the creation-science 
view that "a creator [was] responsible for the universe and 
everything in it."12 2 App. E497. The legislative history 
therefore reveals that the term "creation science," as contem-
plated by the legislature that adopted this Act, embodies the 
religious belief that a supernatural creator was responsible 
for the creation of humankind. 
Furthermore, it is not happenstance that the legislature 
required the teaching of a theory that coincided with this reli-
gious view. The legislative histor~ do~ents that the Act's 
primary purpose was tOCilaiige the science curriculum of 
public schools in order to provide persuasive advantage to a 
articular religious octrme t at reJects t e factual basis of 
evolution in its entirety. The sponsor of the Creationism 
Act,'Senator Keith, explained during the legislative hearings 
that his disdain for the theory of evolution resulted from the 
support that evolutlOn'Supplied to views contrary to his own 
religious beliefs. According to Senator Keith, the theory of 
evolution was consonant with the "cardinal principle[s] of re-
ligious humanism, secular humanism, theological liberalism, 
aetheistism [sic]." 1 App. E312-313; see also 2 App. 
E499-500. The state senator repeatedly stated that scien-
tific evidence supporting his religious views should be in-
cluded in the public school curriculum to redress the fact that 
the theory of evolution incidentally coincided with what he 
12 Senator Keith believed that creation science embodied this view: "One 
concept is that a' creator however you define that creator was responsible 
for everything that is in this world. The other concept is that it just 
evolved." 1 App. E280. Besides Senator Keith, several of the most vocal 
legislators also revealed their religious motives for supporting the bill in 
the official legislative history. See, e. g., id., at E441, 443 (Senator 
Saunders noting that bill was amended so that teachers could refer to the 
Bible and other religious texts to support the creation-science theory); 2 
App. E561-562, 610 (Representative Jenkins contending that the existence 
of God was a scientific fact). 
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characterized as religious beliefs antithetical to his own. 13 
The legislation therefore sought to alter the science curricu-
lum to reflect endorsement of a religious view that is antago-
nistic to the theory of evolution. 
In this case, the purpose of the Creationism Act was to re-
structure the sciencecurrfculum to conform with a particular 
religious v1ewpomt. ut of many possible science subjects 
taught in the public schools, the legislature chose to affect the 
teaching of the one scientific theory that historically has been 
opposed by certain religious sects. As in Epperson, the leg-
islature passed the Act to give preference to those religious 
groups which have as one of their tenets the creation of hu-
mankind by a divine creator. The "overriding fact" that con-
fronted the Court in Epperson was "that Arkansas' law se-
lects from the body of knowledge a particular segment which 
it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict 
with . . . a particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by 
a particular religious group." 393 U. S., at 103. Similarly, 
the Creationism Act is designed either to promote the theory 
of creation science which embodies a particular religious te-
net by requiring that creation science be taught whenever 
evolution is taught or to prohibit the teaching of a scientific 
theory disfavored by certain religious sects by forbidding the 
teaching of evolution when creation science is not also taught. 
The Establishment Clause, however, "forbids alike the pref-
erence of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory 
which is deemed antagonistic to a particular dogma." I d ., at 
106-107 (emphasis added). Because the primary purpose of 
18 See, e. g. , 1 App. E74-75 (noting that evolution is contrary to his fam-
ily's religious beliefs); id. , at E313 (contending that evolution advances reli-
gions contrary to his own); id., at E357 (stating that evolution is "almost a 
religion" to science teachers); id., at E418 (arguing that evolution is corner-
stone of some religions contrary to his own); 2 App. E763-764 (author of 
model bill, from which Act is derived, sent copy of the model bill to Senator 
Keith and advised that "I view this whole battle as one between God and 
anti-God forces. . . . if evolution is permitted to continue . .. it will con-
tinue to be made to appear that a Supreme Being is unnecessary . .. ). 
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the Creationism Act is to advance a particular religious be-
lief, the Act endorses religion in violation of the First 
Amendment. · 
We do not imply that a legislature could never require that 
scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught. 
Indeed, the Court acknowledged in Stone that its decision 
forbidding the posting of the Ten Commandments did not 
mean that no use could ever be made of the Ten Command-
ments, or that the Ten Commandments played an exclusively 
religious role in the history of Western Civilization. 449 
U. S., at 42. In a similar way, teaching a variety of scien- \ 
tiftc theories about the origins of huffiankind to schoolclilfdren 
mig!l~ne witli the clear secular intent of enhanc-
ing the effectiveness of science mstruct10n. ut ecause the 
primary purpose of~ct is to endorse a par-
ticular religious doctrine, the Act furthers religion in viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause. 14 
IV 
Petitioners contend that genuine issues of material fact re-
main in dispute, and therefore the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be ren-
dered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." A court's finding of improper 
purpose behind a statute is appropriately determined by the 
statli'ie on its face, its legislative history, or Its interpretation 
by a responsible admimstrative agency. See:e:--g., Wallace 
14 Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a clear secu-
lar purpose, while both agreed that the Creationism Act's primary purpose 
was to advance religion. "When both courts below are unable to discern 
an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to 
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v. Jaffree, supra, at 56-61; Stone v. Graham, supra, at 
41-42; Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 103-109. The plain 
meaning of the statute's words, enlightened by their context 
and the contemporaneous legislative history, can control the 
determination of legislative purpose. See Wallace v. 
Jaffree, supra, at 74 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); 
Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962); Jay v. Boyd, 
351 U. S. 345, 357 (1956). Moreover, in determining the leg-
islative purpose of a statute, the Court has also considered 
the historical context of the statute, e. g., Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, supra, and the specific sequence of events leading to 
passage of the statute, e. g., Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977). 
In this case, respondents' motion for summary judgment 
rested on the lain language o e rea 1onism c , the leg-
isla 1ve is ory and istor1ca con ex o e c , the specific 
sequence o even s ea mg o e passage of the Act, the 
State Board's report on a survey of school superintendents, 
and the correspondence between the Act's legislative sponsor 
and its key witnesses. Petitioners contend that affidavits 
made by two scientists, two tlieolog~ans, and an educatiOilad-
ministrator raise a genuine issue of material fact and that 
summary judgment was therefore barred. The affidavits 
define creation science as "origin through abrupt appearance 
in complex form" and allege that such a viewpoint constitutes 
a true scientific theory. See Brief of Appellants A-7 to 
A-40. 
We agree with the lower courts that these affidavits do not 
raise a genuine issue of material fact. Tlie existence o!""un-
controvert-ed affidavits" does not bar summary judgment. 15 
Moreover, the post-enactment testimony of outside experts 
is of little use in determining the Louisiana legislature's pur-
16 There is "no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the mov-
ing party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials ne-
gating the opponent's claim." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. -, 
- (1986) (emphasis in original). 
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pose in enacting this statute. The Louisiana legislature did 
hear and rely on scientific experts in passing the bill, 16 but 
none of the persons making the affidavits produced by the pe-
titioners participated in or contributed to the enactment of 
the law or its implementation. 17 The District Court, in its 
discretion, properly concluded that a Monday-morning "bat-
tle of the experts" over possible technical meanings of terms 
in the statute would not illuminate the contemporaneous pur-
pose of the Louisiana legislature when it made the law. 18 We 
therefore conclude that the District Court did not err in find-
ing that petitioners failed to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact, and in granting summary judgment. 19 
16 The experts, who were relied upon by the sponsor of the bill and the 
legislation's other supporters, testified that creation science embodies the 
religious view that there is a supernatural creator of the universe. See, 
supra, at --. 
17 The petitioners contend that the affidavits are relevant because the 
term "creation science" is a technical term similar to that found in statutes 
that regulate certain scientific or technological developments. Even as-
suming arguendo that "creation science" is a term of art as represented by 
the petitioners, the definition provided by the relevant agency provides a 
better insight than the affidavits submitted by the petitioners in this case. 
In a 1981 surve conducted by the Louisiana Department of Education, the 
school superinten en s m c arge of implementing the provisions of the 
Creationism Act were asked to interpret the meaning of "creation science" 
as used in the statute. About 75 er cent of Louisiana's superintendents 
stated that they understood " rea 10n sc1enc ' to b~ a religious doctrine. 
2 App. E798-799. Of this group, the largest proportion of superinten-
dents interpreted creation science, as defined by the Act, to mean the lit-
eral interpretation of the Book of Genesis. The remaining superinten-
dents believed that the Act required teaching the view that "the universe 
was made by a creator." ld., at E799. 
18 The Court has previously found the post-enactment elucidation of the 
meaning of a statute to be of little relevance in determining the intent of 
the legislature contemporaneous to the passage of the statute. See W al-
lace v. Jaffree, supra, at 57, n. 45; id. at 75 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
19 Numerous other Establishment Clause cases that found state statutes 
to be unconstitutional have been disposed of without trial. E. g., Larkin 
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v 
The Louisiana Creationism Act advances a religious doc-
trine by requiring either the banishment of the theory of evo-
lution from public school classrooms or the presentation of a 
religious viewpoint that rejects evolution in its entirety. 
The Act violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment because it seeks to employ the symbolic and fi-
nancial support of government to achieve a religious purpose. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is 
Affirmed. 
v. Grendels Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116 (1982); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U. S. 825 (1973); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962). 
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EDWIN W. EDWARDS, ETC., ET AL. APPELLANTS v. 
DON AGUILLARD ET AL. 
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FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1987] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question for decision is whether Louisiana's "Balanced 
Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in 
Public School Instruction" Act (Creationism .Act), La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 17:286.1-17:286.7 (West 1982), is facially invalid 
as violative of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. 
I 
The Creationism Act forbids the teaching of the theory of 
evolution in public schools unless accompanied by instruction 
in "creation science." § 17:286.4A. No school is required to 
teach evolution or creation science. If either is taught, how-
ever, the other must also be taught. Ibid. The theories of 
evolution and creation science are statutorily defined as "the 
scientific evidences for [creation or evolution] and inferences 
from those scientific evidences." §§ 17.286.3(2) and (3). 
Appellees, who include parents of children attending Loui-
siana public schools, Louisiana teachers, and religious lead-
ers, challenged the constitutionality of the Act in District 
Court, seeking an injunction and declaratory relief. 1 Appel-
1 Appellants, the Louisiana Governor, the Attorney General, the State 
Superintendent, the State Department of Education and the St. Tammany 
Parish School Board, agreed not to implement the Creationism Act pend-
ing the final outcome of this litigation. The Louisiana Board of Elemen-
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-lee& Louisiana officials charged with implementing the Act, 
defended on the ground that the purpose of the Act is to pro-
tect a legitimate secular interest, namely, academic free-
dom. 2 Appellees attacked the Act as facially invalid because 
it violated the Establishment Clause and made a motion for 
summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion. 
Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426 (ED La. 1985). The 
Court held that there can be no valid secular reason for 
prohibiting the teaching of evolution, a theory historically op-
posed by some religious denominations. The Court further 
concluded that "the teaching of 'creation-science' and 
'creationism,' as contemplated by the statute, involves teach-
ing 'tailored to the principles' of a particular religious sect or 
group of sects." Id., at 427 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 
393 U. S. 97, 106 (1968)). The District Court therefore held 
that the Creationism Act violated the Establishment Clause 
either because it prohibited the teaching of evolution or be-
cause it required the teaching of creation science with the 
purpose of advancing a particular religious doctrine. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 765 F. 2d 1251 (CA5 
1985). The Court observed that the statute's avowed pur-
tary and Secondary Education, and the Orleans Parish School Board were 
among the original defendants in the suit but both later realigned as 
plaintiffs. 
2 The District Court initially stayed the action pending the resolution of 
a separate lawsuit brought by the Act's legislative sponsor and others for 
declaratory and injunctive relief. After the separate suit was dismissed 
on jurisdictional grounds, Keith v. Louisiana Department of Education , 
553 F . Supp. 295 (MD La. 1982), the District Court lifted its stay in this 
case and held that the Creationism Act violated the Louisiana Constitu-
tion. The Court ruled that the State Constitution grants authority over 
the public school system to the Board of Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion rather than the state legislature. On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
certified the question to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which found the 
Creationism Act did not violate the State Constitution, Aguillard v. Treen , 
440 So. 2d 704 (La. 1983). The Court of Appeals then remanded the case 
to the District Court to determine whether the Creationism Act violates 
the Federal Constitution. Aguillard v. Treen , 720 F. 2d 676 (CA5 1983). 
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pose of protecting academic freedom was inconsistent with 
requiring, upon risk of sanction, the teaching of creation sci-
ence whenever evolution is taught. !d., at 1257. The Court 
found that the Louisiana legislature's actual intent was "to 
discredit evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every 
turn with the teaching of creationism, a religious belief." 
Ibid. Because the Creationism Act was thus a law further-
ing a particular religious belief, the Court of Appeals held 
that the Act violated the Establishment Clause. A sugges-
tion for rehearing en bane was denied over a dissent. 778 F. 
2d 225 (CA5 1985). We noted probable jurisdiction, 476 
U. S. -- (1986), and now affirm. 
II 
The Establishment Clause forbids the enactment of any 
law "respecting an establishment of religion. "3 The Court 
has applied a three-pronged test to determine whether legis-
lation comports with the Establishment Clause. First, the 
legislature must have adopted the law with a secular pur-
pose. Second, the statute's principal or primary effect must 
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Third, 
the statute must not result in an excessive entanglement of 
government with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 
602, 612-613 (1971). 4 State action violates the Establish-
ment Clause if it fails to satisfy any of these prongs. 
3 The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion . .. . " Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
this "fundamental concept of liberty" applies to the States. Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). 
' The Lemon test has been applied in all cases since its adoption in 1971, 
except in Marsh v. Chambers , 463 U. S. 783 (1983), where the Court held 
that the Nebraska legislature's practice of opening a session with a prayer 
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause. 
The Court based its conclusion in that case on the historical acceptance of 
the practice. Such a historical approach is not useful in determining the 
proper roles of church and state in public schools, since free public educa-
tion was virtually nonexistent at the time the Constitution was adopted. 
See Wallace v. Jaffree , 472 U.S. 38, 80 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J ., concurring 
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In this case, the Court must determine whether the Estab-
lishment Clause was violated in the special context of the 
public elementary and secondary school system. States and 
local school boards are generally afforded considerable dis-
cretion in operating public schools. See Bethel School District 
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. --, -- (1986); id., at--
(BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 
503, 507 (1969). "At the same time . . . we have necessarily 
recognized that the discretion of the States and local school 
boards in matters of education must be exercised in a manner 
that comports with the transcendent imperatives of the First 
Amendment." Board of Education v. Pica, 457 U. S. 853, 
864 (1982). 
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring 
compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and 
secondary schools. Families entrust public schools with the 
education of their children, but condition their trust on the 
understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used 
to advance religious views that may conflict with the private 
beliefs of the student and his or her family. Students in such 
institutions are impressionable and their attendance is invol-
untary. See, e. g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball , 473 
U. S. 373, 383 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 60, 
n. 51 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 369 (1975); Ab-
ington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 252-253 
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). The State exerts great 
authority and coercive power through mandatory attendance 
requirements, and because of the students' emulation of 
teachers as role models and the children's susceptibility to 
peer pressure. 5 See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 
in judgment) (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 238, 
and n. 7 (1963) (BRENNAN, J ., concurring)). 
5 The potential for undue influence is far less significant with regard to 
college students who voluntarily enroll in courses. "This distinction war-
rants a difference in constitutional results." Abington School Dist . v. 
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supra, at--; Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 81 (O'CONNOR, 
J., concurring in judgment). Furthermore, "[t]he public 
scho.ol is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most 
pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no 
activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces 
than in its schools .... " Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. 
Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 231 (1948) (opinion of 
Frankfurter, J.). 
Consequently, the Court has been required often to invali-
date statutes which advance religion in public elementary and 
secondary schools. See, e. g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. 
Ball, supra (school district's use of religious school teachers 
in public schools); Wallace v. Jaffree, supra (Alabama statute 
authorizing moment of silence for school prayer); Stone v. 
Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (posting copy of Ten Command-
ments on public classroom wall); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 
U. S. 97 (1968) (statute forbidding teaching of evolution); Ab-
ington School District v. Schempp, supra (daily reading of 
Bible); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962) (recitation 
of "denominationally neutral" prayer). 
Therefore, in employing the three-pronged Lemon test, we 
must do so mindful of the particular concerns that arise in the 
context of public elementary and secondary schools. We 
now turn to the evaluation of the Act under the Lemon test. 
III 
Lemon's first prong focuses on the purpose that animated 
adoption of the Act. "The purpose prong of the Lemon test 
asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or 
disapprove of religion." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 
690 (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). A governmental in-
Schempp, supra, at 253 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Thus, for instance, 
the Court has not questioned the authority of state colleges and universi-
ties to offer courses on religion or theology. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 
U. S. 263, 271 (1981) (POWELL, J.); id., at 281 (STEVENS, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
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tention to promote religion is clear when the State enacts a 
law to serve a religious purpose. This intention may be evi-
denced by promotion of religion in general, see Wallace v. 
Jaffree, supra, at 52-53 (Establishment Clause protects indi-
vidual freedom of conscience "to select any religious faith or 
none at all"), or by advancement of a particular religious be-
lief, e. g, , Stone v. Graham, supra, at 41 (invalidating re-
quirement to post Ten Commandments, which are "undeni-
ably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths") 
(footnote omitted); Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 106 
(holding that banning the teaching of evolution in public 
schools violates the First Amendment since "teaching and 
learning" must not "be tailored to the principles or prohi-
bitions of any religious sect or dogma"). If the law was en-
acted for the purpose of endorsing religion, "no consideration 
of the second or third criteria [of Lemon] is necessary." 
Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 56. In this case, the petition-
ers have identified no clear secular purpose for the Louisiana 
Act. 
True, the Act's stated purpose is to protect academic free-
dom. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:286.2 (West 1982). This 
phrase might, in common parlance, be understood as refer-
ring to enhancing the freedom of teachers to teach what they 
will. The Court of Appeals, however, correctly concluded 
that the Act was not designed to further that goal. 6 We find 
6 The Court of Appeals stated that: "[a]cademic freedom embodies the 
principle that individual instructors are at liberty to teach that which they 
deem to be appropriate in the exercise of their professional judgment." 
765 F. 2d, at 1257. But, in the State of Louisiana, courses in public 
schools are prescribed by the State Board of Education and teachers are 
not free , absent permission, to teach courses different from what is re-
quired. Tr. of Oral Arg. 44-46. "Academic freedom," at least as it is 
commonly understood, is not a relevant concept in this context. More-
over, as the Court of Appeals explained, the Act "requires, presumably 
upon risk of sanction or dismissal for failure to comply, the teaching of cre-
ation-science whenever evolution is taught. Although states may pre-
scribe public school curriculum concerning science instruction under ordi-
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no merit in the State's argument that the "legislature may 
not [have] use[d] the terms 'academic freedom' in the correct 
legal sense. They might have [had] in mind, instead, a basic 
concept of fairness; teaching all of the evidence." Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 60. Even if "academic freedom" is read to mean 
"teaching all of the evidence" with respect to the origin of 
human beings, the Act does not further this purpose. The 
goal of providing a more comprehensive science curriculum is 
not furthered either by outlawing the teaching of evolution or 
by requiring the teaching of creation science. 
A 
While the Court is normally deferential to a State's articu-
lation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement 
of such purpose be sincere and not a sham. See Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U. S., at 64 (POWELL, J., concurring); id., at 75 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Stone v. Graham, 
supra, at 41; Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 
. U. S., at 223-224. As JusTICE O'CONNOR stated in Wallace: 
"It is not a trivial matter, however, to require that the legis-
lature manifest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian en-
dorsements from its laws. That requirement is precisely tai-
lored to the Establishment Clause's purpose of assuring that 
Government not intentionally endorse religion or a religious 
practice." 472 U. S., at 75 (concurring in judgment). 
It is clear from the legislative history that the purpose of 
the legislative sponsor, Senator Bill Keith, was to narrow the 
science curriculum. During the legislative hearings, Sena-
tor Keith stated: "My preference would be that neither 
[creationism nor evolution] be taught." 2 App. E621. Such 
nary circumstances, the compulsion inherent in the Balanced Treatment 
Act is, on its face, inconsistent with the idea of academic freedom as it is 
universally understood." 765 F. 2d, at 1257 (emphasis in original). The 
Act actually serves to diminish academic freedom by removing the flexibil-
ity to teach evolution without also teaching creation science, even if teach-
ers determine that such curriculum results in less effective and comprehen-
sive science instruction. 
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a ban on teaching does not promote-indeed, it undermines-
the provision of a comprehensive scientific education. 
It is equally clear that requiring schools to teach creation 
science with evolution does not advance academic freedom. 
The Act does not grant teachers a flexibility that they did not 
already possess to supplant the present science curriculum 
with the presentation of theories, besides evolution, about 
the origin of life. Indeed, the Court of Appeals' found that 
no law prohibited Louisiana public schoolteachers from teach-
ing any scientific theory. 765 F. 2d, at 1257. As the presi-
dent of the Louisiana Science Teachers Association testified, 
"[a]ny scientific concept that's based on established fact can 
be included in our curriculum already, and no legislation al-
lowing this is necessary." 2 App. E616. The Act provides 
Louisiana schoolteachers with no new authority. Thus the 
stated purpose is not furthered by it. 
The Alabama statute held unconstitutional in Wallace v. 
Jaffree, supra, is analogous. In Wallace, the State charac-
terized its new law as one designed to provide a one-minute 
period for meditation. We rejected that stated purpose as 
insufficient, because a previously adopted Alabama law al-
ready provided for such a one-minute period. Thus, in this 
case, as in Wallace, "[a]ppellants have not identified any sec-
ular purpose that was not fully served by [existing state law] 
before the enactment of [the statute in question]." 472 
U. S., at 59. 
Furthermore, the goal of basic "fairness" is hardly fur-
thered by the Act's discriminatory preference for the teach-
ing of creation science and against the teaching of evolution. 7 
7 The Creationism Act's provisions appear among other provisions pre-
scribing the courses of study in Louisiana's public schools. These other 
provisions, similar to those in other states, prescribe courses of study in 
such topics as driver training, civics, the Constitution, and free enterprise. 
None of these other provisions, apart from those associated with the 
Creationism Act, nominally mandates "equal time" for opposing opinions 
within a specific area of learning. See, e. g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 17:261-1'1:281 (West 1982 and Supp. 1987). 
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While requiring that curriculum guides be developed for cre-
ation science, the Act says nothing of comparable guides for 
evolution. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:286.7A (West 1982). 
Similarly, research services are supplied for creation science 
but not for evolution. § 17:286. 7B. Only "creation scien- . 
tists" can serve on the panel that supplies the resource serv-
ices. Ibid. The Act forbids school boards to discriminate 
against anyone who "chooses to be a creation-scientist" or to 
teach "creationism," but fails to protect those who choose to 
teach evolution or any other non-creation science theory, or 
who refuse to teach creation science. § 17:286.4C. 
If the Louisiana legislature's purpose was solely to maxi-
mize the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of science in-
struction, it would have encouraged the teaching of all scien-
tific theories about the origins of humankind. But under the 
Act's requirements, teachers who were once free to teach 
any and all facets of this subject are now unable to do so. 
Moreover, the Act fails even to ensure that creation science 
will be taught, but instead requires the teaching of this the-
ory only when the theory of evolution is taught. Thus we 
agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Act does 
not serve to protect academic freedom, but has the distinctly 
different purpose of discrediting "evolution by counterbalanc-
ing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of creation 
science .... " 765 F. 2d, at 1257. 
B 
Stone v. Graham, invalidated the State's requirement that 
the Ten Commandments be posted in public classrooms. 
"The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the 
Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a 
supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact." 449 
U. S., at 41 (footnote omitted). As a result, the contention 
that the law was designed to provide instruction on a "funda-
mental legal code" was "not sufficient to avoid conflict with 
the First Amendment." Ibid. Similarly Abington School 
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Ditrict v. Schempp held unconstitutional a statute "requiring 
the selection and reading at the opening of the school day of 
verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of the Lord's 
Prayer by the students in unison," despite the proffer of such 
secular purposes as the "promotion of moral values, the 
contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the per-
petuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature." 
374 U. S., at 223. 
As in Stone and Abington, we need not be blind in this case 
to the legislature's preeminent religious purpose in enacting 
this statute. There is a historic and contemporaneous link 
between the teachings of certain religious denominations and 
the teaching of evolution. 8 It was this link that concerned 
the Court in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), 
which also involved a facial challenge to a statute regulating 
the teaching of evolution. In that case, the Court reviewed 
an Arkansas statute that made it unlawful for an instructor to 
teach evolution or to use a textbook that referred to this sci-
entific theory. Although the Arkansas anti-evolution law 
did not explicitly state its predominate religious purpose, the 
Court could not ignore that "[t]he statute was a product of 
the upsurge of 'fundamentalist' religious fervor" that has long 
viewed this particular scientific theory as contradicting the 
literal interpretation of the Bible. I d., at 98, 106-107.9 
After reviewing the history of anti-evolution statutes, the 
8 See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Ed., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258-1264 
(ED Ark. 1982) (reviewing historical and contemporary antagonisms be-
tween the theory of evolution and religious movements). 
9 The Court evaluated the statute in light of a series of anti-evolution 
statutes adopted by state legislatures dating back to the Tennessee statute 
that was the focus of the celebrated Scopes trial in 1927. Epperson v. Ar-
kansas , 393 U. S., at 98, 101, n.8, and 109. The Court found the Arkansas 
statute comparable to this Tennessee "monkey law," since both gave pref-
erence to " 'religious establishments which have as one of their tenets or 
dogmas the instantaneous creation of man."' Id . , at 103, n. 11 (quoting 
Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 126, 289 S. W. 363, 369 (1927) (Chambliss, 
J ., concurring)). 
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Court determined that "there can be no doubt that the moti-
vation for the [Arkansas] law was the same [as other anti-
evolution statutes]: to suppress the teaching of a theory 
which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine creation of man." 
I d., at 109. The Court found that there can be no legitimate 
state interest in protecting particular religions from scientific 
views "distasteful to them," id., at 107 (citation omitted), and 
concluded "that the First Amendment does not permit the 
State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored 
to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or 
dogma," id., at 106. 
These same historic and contemporaneous antagonisms be-
tween the teachings of certain religious denominations and 
the teaching of evolution are present in this case. The pre-
eminent purpose of the Louisiana legislature was clearly to 
advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being 
created humankind. 10 The term "creation science" was de-
fined as embracing this particular religious doctrine by those 
responsible for the passage of the Creationism Act. Senator 
Keith's leading expert on creation science, Edward 
Boudreaux, testified at the legislative hearings that the the-
ory of creation science included belief in the existence of a su-
pernatural creator. See 1 App. E421-422 (noting that "cre-
ation scientists" point to high probability that life was 
"created by an intelligent mind"). 11 Senator Keith also cited 
'
0 While the belief in the instantaneous creation of humankind by a su-
pernatural creator may require the rejection of every aspect of the theory 
of evolution, an individual instead may choose to accept some or all of this 
scientific theory as compatible with his or her spiritual outlook. An indi- \ L ~ 
vidual may accept or reject different aspects of the theory of evolution de-
pending on his or her particular religious beliefs. Tr. of Oral Arg. 23-29. 
11 Boudreaux repeatedly defined creation science in terms of a theory 
that supports the existence of a supernatural creator. See, e. g., 2 App. 
E501- 502 (equating creation science with a theory pointing "to conditions 
of a creator"); 1 App. E153- 154 ("Creation . . . requires the direct involve-
ment of a supernatural intelligence"). The lead witness at the hearings 
introducing the original bill, Luther Sunderland, described creation science 
-
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testimony from other experts to support the creation-science 
view that "a creator [was] responsible for the universe and 
everything in it."12 2 App. E497. The legislative history 
therefore reveals that the term "creation science," as contem-
plated by the legislature that adopted this Act, embodies the 
religious belief that a supernatural creator was responsible 
for the creation of humankind. 
Furthermore, it is not happenstance that the legislature 
required the teaching of a theory that coincided with this reli-
gious view. The legislative history documents that the Act's 
primary purpose was to change the science curriculum of 
public schools in order to provide persuasive advantage to a 
particular religious doctrine that rejects the factual basis of 
evolution in its entirety. The sponsor of the Creationism 
Act, Senator Keith, explained during the legislative hearings 
that his disdain for the theory of evolution resulted from the 
support that evolution supplied to views contrary to his own 
religious beliefs. According to Senator Keith, the theory of 
evolution was consonant with the "cardinal principle[s] of re-
ligious humanism, secular humanism, theological liberalism, 
aetheistism [sic]." 1 App. E312-313; see also 2 App. 
E499-500. The state senator repeatedly stated that scien-
tific evidence supporting his religious views should be in-
cluded in the public school curriculum to redress the fact that 
the theory of evolution incidentally coincided with what he 
as postulating "that everything was created by some intelligence or power 
external to the universe." !d., at E9-10. 
12 Senator Keith believed that creation science embodied this view: "One 
concept is that a creator however you define a creator was responsible for 
everything that is in this world. The other concept is that it just evolved." 
I d. , at E280. Besides Senator Keith, several of the most vocal legislators 
also revealed their religious motives for supporting the bill in the official 
legislative history. See, e. g., id. , at E441, E443 (Sen. Saunders noting 
that bill was amended so that teachers could refer to the Bible and other 
religious texts to support the creation-science theory); 2 App. E561-E562, 
E610 (Rep. Jenkins contending that the existence of God was a scientific 
fact). 
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characterized as religious beliefs antithetical to his own. 13 
The legislation therefore sought to alter the science curricu-
lum to reflect endorsement of a religious view that is antago-
nistic to the theory of evolution. 
In this case, the purpose of the Creationism Act was tore-
structure the science curriculum to conform with a particular 
religious viewpoint. Out of many possible science subjects 
taught in the public schools, the legislature chose to affect the 
teaching of the one scienti:Qc theory that historically has been 
opposed by certain religious sects. As in Epperson, the leg-
islature passed the Act to give preference to those religious 
groups which have as one of their tenets the creation of hu-
mankind by a divine creator. The "overriding fact" that con-
fronted the Court in Epperson was "that Arkansas' law se-
lects from the body of knowledge a particular segment which 
it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict 
with . . . a particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by 
a particuiar religious group." 393 U. S., at 103. Similarly, 
the Creationism Act is designed either to promote the theory 
of creation science which embodies a particular religious te-
net by requiring that creation science be taught whenever 
evolution is taught or to prohibit the teaching of a scientific 
theory disfavored by certain religious sects by forbidding the 
teaching of evolution when creation science is not also taught. 
The Establishment Clause, however, "forbids alike the pref-
erence of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory 
which is deemed antagonistic to a particular dogma." I d., at 
13 See, e. g., 1 App. E74-E75 (noting that evolution is contrary to his 
family's religious beliefs); id., at E313 (contending that evolution advances 
religions contrary to his own); id., at E357 (stating that evolution is "al-
most a religion" to science teachers); id., at E418 (arguing that evolution is 
cornerstone of some religions contrary to his own); 2 App. E763-E764 (au-
thor of model bill, from which Act is derived, sent copy of the model bill to 
Senator Keith and advised that "I view this whole battle as one between 
God and anti-God forces . . . . if evolution is permitted to continue . . . it 
will continue to be made to appear that a Supreme Being is 
unnecessary ... "). 
, 
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106-107 (emphasis added). Because the primary purpose of 
the Creationism Act is to advance a particular religious be-
lief, the Act endorses religion in violation of the First 
Amendment. 
We do not imply that a legislature could never require that 
scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught. 
Indeed, the Court acknowledged in Stone that its decision 
forbidding the posting of the Ten Commandments did not 
mean that no use could ever be made of the Ten Command-
ments, or that the Ten Commandments played an exclusively 
religious role in the history of Western Civilization. 449 
U. S., at 42. In a similar way, teaching a variety of scien-
tific theories about the origins of humankind to schoolchildren 
might be validly done with the clear secular intent of enhanc-
ing the effectiveness of science instruction. But because the 
primary purpose of the Creationism Act is to endorse a par-
ticular religious doctrine, the Act furthers religion in viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause. 14 
IV 
Appellants contend that genuine issues of material fact re-
main in dispute, and therefore the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be ren-
dered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." A court's finding of improper 
purpose behind a statute is appropriately determined by the 
statute on its face, its legislative history, or its interpretation 
by a responsible administrative agency. See, e. g., Wallace 
14 Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a clear secu-
lar purpose, while both agreed that the Creationism Act's primary purpose 
was to advance religion. "When both courts below are unable to discern 
an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to 
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v. Jaffree, 472 U. S., at 56-61; Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S., 
at 41-42; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S., at 103-109. The 
plain meaning of the statute's words, enlightened by their 
context and the contemporaneous legislative history, can con-
trol the determination of legislative purpose. See Wallace v. 
Jaffree, supra, at 74 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); 
Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962); Jay v. Boyd, 
351 U. S. 345, 357 (1956). Moreover, in determining the leg-
islative purpose of a statute, the Court has also considered 
the historical context of the statute, e. g. , Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, supra, and the specific sequence of events leading to 
passage of the statute, e. g., Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977). 
In this case, appellees' motion for summary judgment 
rested on the plain language of the Creationism Act, the leg-
islative history and historical context of the Act, the specific 
sequence of events leading to the passage of the Act, the 
State Board's report on a survey of school superintendents, 
and the correspondence between the Act's legislative sponsor 
and its key witnesses. Appellants contend that affidavits 
made by two scientists, two theologians, and an education ad-
ministrator raise a genuine issue of material fact and that 
summary judgment was therefore barred. The affidavits 
define creation science as "origin through abrupt appearance 
in complex form" and allege that such a viewpoint constitutes 
a true scientific theory. See App. to Brief for Appellants 
A-7 to A-40. 
We agree with the lower courts that these affidavits do not 
raise a genuine issue of material fact. The existence of "un-
controverted affidavits" does not bar summary judgment. 15 
Moreover, the postenactment testimony of outside experts is 
of little use in determining the Louisiana legislature's pur-
'
5 There is "no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the mov-
ing party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials ne-
gating the opponent's claim." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. -, 
- (1986) (emphasis in original). 
'1 
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pose in enacting this statute. The Louisiana legislature did 
hear and rely on scientific experts in passing the bill, 16 but 
none of the persons making the affidavits produced by the pe-
titioners participated in or contributed to the enactment of 
the law or its implementation. 17 The District Court, in its 
discretion, properly concluded that a Monday-morning "bat-
tle of the experts" over possible technical meanings of terms 
in the statute would not illuminate the contemporaneous pur-
pose of the Louisiana legislature when it made the law. 18 We 
therefore conclude that the District Court did not err in find-
ing that petitioners failed to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact, and in granting summary judgment. 19 
16 The experts, who were relied upon by the sponsor of the bill and the 
legislation's other supporters, testified that creation science embodies the 
religious view that there is a supernatural creator of the universe. See, 
supra, at --. 
17 Appellants contend that the affidavits are relevant because the term 
"creation science" is a technical term similar to that found in statutes that 
regulate certain scientific or technological developments. Even assuming 
arguendo that "creation science" is a term of art as represented by Appel-
lants, the definition provided by the relevant agency provides a better in-
sight than the affidavits submitted by appellants in this case. In a 1981 
survey conducted by the Louisiana Department of Education, the school. 
superintendents in charge of implementing the provisions of the 
Creationism Act were asked to interpret the meaning of "creation science" 
as used in the statute. About 75 percent of Louisiana's superintendents 
stated that they understood "creation science" to be a religious doctrine. 
2 App. E798-E799. Of this group, the largest proportion of superinten-
dents interpreted creation science, as defined by the Act, to mean the lit-
eral interpretation of the Book of Genesis. The remaining superinten-
dents believed that the Act required teaching the view that "the universe 
was made by a creator." Id., at E799. 
18 The Court has previously found the postenactment elucidation of the 
meaning of a statute to be of little relevance in determining the intent of 
the legislature contemporaneous to the passage of the statute. See W al-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S., at 57, n. 45; id., at 75 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring 
in judgment). 
19 Numerous other Establishment Clause cases that found state statutes 
to be unconstitutional have been disposed of without trial. E. g., Larkin 
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The Louisiana Creationism Act advances a religious doc-
trine by requiring either the banishment of the theory of evo-
lution from public school classrooms or the presentation of a 
religious viewpoint that rejects evolution in its entirety. 
The Act violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment because it seeks to employ the symbolic and fi-
nancial support of government to achieve a religious purpose. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is 
Affirmed. 
v. Grendel's Den, Inc ., 459 U. S. 116 (1982); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I write separately to note certain aspects of the legislative 
history, and to emphasize that nothing in the Court's opinion 
diminishes the traditionally broad discretion accorded state 
and local school officials in the selection of the public school 
curriculum. · 
I 
This Court consistently has applied the three-pronged test 
of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), to determine 
whether a particular state action violates the Establishment 
Clause of the Constitution.' See, e. g., Grand Rapids 
School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, -- (1985) ("We have 
particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sen-
sitive relationship between government and religion in the 
education of our children"). The first requirement of the 
Lemon test is that the challengtd statute have a "secular leg-
islative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612. See 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
773 (1973). If no valid secular purpose can be identified, 
then the statute violates the Establishment Clause. 
1 As the Court recognizes , ante, at - , n. 4, the one exception to this 
consistent application of the Lemon test is Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783 (1983). 
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A 
"The starting point in every case involving construction of 
a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J ., 
concurring). The Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science 
and Evolution-Science Act (Act or Balanced Treatment Act), 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:286.1 et seq. (West), provides in 
part: 
"[P]ublic schools within [the] state shall give balanced 
treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science. 
Balanced treatment of these two models shall be given in 
classroom lectures taken as a whole for each course, in 
textbook materials taken as a whole for each course, in 
library materials taken as a whole for the sciences and 
taken as a whole for the humanities, and in other educa-
tional programs in public schools, to the extent that such 
lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational 
programs deal in any way with the subject of the origin 
of man, life, the earth, or the universe. When creation 
or evolution is taught, each shall be taught as a theory, 
rather than as proven scientific fact." § 17:286.4.A. 
"Balanced treatment" means "providing whatever informa-
tion and instruction in both creation and evolution models the 
classroom teacher determines is necessary and appropriate to 
provide insight into both theories in view of the textbooks 
and other instructional materials available for use in his class-
room." § 286.3(1). "Creation-science" is defined as "the sci-
entific evidences for creation and inferences from those scien-
tific evidences." § 286.3(2). "Evolution-science" means 
"the scientific evidences for evolution and inferences from 
those scientific evidences." § 286.3(3). 
Although the Act requires the teaching of the scientific evi-
dences of both creation and evolution whenever either is 
taught, it does not define either term. "A funnamental 
canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise de-
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fined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, con-
temporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States , 444 
U. S. 37, 42 (1979). The "doctrine or theory of creation" is 
commonly defined as "holding that matter, the various forms 
of life, and the world were created by a transcendent God out 
of nothing." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
532 (unabridged 1981). "Evolution" is defined as "the theory 
that the various types of animals and plants have their origin 
in other preexisting types, the distinguishable difference 
being due to modifications in successive generations." I d. , 
at 789. Thus, the Balanced Treatment Act mandates that 
public schools present the scientific evidence to support a 
theory of divine creation whenever they present the scientific 
evidence to support the theory of evolution. "[C]oncepts 
concerning . . . a supreme being of some sort are manifestly 
religious. . . . These concepts do not shed that religiosity 
merely because they are presented as philosophy or as a sci-
ence." Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 (D.N. J. 
1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F. 2d 197 (CA3 1979). From the 
face of the statute, a purpose to advance a religious belief is 
apparent. 
A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate -an act 
of a state legislature. The religious purpose must predomi-
nate. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 56 (1986); id., at 
64 (POWELL, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 
668, 681, n. 6 (1984). The Act contains a statement of pur-
pose: to "protec[t] academic freedom." § 286.2. This state-
ment is puzzling. The "academic freedom" of teachers to 
present information in public schools, and students to receive 
it, is, of course, broad. But it necessarily is circumscribed 
by the Establishment Clause. "Academic freedom" does not 
encompass the right of a legislature to structure the public 
school curriculum in order to advance a particular religious 
belief. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 106 (1968). 
Nevertheless, I read this statement as rendering the purpose 
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; 
, I 
of the statute at least ambiguous. Accordingly, I proceed to 
review the legislative history of the Act. 
B 
In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate Bill 956 
to the Louisiana legislature. The purpose of the bill was to 
"assure academic freedom by requiring the teaching of the 
theory of creation ex nihilo in all public schools where the the-
ory of evolution is taught." 1 App. E-1. 2 The bill defined 
the "theory of creation ex nihilo" as "the belief that the origin 
of the elements, the galaxy, the solar system, of life, of all the 
species of plants and animals, the origin of man, and the ori-
gin of all things and their processes and relationships were 
created ex nihilo and fixed by God." 1 App. E-1a-1b. 
This theory was referred to by Senator Keith as "scientific 
creationism." 1 App. E-2. 
While a Senate committee was studying scientific 
creationism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of the 
bill, requiring balanced treatment of "evolution-science" and 
"creation-science." 1 App. E-108. Although the Keith bill 
prohibited "instruction in any religious doctrine or materi-
als," 1 App. E-302, it defined "creation-science" to include: 
"the scientific evidences and related inferences that indi-
cate (a) sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life 
from nothing; (b) the insufficiency of mutation and natu-
ral selection in bringing about development of all living 
2 Creation "ex nihilo" means creation "from nothing" and has been found 
to be an "inherently religious concept." McLean v. Arkansas Board of 
Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (ED Ark. 1982). The District Court 
in McLean found: 
"The argument that creation from nothing in [section] 4(a)(l) [of the sub-
stantially similar Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act] does not involve a su-
pernatural deity has no evidentiary or rational support. To the contrary, 
'creation out of nothing' is a concept unique to Western religions. In tradi-
tional Western religious thought, the conception of a creator of the world is 
a conception of God. Indeed, <''"eation of the world 'out of nothing' is the 
ultimate religious statement because God is the only actor." Id., at 1265. 
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kinds from a single organism; (c) changes only within 
fixed limits or originally created kinds of plants and ani-
mals; (d) separate ancestry for man and apes; (e) ex-
planation of the earth's geology by catastrophism, in-
cluding the occurrence of a worldwide flood; and (f) a 
relatively recent inception of the earth and living kinds." 
1 App. E-298-299. 
Significantly, the model act on which the Keith bill relied 
was also the basis for a similar statute in Arkansas. See 
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F . Supp. 1255 
(ED Ark. 1982). The District Court in McLean carefully ex-
amined this model act, particularly the section defining cre-
ation-science, and concluded that "[b]oth [its] concepts and 
wording .. . convey an inescapable religiosity. " Id. , at 
1265. The court found that "[t]he ideas of [this section] are 
not merely similar to the literal interpretation of Genesis; 
they are identical and parallel to no other story of creation." 
Ibid. 
The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981. On 
May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee amended the Keith 
bill to delete the illustrative list of scientific evidences. Ac-
cording to the legislator who proposed the amendment, it 
was "not intended to try to gut [the bill] in any way, or defeat 
the purpose [for] which Senator Keith introduced [it] ," 1 
App. E-432, and was not viewed as working "any violence to 
the bill." 1 App. E-438. Instead, the concern was 
"whether this should be an all inclusive list." 1 App. E-438. 
The legislature then held hearings on the amended bill, 
that became the Balanced Treatment Act under review. 
The principal creation-scientist to testify in support of the 
Act was Dr. Edward Boudreaux. He did not elaborate on 
the nature of creation-science except to indicate that the "sci-
entific evidences" of the theory are "the objective information 
of science [that] point[s] to conditions of a creator." .2 App. 
E-501-502. He further testified that the recognized cre-
ation-scientists in the United States, who "numbe[r] some-
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thing like a thousand [and] who hold doctorate and masters 
degrees in all areas of science," are affiliated with either or 
both the Institute for Creation Research and the Creation 
Research Society. 2 App. E-503--504. Information on 
both of these organizations is part of the legislative history, 
and a review of their goals and activities sheds light on the 
nature of creation-science as it was presented to, and under-
stood by, the Louisiana legislature. 
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate of the 
Christian Heritage College in San Diego, California. The 
Institute was established to address the "urgent need for our 
nation to return to belief in a personal, omnipotent Creator, 
who has a purpose for His creation and to whom all people 
must eventually give account." 1 App. E-197. A goal of 
the Institute is "a revival of belief in special creation as the 
true explanation of the origin of the world." Therefore, the 
Institute currently is working on the "development of new 
methods for teaching scientific creationism in public schools." 
1 App. E-197-199. The Creation Research Society (CRS) 
is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. A member must sub-
scribe to the following statement of belief: "The Bible is the 
written word of God, and because it is inspired throughout, 
all of its assertions are historically and scientifically true." 2 
App. E-583. To study creation-science at the CRS, a mem-
ber must accept "that the account of origins in Genesis is a 
factual presentation of simple historical truth." 2 App. 
E-583.3 
3 The District Court in McLean noted three other elements of the CRS 
statement of belief to which members must subscribe: 
"[i] All basic types of living things, including man, were made by direct cre-
ative acts of God during Creation Week as described in Genesis. What-
ever biological changes have occurred since Creation have accomplished 
only changes within the original created kinds. [ii] The great Flood de-
scribed in Genesis, commonly referred to as the Noachian Deluge, was an 
historical event, world-wide in its extent and effect. [iii] Finally, we are 
an organization of Christian men of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our 
Lord and Savior. The account of the special creation of Adam and Eve as 
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When, as here, "both courts below are unable to discern an 
arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should 
hesitate to find one." Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 66 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). My examination of the language and 
the legislative history of the Balanced Treatment Act con-
firms that the intent of the Louisiana legislature was to pro-
mote a particular religious belief. The legislative history of 
the Arkansas statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution ex-
amined in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S., at 97, was strik-
ingly similar to the legislative history of the Balanced Treat-
ment Act. In Epperson, the Court found: 
"It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was 
and is the law's reason for existence. Its antecedent, 
Tennessee's 'monkey law,' candidly stated its purpose: to 
make it unlawful 'to teach any theory that denies the 
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bi-
ble, and to teach instead that man has descended from a 
lower .order of animals.' Perhaps the sensational public-
ity attendant upon the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to 
adopt less explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's 
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation of man' as 
taught in the Bible, but there is no doubt that the moti-
vation for the law was the same: to suppress the teaching 
of a theory which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine cre-
ation of man." !d., at 107-109 (footnotes omitted). 
Here, it is clear that religious belief is the Balanced Treat-
ment's Act's "reason for existence." The tenets of creation-
science parallel the Genesis story of creation, 4 and this is a 
one man and one woman, and their subsequent Fall into sin, is the basis for 
our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all mankind. Therefore, salva-
tion can come only thru (sic) accepting Jesus Christ as our Savior." 529 F . 
Supp., at 1260, n. 7. 
'After hearing testimony from numerous experts, the District Court in 
McLean concluded that "[t]he parallels between [the definition section of 
the model act] and Genesis are quite specific." 529 F. Supp., at 1265, 
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religious belief. "No legislative recitation of a supposed sec-
ular purpose can blind us to that fact." Stone v. Graham, 
449 U. S. 39, 41 (1980). Although the Act as finally enacted 
does not contain explicit reference to its religious purpose, 
there is no indication in the legislative history that the dele-
tion of ·"creation ex nihilo" and the four primary tenets of the 
theory were . intended to alter the purpose of teaching cre-
ation-science. Instead, the statements of purpose of the 
sources of creation-science in the United States make clear 
that their purpose is to promote a religious belief. There is 
no evidence in the legislative history that the legislature's 
purpose was any different. The fact that the Louisiana leg-
islature purported to add information to the school curricu-
lum rather than detract from it as in Epperson does not affect 
my analysis. Both legislatures acted with the unconstitu-
tional purpose of structuring the public school curriculum to 
make it compatible with a particular religious belief: the "di-
vine creation of man." 
That the statute is limited to the scientific evidences sup-
porting the theory does not render its purpose secular. In 
reaching its conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional, the 
Court of Appeals "did not deny that the underpinnings of 
creationism may be supported by scientific evidence." 765 
F. 2d 1251, 1256 (1985). And there is no need to do so. 
Whatever the academic merit of particular subjects or theo-
ries, the Establishment Clause limits the discretion of state 
officials to pick and choose among them for the purpose of 
promoting a particular religious belief. The language of the 
statute and its legislative history convince me that the Loui-
n. 19. It found the concepts of "sudden creation from nothing," a world-
wide flood of divine origin, and "kinds" to be derived from Genesis; "rela-
tively recent inception" to mean "an age of the earth from 6,000 to 10,000 
years" and to be based "on the geneology of the Old Testament using the 
rather astronomical ages assigned to the patriarchs;" and the "separate an-
cestry of man and ape" to focus on "the portion of the theory of evolution 
which Fundamentalists find most offensive." Ibid. (citing Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968)). 
.. 
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siana legislature exercised its discretion for this purpose in 
this case. 
II 
Even though I find Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act 
unconstitutional, I adhere to the view "that the States and 
locally elected school boards should have the responsibility 
for determining the educational policy of the public schools." 
Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 893 (1982) (Pow-
ELL, J., dissenting). A decision respecting the subject mat-
ter to be taught in public schools does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause simply because the material to be taught 
"'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or 
all religions."' Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 319 (1980) 
(quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961)). 
In the context of a challenge under the Establishment 
Clause, interference with the decisions of these authorities is 
warranted only when the purpose for their decisions is 
clearly religious. 
The history of the religion clauses of the First Amendment 
has been chronicled by this Court in detail. See, e. g., 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 8-14 (1947); 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 425-430 (1962); McGowan v. 
Maryland, supra, at 437-442. Therefore, only a brief re-
view at this point may be appropriate. The early settlers 
came to this country from Europe to escape religious per-
secution that took the form of forced support of state-estab-
lished churches. The new Americans thus reacted strongly 
when they perceived the same type of religious intolerance 
emerging in this country. The reaction in Virginia, the 
home of many of the Founding Fathers, is instructive. 
George Mason's draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
was adopted by the House of Burgesses in 1776. It con-
tained a guarantee of free exercise of religion. Eight years 
later, a provision prohibiting the establishment of religion be-
came a part of Virginia law when James Madison's Memorial 
and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, written in 
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response to a proposal that all Virginia citizens be taxed to 
support the teaching of the Christian religion, spurred the 
legislature to consider and adopt Thomas Jefferson's Bill for 
Establishing Religious Freedom. See Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 770, n. 28. Both the 
guarantees of free exercise and against the establishment of 
religion were then incorporated into the Federal Bill of 
Rights by its drafter, James Madison. 
While the "meaning and scope of the First Amendment" 
must be read "in light of its history and the evils it was de-
signed forever to suppress," Everson v. Board of Education, 
supra, at 14-15, this Court has also recognized that "this Na-
tion's history has not been one of entirely sanitized separa-
tion between Church and State." Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 760. "The fact that the 
Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God 
and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is 
clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Com-
pact to the Constitution itself." Abington School District v. 
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 213 (1963). 5 The Court has noted 
"an unbroken history of offical acknowledgement . . . of the 
role of religion in American life." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U. S., at 674, and has recognized that these references to 
"our religious heritage" are constitutionally acceptable. I d., 
at 677. 
As a matter of history, school children can and should prop-
erly be informed of all aspects of this Nation's religious heri-
tage. I would see no constitutional problem if school chil-
dren were taught the nature of the Founding Father's 
religious beliefs and how these beliefs affected the attitudes 
5J ohn Adams wrote to Thomas Jefferson, "The Bible is the best book in 
the world. It contains more of my little philosophy than all the libraries I 
have seen; and such parts of it as I cannot reconcile to my little philosophy, 
I postpone for future investigation." II Correspondence 412 (Dec. 25, 
1813). 
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of the times and the structure of our government. 6 Courses 
in comparative religion of course are customary and constitu-
tionally appropriate. 7 In fact, since religion permeates our 
history, a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is 
necessary to understand many historical as well as contempo-
rary events. 8 In addition, it is worth noting that the Estab-
lishment Clause does not prohibit per se the educational use 
of religious documents in public school education. Although 
this Court has recognized that the Bible is "an instrument of 
religion," Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 
224, it also has made clear that the Bible "may constitution-
ally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, 
6 There is an enonnous variety of religions in the United States. The 
Encyclopedia of American Religions (2d ed. 1987) describes 1,347 religious 
organizations. The United States Census Bureau groups the major Amer-
ican religions into: Buddhist Churches of America; Eastern Churches; 
Jews; Old Catholic, Polish National Catholic, and Annenian Churches; The 
Roman Catholic Church; Protestants; and Miscellaneous. Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States 50 (106th ed. 1986). 
7 State-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer courses inte-
grating religious studies into the curriculum. Approximately half of the 
state-sponsored universities offer one or more courses involving religion. 
As an example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers seven 
courses: Introduction to Religion, Old Testament, New Testament, Faith 
and Doubt, Jesus in History and Tradition, Eastern Religions, and Philoso-
phy of Religion. 
Of course, the difference in maturity between college-age and secondary 
students may affect the constitutional analysis of a particular public school 
policy. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274, n. 14 (1981). Never-
theless, many general teaching guides suggest that education as to the na-
ture of various religious beliefs could be integrated into a secondary school 
curriculum in a manner consistent with the Constitution. See, e. g., C. 
Kniker, Teaching about Religion in the Public Schools (1985); The Religion 
in Elementary Social Studies Project, Final Report (Fla. State Univ. 
1976); L. Karp, Teaching the Bible as Literature in the Public Schools 
(1973). 
6 For example, the political controversies in Northern Ireland, the Mid-
dle East, and India cannot be understood properly without reference to the 
underlying religious beliefs and the conflicts they tend to generate. 
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ethics, comparative religion, or the like." Stone v. Graham, 
449 U. S., at 42 (citing id., at 225). The book is, in fact, "the 
world's all-time best seller"9 with undoubted literary and his-
toric value apart from its religious content. The Establish-
ment Clause is properly understood to prohibit the use of the 
Bible and other religious documents in public school educa-
tion only when the purpose of the use is to advance religious 
belief. 
III 
In sum, I find that the language and the legislative history 
of the Balanced Treatment Act unquestionably demonstrate 
that its purpose is to advance a particular religious belief. 
Although the discretion of state and local authorities over 
public school curricula is broad, "the First Amendment does 
not permit the State to require that teaching and learning 
must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any reli-
gious sect or dogma." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S., at 
106. Accordingly, I concur in the opinion of the Court and 
its judgment that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the 
Establishment Clause of the Constitution. 
9 SeeN. Y. Times, May 10, 1981, section 2, p. 24, col. 3; N. McWhirter, 
1986 Guiness Book of World Records 144 (the Bible is the world's most 
widely distributed book). 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I write separately to note certain aspects of the legislative 
history, and to emphasize that nothing in the Court's opinion 
diminishes the traditionally broad discretion accorded state 
and local school officials in the selection of the public school 
curriculum. 
I 
This Court consistently has applied the three-pronged test 
of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), to determine 
whether a particular state action violates the Establishment 
Clause of the Constitution. 1 See, e. g., Grand Rapids 
School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 383 (1985) ("We have 
particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sen-
sitive relationship between government and religion in the 
education of our children"). The first requirement of the 
Lemon test is that the challenged statute have a "secular leg-
islative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612. See 
Committee fo·,· Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 755, 
773 (1973). If no valid secular purpose can be identified, 
then the statute violates the Establishment Clause. 
'As the Court recognizes, ante, at -, n. 4, the one exception to this 
consistent application of the Lemon test is Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783 (1983). 
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A 
"The starting point in every case involving construction of 
a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., 
concurring). The Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science 
and Evolution-Science Act (Act or Balanced Treatment Act), 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:286.1 et seq. (West 1982), provides 
in part: 
"[P]ublic schools within [the] state shall give balanced 
treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science. 
Balanced treatment of these two models shall be given in 
classroom lectures taken as a whole for each course, in 
textbook materials taken as a whole for each course, in 
library materials taken as a whole for the sciences and 
taken as a whole for the humanities, and in other educa-
tional programs in public schools, to the extent that such 
lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational 
programs deal in any way with the subject of the origin 
of man, life, the earth, or the universe. When creation 
or evolution is taught, each shall be taught as a theory, 
rather than as proven scientific fact." § 17:286.4(A). 
"Balanced treatment" means "providing whatever informa-
tion and instruction in both creation and evolution models the 
classroom teacher determines is necessary and appropriate to 
provide insight into both theories in view of the textbooks 
and other instructional materials available for use in his class-
room." § 17:286.3(1). "Creation-science" is defined as "the 
scientific evidences for creation and inferences from those 
scientific evidences." § 17:286.3(2). "Evolution-science" 
means "the scientific evidences for evolution and inferences 
from those scientific evidences." § 17:286.3(3). 
Although the Act requires the teaching of the scientific evi-
dences of both creation and evolution whenever either is 
taught, it does not define either term. "A fundamental 
canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise de-
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fined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, con-
temporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444 
U. S. 37, 42 (1979). The "doctrine or theory of creation" is 
commonly defined as "holding that matter, the various forms 
of life, and the world were created by a transcendent God out 
of nothing." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
532 (unabridged 1981). "Evolution" is defined as "the theory 
that the various types of animals and plants have their origin 
in other preexisting types, the distinguishable differences 
being due to modifications in successive generations." I d., 
at 789. Thus, the Balanced Treatment Act mandates that 
public schools present the scientific evidence to support a 
theory of divine creation whenever they present the scientific 
evidence to support the theory of evolution. "[C]oncepts 
concerning God or a supreme being of some sort are mani-
festly religious . . . . These concepts do not shed that religi-
osity merely because they are presented as a philosophy or as 
a science." Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 (N J 
1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F. 2d 197 (CA3 1979). From the 
face of the statute, a purpose to advance a religious belief is 
apparent. 
A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act 
of a state legislature. The religious purpose must predomi-
nate. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 56 (1985); id., at 
64 (POWELL, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 
668, 681, n. 6 (1984). The Act contains a statement of pur-
pose: to "protec[t] academic freedom." § 17:286.2. This 
statement is puzzling. The "academic freedom" of teachers 
to present information in public schools, and students to re-
ceive it, is, of course, broad. But it necessarily is circum-
scribed by the Establishment Clause. "Academic freedom" 
does not encompass the right of a legislature to structure the 
public school curriculum in order to advance a particular reli-
gious belief. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 106 
(1968). Nevertheless, I read this statement as rendering the 
85-1513-CONCUR 
4 EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD 
purpose of the statute at least ambiguous. Accordingly, I 
proceed to review the legislative history of the Act. 
B 
In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate Bill 956 
to the Louisiana legislature. The purpose of the bill was to 
"assure academic freedom by requiring the teaching of the 
theory of creation ex nihilo in all public schools where the the-
ory of evolution is taught." 1 App. E-1. 2 The bill defined 
the "theory of creation ex nihilo" as "the belief that the origin 
of the elements, the galaxy, the solar system, of life, of all the 
species of plants and animals, the origin of man, and the ori-
gin of all things and their processes and relationships were 
created ex nihilo and fixed by God." Id., at E-1a-E-1b. 
This theory was referred to by Senator Keith as "scientific 
creationism." Id., at E-2. 
While a Senate committee was studying scientific 
creationism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of the 
bill, requiring balanced treatment of "evolution-science" and 
"creation-science." /d., at E-108. Although the Keith bill 
prohibited "instruction in any religious doctrine or materi-
als," id., at E-302, it defined "creation-science" to include 
"the scientific evidences and related inferences that indi-
cate (a) sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life 
from nothing; (b) the insufficiency of mutation and natu-
ral selection in bringing about development of all living 
2 Creation "ex nihilo" means creation "from nothing" and has been found 
to be an "inherently religious concept." McLean v. Arkansas Board of 
Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (ED Ark. 1982). The District Court 
in McLean found: 
"The argument that creation from nothing in [section] 4(a)(l) [of the sub-
stantially similar Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act] does not involve a su-
pernatural deity has no evidentiary or rational support. To the contrary, 
'creation out of nothing' is a concept unique to Western religions. In tradi-
tional Western religious thought, the conception of a creator of the world is 
a conception of God. Indeed, creation of the world 'out of nothing' is the 
ultimate religious statement because God is the only actor." !d., at 1265. 
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kinds from a single organism; (c) changes only within 
fixed limits or originally created kinds of plants and ani-
mals; (d) separate ancestry for man and apes; (e) ex-
planation of the earth's geology by catastrophism, in-
cluding the occurrence of a worldwide flood; and (f) a 
relatively recent inception of the earth and living kinds." 
/d., at E-298---E-299. 
Significantly, the model act on which the Keith bill relied 
was also the basis for a similar statute in Arkansas. See 
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255 
(ED Ark. 1982). The District Court in McLean carefully ex-
amined this model act, particularly the section defining cre-
ation-science, and concluded that "[b]oth [its] concepts and 
wording . . . convey an inescapable religiosity." I d., at 
1265. The court found that "[t]he ideas of [this section] are 
not merely similar to the literal interpretation of Genesis; 
they are identical and parallel to no other story of creation." 
Ibid. 
The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981. On 
May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee amended the Keith 
bill to delete the illustrative list of scientific evidences. Ac-
cording to the legislator who proposed the amendment, it 
was "not intended to try to gut [the bill] in any way, or defeat 
the purpose [for] which Senator Keith introduced [it]," 1 
App. E-432, and was not viewed as working "any violence to 
the bill." I d., at E-438. Instead, the concern was "whether 
this should be an all inclusive list." Ibid. 
The legislature then held hearings on the amended bill, 
that became the Balanced Treatment Act under review. 
The principal creation-scientist to testify in support of the 
Act was Dr. Edward Boudreaux. He did not elaborate on 
the nature of creation-science except to indicate that the "sci-
entific evidences" of the theory are "the objective information 
of science [that] point[s] to conditions of a creator." 2 id., at 
E-501-E-502. He further testified that the recognized cre-
ation-scientists in the United States, who "numbe[r] some-
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thing like a thousand [and] who hold doctorate and masters 
degrees in all areas of science," are affiliated with either or 
both the Institute for Creation Research and the Creation 
Research Society. Id., at E-503-E-504. Information on 
both of these organizations is part of the legislative history, 
and a review of their goals and activities sheds light on the 
nature of creation-science as it was presented to, and under-
stood by, the Louisiana legislature. 
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate of the 
Christian Heritage College in San Diego, California. The 
Institute was established to address the "urgent need for our 
nation to return to belief in a personal, omnipotent Creator, 
who has a purpose for His creation and to whom all people 
must eventually give account." 1 id., at E-197. A goal of 
the Institute is "a revival of belief in special creation as the 
true explanation of the origin of the world." Therefore, the 
Institute currently is working on the "development of new 
methods for teaching scientific creationism in public schools." 
Id., at E-197-E-199. The Creation Research Society 
(CRS) is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. A member must 
subscribe to the following statement of belief: "The Bible is 
the written word of God, and because it is inspired through-
out, all of its assertions are historically and scientifically 
true." 2 id., at E-583. To study creation-science at the 
CRS, a member must accept "that the account of origins in 
Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical truth." 
Ibid. 3 
3 The District Court in McLean noted three other elements of the CRS 
statement of belief to which members must subscribe: 
"[i] All basic types of living things, including man, were made by direct cre-
ative acts of God during Creation Week as described in Genesis. What-
ever biological changes have occurred since Creation have accomplished 
only changes within the original created kinds. [ii] The great Flood de-
scribed in Genesis, commonly referred to as the Noachian Deluge, was an 
historical event, world-wide in its extent and effect. [iii] Finally, we are 
an organization of Christ:an men of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our 
Lord and Savior. The account of the special creation of Adam and Eve as 
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When, as here, "both courts below are unable to discern an 
arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should 
hesitate to find one." Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 66 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). My examination of the language and 
the legislative history of the Balanced Treatment Act con-
firms that the intent of the Louisiana legislature was to pro-
mote a particular religious belief. The legislative history of 
the Arkansas statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution ex-
amined in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), was 
strikingly similar to the legislative history of the Balanced 
Treatment Act. In Epperson, the Court found: 
"It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was 
and is the law's reason for existence. Its antecedent, 
Tennessee's 'monkey law,' candidly stated its purpose: to 
make it unlawful 'to teach any theory that denies the 
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bi-
ble, and to teach instead that man has descended from a 
lower order of animals.' Perhaps the sensational public-
ity attendant upon the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to 
adopt less explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's 
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation of man' as 
taught in the Bible, but there is no doubt that the moti-
vation for the law was the same: to suppress the teaching 
of a theory which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine cre-
ation of man." !d., at 107-109 (footnotes omitted). 
Here, it is clear that religious belief is the Balanced Treat-
ment's Act's "reason for existence." The tenets of creation-
science parallel the Genesis story of creation, 4 and this is a 
one man and one woman, and their subsequent Fall into sin, is the basis for 
our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all mankind. Therefore, salva-
tion can come only thru (sic) accepting Jesus Christ as our Savior." 529 F. 
Supp., at 1260, n. 7. 
'After hearing testimony from numerous experts, the District Court in 
McLean concluded that "[t]he parallels between [the definition section of 
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religious belief. "[N]o legislative recitation of a supposed 
secular purpose can blind us to that fact." Stone v. Graham, 
449 U. S. 39, 41 (1980). Although the Act as finally enacted 
does not contain explicit reference to its religious purpose, 
there is no indication in the legislative history that the dele-
tion of "creation ex nihilo" and the four primary tenets of the 
theory were intended to alter the purpose of teaching cre-
ation-science. Instead, the statements of purpose of the 
sources of creation-science in the United States make clear 
that their purpose is to promote a religious belief. There is 
no evidence in the legislative history that the legislature's 
purpose was any different. The fact that the Louisiana leg-
islature purported to add information to the school curricu-
lum rather than detract from it as in Epperson does not affect 
my analysis. Both legislatures acted with the unconstitu-
tional purpose of structuring the public school curriculum to 
make it compatible with a particular religious belief: the "di-
vine creation of man." 
That the statute is limited to the scientific evidences sup-
porting the theory does not render its purpose secular. In 
reaching its conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional, the 
Court of Appeals "[did] not deny that the underpinnings of 
creationism may be supported by scientific evidence." 765 
F. 2d 1251, 1256 (1985). And there is no need to do so. 
Whatever the academic merit of particular subjects or theo-
ries , the Establishment Clause limits the discretion of state 
officials to pick and choose among them for the purpose of 
promoting a particular religious belief. The language of the 
statute and its legislative history convince me that the Loui-
found the concepts of "sudden creation from nothing," a worldwide flood of 
divine origin, and "kinds" to be derived from Genesis; "relatively recent 
inception" to mean "an age of the earth from 6,000 to 10,000 years" and to 
be based "on the geneology of the Old Testament using the rather as-
tronomical ages assigned to the patriarchs"; and the "separate ancestry of 
man and ape" to focus on "the portion of the theory of evolution which Fun-
damentalists find most offensive." Ibid. (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 
393 u. s. 97 (1968)). 
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siana legislature exercised its discretion for this purpose in 
this case. 
II 
Even though I find Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act 
unconstitutional, I adhere to the view "that the States and 
locally elected school boards should have the responsibility 
for determining the educational policy of the public schools." 
Board of Education v. Pica, 457 U. S. 853, 893 (1982) (Pow-
ELL, J., dissenting). A decision respecting the subject mat-
ter to be taught in public schools does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause simply because the material to be taught 
"'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or 
all religions."' Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 319 (1980) 
(quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961)). 
In the context of a challenge under the Establishment 
Clause, interference with the decisions of these authorities is 
warranted only when the purpose for their decisions is 
clearly religious. 
The history of the religion clauses of the First Amendment 
has been chronicled by this Court in detail. See, e. g., 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 8-14 (1947); 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 425-430 (1962); McGowan v. 
Maryland, supra, at 437-442. Therefore, only a brief re-
view at this point may be appropriate. The early settlers 
came to this country from Europe to escape religious per-
secution that took the form offorced support of state-estab-
lished churches. The new Americans thus reacted strongly 
when they perceived the same type of religious intolerance 
emerging in this country. The reaction in Virginia, the 
home of many of the Founding Fathers, is instructive. 
George Mason's draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
was adopted by the House of. Burgesses in 1776. It con-
tained a guarantee of free exercise of religion. Eight years 
later, a provision prohibiting the establishment of religion be-
came a part of Virginia law when James Madison'~ Memorial 
and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, written in 
'· 
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response to a proposal that all Virginia citizens be taxed to 
support the teaching of the Christian religion, spurred the 
legislature to consider and adopt Thomas Jefferson's Bill for 
Establishing Religious Freedom. See Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 770, n. 28. Both the 
guarantees of free exercise and against the establishment of 
religion were then incorporated into the Federal Bill of 
Rights by its drafter, James Madison. 
While the "meaning and scope of the First Amendment" 
must be read "in light of its history and the evils it was de-
signed forever to suppress," Everson v. Board of Education, 
supra, at 14-15, this Court has also recognized that "this Na-
tion's history has not been one of entirely sanitized separa-
tion between Church and State." Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 760. "The fact that the 
Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God 
and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is 
clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Com-
pact to the Constitution itself." Abington School District v. 
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 213 (1963). 5 The Court has noted 
"an unbroken history of official acknowledgement . . . of the 
role of religion in American life." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U. S., at 674, and has recognized that these references to 
"our religious heritage" are constitutionally acceptable. I d., 
at 677. 
As a matter of history, school children can and should prop-
erly be informed of all aspects of this Nation's religious heri-
tage. I would see no constitutional problem if school chil-
dren were taught the nature of the Founding Father's 
religious beliefs and how these beliefs affected the attitudes 
5J ohn Adams wrote to Thomas Jefferson: "(T]he Bible is the best book 
in the world. It contains more of my little philosophy than all the libraries 
I have seen; and such parts of it as I cannot reconcile to my little philoso-
phy, I postpone for future investigation." Letter of Dec. 25, 1813, 10 
Works of John Adams 85 (1856). 
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of the times and the structure of our government. 6 Courses 
in comparative religion of course are customary and constitu-
tionally appropriate. 7 In fact, since religion permeates our 
history, a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is 
necessary to understand many historical as well as contempo-
rary events. 8 In addition, it is worth noting that the Estab-
lishment Clause does not prohibit per se the educational use 
of religious documents in public school education. Although 
this Court has recognized that the Bible is "an instrument of 
religion," Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 
224, it also has made clear that the Bible "may constitution-
ally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, 
ethics, comparative religion, or the like." Stone v. Graham, 
6 There is an enormous variety of religions in the United States. The 
Encyclopedia of American Religions (2d ed. 1987) describes 1,347 religious 
organizations. The United States Census Bureau groups the major Amer-
ican religions into: Buddhist Churches of America; Eastern Churches; 
Jews; Old Catholic, Polish National Catholic, and Armenian Churches; The 
Roman Catholic Church; Protestants; and Miscellaneous. Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States 50 (106th ed. 1986). 
7 State-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer courses inte-
grating religious studies into the curriculum. Approximately half of the 
state-sponsored universities offer one or more courses involving religion. 
As an example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers seven 
courses: Introduction to Religion, Old Testament, New Testament, Faith 
and Doubt, Jesus in History and Tradition, Eastern Religions, and Philoso-
phy of Religion. 
Of course, the difference in maturity between college-age and secondary 
students may affect the constitutional analysis of a particular public school 
policy. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274, n. 14 (1981). Never-
theless, many general teaching guides suggest that education as to the na-
ture of various religious beliefs could be integrated into a secondary school 
curriculum in a manner consistent with the Constitution. See, e. g., C. 
Kniker, Teaching about Religion in Public Schools (1985); Religion in Ele-
mentary Social Studies Project, Final Report (Fla. State Univ. 1976); L. 
Karp, Teaching the Bible as Literature in Public Schools (1973). 
8 For example, the political controversies in Northern Ireland, the Mid-
dle East, and India cannot be understood properly without reference to the 
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449 U. S., at 42 (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 
supra, at 225). The book is, in fact, "the world's all-time 
best seller"9 with undoubted literary and historic value apart 
from its religious content. The Establishment Clause is 
properly understood to prohibit the use of the Bible and other 
religious documents in public school education only when the 
purpose of the use is to advance religious belief. 
III 
In sum, I find that the language and the legislative history 
of the Balanced Treatment Act unquestionably demonstrate 
that its purpose is to advance a particular religious belief. 
Although the discretion of state and local authorities over 
public school curricula is broad, "the First Amendment does 
not permit the State to require that teaching and learning 
must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any reli-
gious sect or dogma." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S., at 
106. Accordingly, I concur in the opinion of the Court and 
its judgment that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the 
Establishment Clause of the Constitution. 
9 SeeN. Y. Times, May 10, 1981, section 2, p. 24, col. 3; N. McWhirter, 
1986 Guiness Book of World Records 144 (the Bible is the world's most 
widely distributed book). 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1513 
EDWIN W. EDWARDS, ETC., ET AL. APPELLANTS v. 
DON AGUILLARD ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[April-, 1987] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I write separately to note certain aspects of the legislative 
history, and to emphasize that nothing in the Court's opinion 
diminishes the traditionally broad discretion accorded state 
and local school officials in the selection of the public school 
curriculum. 
I 
This Court consistently has applied the three-pronged test 
of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), to determine 
whether a particular state action violates the Establishment 
Clause of the Constitution. 1 See, e. g., Grand Rapids 
School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 383 (1985) ("We have 
particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sen-
sitive relationship between government and religion in the 
education of our children"). The first requirement of the 
Lemon test is that the challenged statute have a "secular leg-
islative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612. See 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
773 (1973). If no valid secular purpose can be identified, 
then the statute violates the Establishment Clause. 
1 As the Court recognizes, ante, at -, n. 4, the one exception to this 
consistent application of the Lemon test is Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783 (1983). 
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"The starting point in every case involving construction of 
a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., 
concurring). The Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science 
and Evolution-Science Act (Act or Balanced Treatment Act), 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:286.1 et seq. (West 1982), provides 
in part: 
"[P]ublic schools within [the] state shall give balanced 
treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science. 
Balanced treatment of these two models shall be given in 
classroom lectures taken as a whole for each course, in 
textbook materials taken as a whole for each course, in 
library materials taken as a whole for the sciences and 
taken as a whole for the humanities, and in other educa-
tional programs in public schools, to the extent that such 
lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational 
programs deal in any way with the subject of the origin 
of man, life, the earth, or the universe. When creation 
or evolution is taught, each shall be taught as a theory, 
rather than as proven scientific fact." § 17:286.4(A). 
"Balanced treatment" means "providing whatever informa-
tion and instruction in both creation and evolution models the 
classroom teacher determines is necessary and appropriate to 
provide insight into both theories in view of the textbooks 
and other instructional materials available for use in his 
classroom." § 17:286.3(1). "Creation-science" is defined 
as "the scientific evidences for creation and inferences from 
those scientific evidences." § 17:286.3(2). "Evolution-
science" means "the scientific evidences for evolution and 
inferences from those scientific evidences." · § 17:286. 3(3). 
Although the Act requires the teaching of the scientific evi-
dences of both creation and evolution whenever either is 
taught, it does not define either term. "A fundamental 
canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise de-
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fined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, con-
temporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444 
U. S. 37, 42 (1979). The "doctrine or theory of creation" is 
commonly defined as "holding that matter, the various forms 
of life, and the world were created by a transcendent God out 
of nothing." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
532 (unabridged 1981). "Evolution" is defined as "the theory 
that the various types of animals and plants have their origin 
in other preexisting types, the distinguishable differences 
being due to modifications in successive generations." I d., 
at 789. Thus, the Balanced Treatment Act mandates that 
public schools present the scientific evidence to support a· 
theory of divine creation whenever they present the scientific 
evidence to support the theory of evolution. "[C]oncepts 
concerning God or a supreme being of some sort are mani-
festly religious .... These concepts do not shed that religi-
osity merely because they are presented as a philosophy or as 
a science." Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 (NJ 
1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F. 2d 197 (CA3 1979). From the 
face of the statute, a purpose to advance a religious belief is 
apparent. 
A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act 
of a state legislature. The religious purpose must predomi-
nate. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 56 (1985); id., at 
64 (POWELL, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 
668, 681, n. 6 (1984). The Act contains a statement of pur-
pose: to "protec[t] academic freedom." § 17:286.2. This 
statement is puzzling. The "academic freedom" of teachers 
to present information in public schools, and students to re-
ceive it, is, of course, broad. But it necessarily is circum-
scribed by the Establishment Clause. "Academic freedom" 
does not encompass the right of a legislature to structure the 
public school curriculum in order to advance a particular reli-
gious belief. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 106 
(1968). Nevertheless, I read this statement as rendering the 
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purpose of the statute at least ambiguous. Accordingly, I 
proceed to review the legislative history of the Act. 
B 
In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate Bill 956 
to the Louisiana legislature. The purpose of the bill was to 
"assure academic freedom by requiring the teaching of the 
theory of creation ex nihilo in all public schools where the the-
ory of evolution is taught." 1 App. E-1. 2 The bill defined 
the "theory.of creation ex nihilo" as "the belief that the origin 
of the elements, the galaxy, the solar system, of life, of all the 
species of plants and animals, the origin of man, and the ori-
gin of all things and their processes and relationships were 
created ex nihilo and fixed by God." !d., at E-1a-E-1b. 
This theory was referred to by Senator Keith as "scientific 
creationism." I d., at E-2. 
While a Senate committee was studying scientific 
creationism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of the 
bill, requiring balanced treatment of "evolution-science" and 
"creation-science." !d., at E-108. Although the Keith bill 
prohibited "instruction in any religious doctrine or materi-
als," id., at E-302, it defined "creation-science" to include 
"the scientific evidences and related inferences that indi-
cate (a) sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life 
from nothing; (b) the insufficiency of mutation and natu-
ral selection in bringing about development of all living 
2 Creation "ex nihilo" means creation "from nothing" and has been found 
to be an "inherently religious concept." McLean v. Arkansas Board of 
Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (ED Ark. 1982). The District Court 
in McLean found: 
"The argument that creation from nothing in [section]4(a)(l) [of the sub-
stantially similar Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act] does not involve a su-
pernatural deity has no evidentiary or rational support. To the contrary, 
'creation out of nothing' is a concept unique to Western religions. In tradi-
tional Western religious thought, the conception of a creator of the world is 
a conception of God. Indeed, creation of the world 'out of nothing' is the 
ultimate religious statement because God is the only actor." I d., at 1265. 
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kinds from a single organism; (c) changes only within 
fixed limits or originally created kinds of plants and ani-
mals; (d) separate ancestry for man and apes; (e) ex-
planation of the earth's geology by catastrophism, in-
cluding the occurrence of a worldwide flood; and (f) a 
relatively recent inception of the earth and living kinds." 
I d., at E-298--E-299. 
Significantly, the model act on which the Keith bill relied 
was also the basis for a similar statute in Arkansas. See 
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255 
(ED Ark. 1982). The District Court in McLean carefully ex-
amined this model act, particularly the section defining cre-
ation-science, and concluded that "[b]oth [its] concepts and 
wording ... convey an inescapable religiosity." Id., at 
1265. The court found that "[t]he ideas of [this section] are 
not merely similar to the literal interpretation of Genesis; 
they are identical and parallel to no other story of creation." 
Ibid. 
The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981. On 
May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee amended the Keith 
bill to delete the illustrative list of scientific evidences. Ac-
cording to the legislator who proposed the amendment, it 
was "not intended to try to gut [the bill] in any way, or defeat 
the purpose [for] which Senator Keith introduced [it]," 1 
App. E-432, and was not viewed as working "any violence to 
the bill." I d., at E-438. Instead, the concern was "whether 
this should be an all inclusive list." Ibid. 
The legislature then held hearings on the amended bill, 
that became the Balanced Treatment Act under review. 
The principal creation-scientist to testify in support of the 
Act was Dr. Edward Boudreaux. He did not elaborate on 
the nature of creation-science except to indicate that the "sci-
entific evidences" of the theory are "the objective information 
of science [that] point[s] to conditions of a creator." 2 id., at 
E-501-E-502. He further testified that the recognized 
creation-scientists in the United States, who "numbe[r] 
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something like a thousand [and] who hold doctorate and mas-
ters degrees in all areas of science," are affiliated with either 
or both the Institute for Creation Research and the Creation 
Research Society. ld., at E-503-E-504. Information on 
both of these organizations is part of the legislative history, 
and a review of their goals and activities sheds light on the 
nature of creation-science as it was presented to, and under-
stood by, the Louisiana legislature. 
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate of the 
Christian Heritage College in San Diego, California. The 
Institute was established to address the "urgent need for our 
nation to return to belief in a personal, omnipotent Creator, 
who has a purpose for His creation and to whom all people 
must eventually give account." 1 id., at E-197. A goal of 
the Institute is "a revival of belief in special creation as the 
true explanation of the origin of the world." Therefore, the 
Institute currently is working on the "development of new 
methods for teaching scientific creationism in public schools." 
ld., at E-197-E-199. The Creation Research Society 
(CRS) is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. A member must 
subscribe to the following statement of belief: "The Bible is 
the written word of God, and because it is inspired through-
out, all of its assertions are historically and scientifically 
true." 2 id., at E-583. To study creation-science at the 
CRS, a member must accept "that the account of origins in 
Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical truth." 
lbid. 3 
3 The District Court in McLean noted three other elements of the CRS 
statement of belief to which members must subscribe: 
"[i] All basic types of living things, including man, were made by direct cre-
ative acts of God during Creation Week as described in Genesis. What-
ever biological changes have occurred since Creation have accomplished 
only changes within the original created kinds. [ii] The great Flood de-
scribed in Genesis, commonly referred to as the Noachian Deluge, was an 
historical event, world-wide in its extent and effect. [iii] Finally, we are 
an organization of Christian men of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our 
Lord and Savior. The account of the special cr~ation of Adam and Eve as 
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When, as here, "both courts below are unable to discern an 
arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should 
hesitate to find one." Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 66 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). My examination of the language and 
the legislative history of the Balanced Treatment Act con-
firms that the intent of the Louisiana legislature was to pro-
mote a particular religious belief. The legislative history of 
the Arkansas statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution ex-
amined in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), was 
strikingly similar to the legislative history of the Balanced 
Treatment Act. In Epperson, the Court found: 
"It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was 
and is the law's reason for existence. Its antecedent, 
Tennessee's 'monkey law,' candidly stated its purpose: to 
make it unlawful 'to teach any theory that denies the 
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bi-
ble, and to teach instead that man has descended from a 
lower order of animals.' Perhaps the sensational public-
ity attendant upon the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to 
adopt less explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's 
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation of man' as 
taught in the Bible, but there is no doubt that the moti-
vation for the law was the same: to suppress the teaching 
of a theory which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine cre-
ation of man." !d., at 107-109 (footnotes omitted). 
Here, it is clear that religious belief is the Balanced Treat-
ment's Act's "reason for existence." The tenets of creation-
science parallel the Genesis story of creation, 4 and this is a 
one man and one woman, and their subsequent Fall into sin, is the basis for 
our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all mankind. Therefore, salva-
tion can come only thru (sic) accepting Jesus Christ as our Savior. " 529 F . 
Supp., at 1260, n. 7. 
• After hearing testimony from numerous experts, the District Court in 
McLean concluded that "[t]he parallels between [the definition section of 
the model act] and Genesis are quite specific." !d., at 1265, n. 19. It 
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religious belief. "[N]o legislative recitation of a supposed 
secular purpose can blind us to that fact." Stone v. Graham, 
449 U. S. 39, 41 (1980). Although the Act as finally enacted 
does not contain explicit reference to its religious purpose, 
there is no indication in the legislative history that the dele-
tion of "creation ex nihilo" and the four primary tenets of the 
theory were intended to alter the purpose of teaching cre-
ation-science. Instead, the statements of purpose of the 
sources of creation-science in the United States make clear 
that their purpose is to promote a religious belief. There is 
no evidence in the legislative history that the legislature's 
purpose was any different. The fact that the Louisiana leg-
islature purported to add information to the school curricu-
lum rather than detract from it as in Epperson does not affect 
my analysis. Both legislatures acted with the unconstitu-
tional purpose of structuring the public school curriculum to 
make it compatible with a particular religious belief: the "di-
vine creation of man." 
That the statute is limited to the scientific evidences sup-
porting the theory does not render its purpose secular. In 
reaching its conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional, the 
Court of Appeals "[did] not deny that the underpinnings of 
creationism may be supported by scientific evidence." 765 
F. 2d 1251, 1256 (1985). And there is no need to do so. 
Whatever the academic merit of particular subjects or theo-
ries, the Establishment Clause limits the discretion of state 
officials to pick and choose among them for the purpose of 
promoting a particular religious belief. The language of the 
statute and its legislative history convince me that the Loui-
found the concepts of "sudden creation from nothing," a worldwide flood of 
divine origin, and "kinds" to be derived from Genesis; "relatively recent 
inception" to mean "an age of the earth from 6,000 to 10,000 years" and to 
be based "on the genealogy of the Old Testament using the rather as-
tronomical ages assigned to the patriarchs"; and the "separate ancestry of 
man and ape" to focus on "the portion of the theory of evolution which Fun-
damentalists find most offensive." Ibid. (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 
393 u. s. 97 (1968)). 
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siana legislature exercised its discretion for this purpose in 
this case. 
II 
Even though I find Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act 
unconstitutional, I adhere to the view "that the States and 
locally elected school boards should have the responsibility 
for determining the educational policy of the public schools." 
Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 893 (1982) (Pow-
ELL, J., dissenting). A decision respecting the subject mat-
ter to be taught in public schools does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause simply because the material to be taught 
"'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or 
all religions."' Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 319 (1980) 
(quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961)). 
In the context of a challenge under the Establishment 
Clause, interference with the decisions of these authorities is 
warranted only when the purpose for their decisions is 
clearly religious. 
The history of the religion clauses of the First Amendment 
has been chronicled by this Court in detail. See, e. g., 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 8-:-14 (1947); 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 425-430 (1962); McGowan v. 
Maryland, supra, at 437-442. Therefore, only a brief re-
view at this point may be appropriate. The early settlers 
came to this country from Europe to escape religious per-
secution that took the form of forced support of state-estab-
lished churches. The new Americans thus reacted strongly 
when they perceived the same type of religious intolerance 
emerging in this country. The reaction in Virginia, the 
home of many of the Founding Fathers, is instructive. 
George Mason's draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
was adopted by the House of Burgesses in 1776. Because of 
James Madison's influence, the Declaration of Rights embod-
ied the guarantee of free exercise of religion, as opposed to 
toleration. Eight years later, a provision prohibiting the 
establishment of religion became a part of Virginia law when 
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James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance against Reli-
gious Assessments, written in response to a proposal that all 
Virginia citizens be taxed to support the teaching of the 
Christian religion, spurred the legislature to consider and 
adopt Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious 
Freedom. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
413 U. S., at 770, n. 28. Both the guarantees of free exer-
cise and against the establishment of religion were then in-
corporated into the Federal Bill of Rights by its drafter, 
James Madison. 
While the "meaning and scope of the First Amendment" 
must be read "in light of its history and the evils it was de-
signed forever to suppress," Everson v. Board of Education, 
supra, at 14-15, this Court has also recognized that "this Na-
tion's history has not been one of entirely sanitized separa-
tion between Church and State." Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 760. "The fact that the 
Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God 
and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is 
clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Com-
pact to the Constitution itself." Abington School District v. 
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 213 (1963). 5 The Court has noted 
"an unbroken history of official acknowledgement ... of the 
role of religion in American life." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U. S., at 674, and has recognized that these references to 
"our religious heritage" are constitutionally acceptable. I d., 
at 677. 
As a matter of history, school children can and should prop-
erly be informed of all aspects of this Nation's religious heri-
tage. I would see no constitutional problem if school chil-
dren were taught the nature of the Founding Father's 
5 John Adams wrote to Thomas Jefferson: "[T]he Bible is the best book 
in the world. It contains more of my little philosophy than all the libraries 
I have seen; and such parts of it as I cannot reconcile to my little philoso-
phy, I postpone for future investigation." Letter of Dec. 25, 1813, 10 
Works of John Adams 85 (1856). 
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religious beliefs and how these beliefs affected the attitudes 
of the times and the structure of our government. 6 Courses 
in comparative religion of course are customary and constitu-
tionally appropriate. 7 In fact, since religion permeates our 
history, a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is 
necessary to understand many historical as well as contempo-
rary events. 8 In.addition, it is worth noting that the Estab-
lishment Clause does not prohibit per se the educational use 
of religious documents in public school education. Although 
this Court has recognized that the Bible is "an instrument of 
religion," Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 
224, it also has made clear that the Bible "may constitution-
ally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, 
"There is an enormous variety of religions in the United States. The 
Encyclopedia of American Religions (2d ed. 1987) describes 1,347 religious 
organizations. The United States Census Bureau groups the major Amer-
ican religions into: Buddhist Churches of America; Eastern Churches; 
Jews; Old Catholic, Polish National Catholic, and Armenian Churches; The 
Roman Catholic Church; Protestants; and Miscellaneous. Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States 50 (106th ed. 1986). 
7 State-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer courses inte-
grating religious studies into the curriculum. Approximately half of the 
state-sponsored universities offer one or more courses involving religion. 
As an example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers seven 
courses: Introduction to Religion, Old Testament, New Testament, Faith 
and Doubt, Jesus in History and Tradition, Eastern Religions, and Philoso-
phy of Religion. 
Of course, the difference in maturity between college-age and secondary 
students may affect the constitutional analysis of a particular public school 
policy. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274, n. 14 (1981). Never-
theless, many general teaching guides suggest that education as to the na-
ture of various religious beliefs could be integrated into a secondary school 
curriculum in a manner consistent with the Constitution. See, e. g., 
C. Kniker, Teaching about Religion in Public Schools (1985); Religion in 
Elementary Social Studies Project, Final Report (Fla. State Univ. 1976); 
L. Karp, Teaching the Bible as Literature in Public Schools (1973). 
8 For example, the political controversies in Northern Ireland, the Mid-
dle East, and India cannot be understood properly without reference to the 
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ethics, comparative religion, or the like." Stone v. Graham, 
449 U. S., at 42 (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 
supra, at 225). The book is, in fact, "the world's all-time 
best seller"9 with undoubted literary and historic value apart 
from its religious content. The Establishment Clause is 
properly understood to prohibit the use of the Bible and other 
religious documents in public school education only when the 
purpose of the use is to advance religious belief. 
III 
In sum, I find that the language and the legislative history 
of the Balanced Treatment Act unquestionably demonstrate 
that its · purpose is to advance a particular religious belief. 
Although the discretion of state and local authorities over 
public school curricula is broad, "the First Amendment does 
not permit the State to require that teaching and learning 
must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any reli-
gious sect or dogma." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S., at 
106. Accordingly, I concur in the opinion of the Court and 
its judgment that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the 
Establishment Clause of the Constitution. 
9 See N. Y. Times, May 10, 1981, § 2, p. 24, col. 3; N. McWhirter, 1986 
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, 
concurring. 
I write separately to note certain aspects of the legislative 
history, and to emphasize that nothing in the Court's opinion 
diminishes the traditionally broad discretion accorded state 
and local school officials in the selection of the public school 
curriculum. 
I 
This Court consistently has applied the three-pronged test 
of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), to determine 
whether a particular state action violates the Establishment 
Clause of the Constitution.' See, e. g., Grand Rapids 
School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 383 (1985) ("We have 
particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sen-
sitive relationship between government and religion in the 
education of our children"). The first requirement of the 
Lemon test is that the challenged statute have a "secular leg-
islative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612. See 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
773 (1973). If no valid secular purpose can be identified, 
then the statute violates the Establishment Clause. 
'As the Court recognizes, ante, at -, n. 4, the one exception to this 
consistent application of the Lemon test is Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783 (1983). 
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A 
"The starting point in every case involving construction 
of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., 
concurring). The Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science 
and Evolution-Science Act (Act or Balanced Treatment Act), 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:286.1 et seq. (West 1982), provides 
in part: 
"[P]ublic schools within [the] state shall give balanced 
treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science. 
Balanced treatment of these two models shall be given in 
classroom lectures taken as a whole for each course, in 
textbook materials taken as a whole for each course, in 
library materials taken as a whole for the sciences and 
taken as a whole for the humanities, and in other educa-
tional programs in public schools, to the extent that such 
lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational 
programs deal in any way with the subject of the origin 
of man, life, the earth, or the universe. When creation 
or evolution is taught, each shall be taught as a theory, 
rather than as proven scientific fact." § 17:286.4(A). 
"Balanced treatment" means "providing whatever informa-
tion and instruction in both creation and evolution models 
the classroom teacher determines is necessary and appropri-
ate to provide insight into both theories in view of the text-
books and other instructional materials available for use 
in his classroom." § 17:286.3(1). "Creation-science" is de-
fined as "the scientific evidences for creation and inferences 
from those scientific evidences." § 17:286.3(2). "Evolution-
science" means "the scientific evidences for evolution and in-
ferences from those scientific evidences." § 17:286.3(3). 
Although the Act requires the teaching of the scientific 
evidences of both creation and evolution whenever either 
is taught, it does not define either term. "A fundamental 
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fined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, con-
temporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444 
U. S. 37, 42 (1979). The "doctrine or theory of creation" is 
commonly defined as "holding that matter, the various forms 
of life, and the world were created by a transcendent God out 
of nothing." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
532 (unabridged 1981). "Evolution" is defined as "the theory 
that the various types of animals and plants have their origin 
in other preexisting types, the distinguishable differences 
being due to modifications in successive generations." I d., 
at 789. Thus, the Balanced Treatment Act mandates that 
public schools present the scientific evidence to support a 
theory of divine creation whenever they present the scientific 
evidence to support the theory of evolution. "[C]oncepts 
concerning God or a supreme being of some sort are mani-
festly religious . . .. These concepts po not shed that religi-
osity merely because they are presented as a philosophy or as 
a science." Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 (NJ 
1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F. 2d 197 (CA31979). From the 
face of the statute, a purpose to advance a religious belief is 
apparent. 
A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an 
act of a state legislature. The religious purpose must pre-
dominate. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 56 (1985); 
id., at 64 (POWELL, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U. S. 668, 681, n. 6 (1984). The Act contains a statement of 
purpose: to "protec[t] academic freedom." § 17:286.2. This 
statement is puzzling. Of course, the "academic freedom" of 
teachers to present information in public schools, and stu-
dents to receive it is broad. But it necessarily is circum-
scribed by the Establishment Clause. "Academic freedom" 
does not encompass the right of a legislature to structure 
the public school curriculum in order to advance a particular 
religious belief. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 106 
(1968). Nevertheless, I read this statement in the Act as 
rendering the purpose of the statute at least ambiguous. 
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Accordingly, I proceed to review the legislative history of 
the Act. 
B 
In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate Bill 956 
in the Louisiana legislature. The stated purpose of the bill 
was to "assure academic freedom by requiring the teaching of 
the theory of creation ex nihilo in all public schools where the 
theory of evolution is taught." 1 App. E-1. 2 The bill de-
fined the "theory of creation ex nihilo" as "the belief that the 
origin of the elements, the galaxy, the solar system, of life, of 
all the species of plants and animals, the origin of man, and 
the origin of all things and their processes and relationships 
were created ex nihilo and fixed by God." ld., at E-1a-
E-1b. This theory was referred to by Senator Keith as "sci-
entific creationism." I d., at E-2. 
While a Senate committee was studying scientific creation-
ism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of the bill, 
requiring balanced treatment of "evolution-science" and "cre-
ation-science." ld., at E-108. Although the Keith bill pro-
hibited "instruction in any religious doctrine or materials," 
id., at E-302, it defined "creation-science" to include 
"the scientific evidences and related inferences that indi-
cate (a) sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life 
from nothing; (b) the insufficiency of mutation and natu-
ral selection in bringing about development of all living 
kinds from a single organism; (c) changes only within 
2 Creation "ex nihilo" means creation "from nothing" and has been found 
to be an "inherently religious concept." McLean v. Arkansas Board of 
Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (ED Ark. 1982). The District Court 
in McLean found: 
"The argument that creation from nothing in [section] 4(a)(1) [of the sub-
stantially similar Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act] does not involve a su-
pernatural deity has no evidentiary or rational support. To the contrary, 
'creation out of nothing' is a concept unique to Western religions. In tradi-
tional Western religious thought, the conception of a creator of the world is 
a conception of God. Indeed, creation of the world 'out of nothing' is the 
ultimate religious statement because God is the only actor." Id., at 1265. 
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fixed limits or originally created kinds of plants and ani-
mals; (d) separate ancestry for man and apes; (e) ex-
planation of the earth's geology by catastrophism, in-
cluding the occurrence of a worldwide flood; and (f) a 
relatively recent inception of the earth and living kinds." 
I d., at E-298---E-299. 
Significantly, the model act on which the Keith bill relied 
was also the basis for a similar statute in Arkansas. See 
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255 
(ED Ark. 1982). The District Court in McLean carefully ex-
amined this model act, particularly the section defining cre-
ation-science, and concluded that "[b]oth [its] concepts and 
wording ... convey an inescapable religiosity." Id., at 
1265. The court found that "[t]he ideas of [this section] are 
not merely similar to the literal interpretation of Genesis; 
they are identical and parallel to no other story of creation." 
Ibid. 
The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981. On 
May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee amended the Keith 
bill to delete the illustrative list of scientific evidences. 
According to the legislator who proposed the amendment, 
it was "not intended to try to gut [the bill] in any way, or de-
feat the purpose [for] which Senator Keith introduced [it]," 1 
App. E-432, and was not viewed as working "any violence to 
the bill." I d., at E-438. Instead, the concern was "whether 
this should be an all inclusive list." Ibid. 
The legislature then held hearings on the amended bill, 
that became the Balanced Treatment Act under review. 
The principal creation-scientist to testify in support of the 
Act was Dr. Edward Boudreaux. He did not elaborate on 
the nature of creation-science except to indicate that the "sci-
entific evidences" of the theory are "the objective information 
of science [that] point[s] to conditions of a creator." 2 id., at 
E-501-E-502. He further testified that the recognized cre-
ation-scientists in the United States, who "numbe[r] some-
thing like a thousand [and] who hold doctorate and masters 
·' •' 
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degrees in all areas of science," are affiliated with either or 
both the Institute for Creation Research and the Creation 
Research Society. Id., at E-503-E-504. Information on 
both of these organizations is part of the legislative history, 
and a review of their goals and activities sheds light on the 
nature of creation-science as it was presented to, and under-
stood by, the Louisiana legislature. 
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate of the 
Christian Heritage College in San Diego, California. The 
Institute was established to address the "urgent need for our 
nation to return to belief in a personal, omnipotent Creator, 
who has a purpose for His creation and to whom all people 
must eventually give account." 1 id., at E-197. A goal 
of the Institute is "a revival of belief in special creation as 
the true explanation of the origin of the world." Therefore, 
the Institute currently is working on the "development of 
new methods for teaching scientific creationism in public 
schools." Id., at E-197-E-199. The Creation Research 
Society (CRS) is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. A mem-
ber must subscribe to the following statement of belief: "The 
Bible is the written word of God, and because it is inspired 
throughout, all of its assertions are historically and scientifi-
cally true." 2 id., at E-583. To study creation-science at 
the CRS, a member must accept "that the account of origins 
in Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical truth." 
lbid. 3 
3 The District Court in McLean noted three other elements of the CRS 
statement of belief to which members must subscribe: 
"[i] All basic types of living things, including man, were made by direct cre-
ative acts of God during Creation Week as described in Genesis. What-
ever biological changes have occurred since Creation have accomplished 
only changes within the original created kinds. [ii] The great Flood de-
scribed in Genesis, commonly referred to as the Noachian Deluge, was an 
historical event, world-wide in its extent and effect. [iii] Finally, we are 
an organization of Christian men of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our 
Lord and Savior. The account of the special creation of Adam and Eve as 
one man and one woman, and their subsequent Fall into sin, is the basis for 
' I 
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c 
When, as here, "both courts below are unable to discern an 
arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should 
hesitate to find one." Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 66 
(POWELL, J., concurring). My examination of the language 
and the legislative history of the Balanced Treatment Act 
confirms that the intent of the Louisiana legislature was to 
promote a particular religious belief. The legislative history 
of the Arkansas statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution 
examined in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), was 
strikingly similar to the legislative history of the Balanced 
Treatment Act. In Epperson, the Court found: 
"It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was 
and is the law's reason for existence. Its antecedent, 
Tennessee's 'monkey law,' candidly stated its purpose: to 
make it unlawful 'to teach any theory that denies the 
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bi-
ble, and to teach instead that man has descended from a 
lower order of animals.' Perhaps the sensational public-
ity attendant upon the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to 
adopt less explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's 
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation of man' as 
taught in the Bible, but there is no doubt that the moti-
vation for the law was the same: to suppress the teaching 
of a theory which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine cre-
ation of man." ld., at 107-109 (footnotes omitted). 
Here, it is clear that religious belief is the Balanced Treat-
ment's Act's "reason for existence." The tenets of creation-
science parallel the Genesis story of creation, 4 and this is a 
our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all mankind. Therefore, salva-
tion can come only thru (sic) accepting Jesus Christ as our Savior." 529 F . 
Supp., at 1260, n. 7. 
' After hearing testimony from numerous experts, the District Court in 
McLean concluded that "[t]he parallels between [the definition section of 
the model act] and Genesis are quite specific." I d., at 1265, n. 19. It 




8 EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD 
religious belief. "[N]o legislative recitation of a supposed 
secular purpose can blind us to that fact." Stone v. Graham, 
449 U. S. 39, 41 (1980). Although the Act as finally enacted 
does not contain explicit reference to its religious purpose, 
there is no indication in the legislative history that the dele-
tion of "creation ex nihilo" and the four primary tenets of the 
theory were intended to alter the purpose of teaching cre-
ation-science. Instead, the statements of purpose of the 
sources of creation-science in the United States make clear 
that their purpose is to promote a religious belief. I find no 
persuasive evidence in the legislative history that the legisla-
ture's purpose was any different. The fact that the Louisi-
ana legislature purported to add information to the school 
curriculum rather than detract from it as in Epperson does 
not affect my analysis. Both legislatures acted with the un-
constitutional purpose of structuring the public school curric-
ulum to make it compatible with a particular religious· belief: 
the "divine creation of man." 
That the statute is limited to the scientific evidences sup-
porting the theory does not render its purpose secular. In 
reaching its conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional, the 
Court of Appeals "[did] not deny that the underpinnings of 
creationism may be supported by scientific evidence." 765 
F. 2d 1251, 1256 (1985). And there is no need to do so. 
Whatever the academic merit of particular subjects or theo-
ries, the Establishment Clause limits the discretion of state 
officials to pick and choose among them for the purpose of 
promoting a particular religious belief. The language of tpe 
statute and its legislative history convince me that the Loui-
divine origin, and "kinds" to be derived from Genesis; "relatively recent 
inception" to mean "an age of the earth from 6,000 to 10,000 years" and to 
be based "on the geneology of the Old Testament using the rather as-
tronomical ages assigned to the patriarchs"; and the "separate ancestry of 
man and ape" to focus on "the portion of the theory of evolution which Fun-
damentalists find most offensive." Ibid. (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 
393 u. s. 97 (1968)). 
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siana legislature exercised its discretion for this purpose in 
this case. 
II 
Even though I find Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act 
unconstitutional, I adhere to the view "that the States and 
locally elected school boards should have the responsibility 
for determining the educational policy of the public schools." 
Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 893 (1982) 
(POWELL, J., dissenting). A decision respecting the subject 
matter to be taught in public schools does not violate the 
Establishment Clause simply because the material to be 
taught "'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of 
some or all religions."' Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 319 
(1980) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 
(1961)). In the context of a challenge under the Establish~ 
ment Clause, interference with the decisions of these authori:.. 
ties is warranted only when the purpose for their decisions is 
clearly religious. 
The history of the religion clauses of the First Amendment 
has been chronicled by this Court in detail. See, e. g., Ever-
son v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 8-14 (1947); Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 425-430 (1962); McGowan v. Mary-
land, supra, at 437-442. Therefore, only a brief review at 
this point may be appropriate. The early settlers came to 
this country from Europe to escape religious persecution that 
took the form of forced support of state-established churches. 
The new Americans thus reacted strongly when they per-
ceived the same type of religious intolerance emerging in this 
country. The reaction in Virginia, the home of many of the 
Founding Fathers, is instructive. George Mason's draft of 
the Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted by the House 
of Burgesses in 1776. Because of James Madison's influence, 
the Declaration of Rights embodied the guarantee of free 
exercise of religion, as opposed to toleration. Eight years 
later, a provision prohibiting the establishment of religion be-
came a part of Virginia law when James Madison's Memorial 
85-1513-CONCUR 
10 EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD 
and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, written in 
response to a proposal that all Virginia citizens be taxed to 
support the teaching of the Christian religion, spurred the 
legislature to consider and adopt Thomas Jefferson's Bill for 
Establishing Religious Freedom. See Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 770, n. 28. Both the 
guarantees of free exercise and against the establishment 
of religion were then incorporated into the Federal Bill of 
Rights by its drafter, James Madison. 
While the "meaning and scope of the First Amendment" 
must be read "in light of its history and the evils it was de-
signed forever to suppress," Everson v. Board of Education, 
supra, at 14-15, this Court has also recognized that "this 
Nation's history has not been one of entirely sanitized sep-
aration between Church and State." Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 760. "The fact that the 
Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God 
and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is 
clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Com-
pact to the Constitution itself." Abington School District v. 
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 213 (1963). 5 The Court properly 
has noted "an unbroken history of official acknowledgement 
... of the role of religion in American life." Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U. S., at 674, and has recognized that these refer-
ences to "our religious heritage" are constitutionally accept-
able. /d., at 677. 
As a matter of history, school children can and should prop-
erly be informed of all aspects of this Nation's religio_us 
heritage. I would see no constitutional problem if school 
children were taught the nature of the Founding Father's re-
ligious beliefs and how these beliefs affected the attitudes 
~ John Adams wrote. to Thomas Jefferson: "[T]he Bible is the best book 
in the world. It contains more of my little philosophy than all the libraries 
I have seen; and such parts of it as I cannot reconcile to my little philoso-
phy, I postpone for future investigation." Letter of Dec. 25, 1813, 10 
Works of John Adams 85 (1856). 
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of the times and the structure of our government. 6 Courses 
in comparative religion of course are customary and constitu-
tionally appropriate·. 7 In fact, since religion permeates our 
history, a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is 
necessary to understand many historical as well as contempo-
rary events. 8 In addition, it is worth noting that the Estab-
6 There is an enormous variety of religions in the United States. The 
Encyclopedia of American Religions (2d ed. 1987) describes 1,347 religious 
organizations. The United States Census Bureau groups the major Amer-
ican religions into: Buddhist Churches of America; Eastern Churches; 
Jews; Old Catholic, Polish National Catholic, and Armenian Churches; The 
Roman Catholic Church; Protestants; and Miscellaneous. Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States 50 (106th ed. 1986). 
Our country has become strikingly multi-religious as well as multi-racial 
and multi-ethnic. This fact, perhaps more than anything one could write, 
demonstrates the wisdom of including the Establishment Clause in the 
First Amendment. States' proposals for what became the Establishment 
Clause evidence the goal of accommodating competing religious beliefs. 
See, e. g., New York's Resolution of Ratification reprinted in 2 Documen-
tary History of the Constitution 190, 191 (1894) ("[N]o Religious Sect 
or Society ought to be favoured or established by Law in preference of 
others"). 
7 State-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer courses inte-
grating religious studies into the curriculum. Approximately half of the 
state-sponsored universities offer one or more courses involving religion. 
As an example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers seven 
courses: Introduction to Religion, Old Testament, New Testament, Faith 
and Doubt, Jesus in History and Tradition, Eastern Religions, and Phi-
losophy of Religion. 
Of course, the difference in maturity between college-age and secondary 
students may affect the constitutional analysis of a particular public school 
policy. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274, n. 14 (1981). Never-
theless, many general teaching guides suggest that education as to the na-
ture of various religious beliefs could be integrated into a secondary school 
curriculum in a manner consistent with the Constitution. See, e. g., 
C. Kniker, Teaching about Religion in Public Schools (1985); Religion in 
Elementary Social Studies Project, Final Report (Fla. State Univ. 1976); 
L. Karp, Teaching the Bible as Literature in Public Schools (1973). 
8 For example, the political controversies in Northern Ireland, the Mid-
dle East, al).d India cannot be understood properly without reference to the 
underlying religious beliefs and the conflicts they tend to generate. 
-·~ 
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lishment Clause does not prohibit per se the educational use 
of religious documents in public school education. Although 
this Court has recognized that the Bible is "an instrument of 
religion," Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 
224, it also has made clear that the Bible "may constitution-
ally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, 
ethics, comparative religion, or the like." Stone v. Graham, 
449 U. S., at 42 (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 
supra, at 225). The book is, in fact, "the world's all-time 
best seller" 9 with undoubted literary and historic value apart 
from its religious content. The Establishment Clause is 
properly understood to prohibit the use of the Bible and other 
religious documents in public school education only when the 
purpose of the use is to advance a particular religious belief. 
III 
In sum, I find that the language and the legislative history 
of the Balanced Treatment Act unquestionably demonstrate 
that its purpose is to advance a particular religious belief. 
Although the discretion of state and local authorities over 
public school curricula is broad, "the First Amendment does 
not permit the State to require that teaching and learning 
must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any reli-
gious sect or dogma." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S., at 
106. Accordingly, I concur in the opinion of the Court and 
its judgment that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the 
Establishment Clause of the Constitution. 
9 See N. Y. Times, May 10, 1981, § 2, p. 24, col. 3; N. McWhirter, 1986 
Guiness Book of World Records 144 (the Bible is the world's most widely 
distributed book). 
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I write separately to note certain aspects of the 
legislative history, and to emphasize the broad discretion 
accorded state and local school officials in the selection 
of the public school curriculum. 
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FIRST DRAFT 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join in the thorough and well-reasoned opinion for 
the Court~! write separately to emphasize why, in light 
of the broad discretion accorded state and local official ...... 
in the selection of the public school curriculum, the 
issue in this case violates the Constituti 
I 
This Court has consistently applied the three-pronged 
test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1972) to 
determine whether a particular state action violates the 
2. 
Establishment Clause of the Constitution.l See, e.g., 
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 105 s. Ct. 3216, 
3222 ( 1985) ("We have particularly relied on Lemon in 
every case involving the sensitive relationship between 
government and religion in the education of our 
children"). The first requirement of the Lemon test is 
that the challenged statute have a "secular legislative 
purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612. If no valid 
secular purpose for the statute can be identified, the 
"purpose" prong of the test is determinative. 
lAs the Cour recognizes, ante, n. 4., the one exception 
to this con istent application of Lemon is Marsh v. 






"The starting point in every case involving 
interpretation of a statute is the language itself." Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 u.s. 723, 756 (1979) 
(POWELL, J., concurring). The Balanced Treatment for 
I ' 1-- 1-/J...., 
Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act (Balanced 
Treatment Act), La. Rev. Stat. §17:286.1 et seg., 
provides: 
"[P]ublic schools within [the] state shall give 
balanced treatment to creation-science and to 
evolution-science. Balanced treatment of these 
two models shall be given in classroom lectures 
taken as a whole for each course, in textbook 
materials taken as a whole for each course, in 
library materials taken as a whole for the 
sciences and taken a a whole for the humanities, 
and in other educational programs in public 
schools, to the extent that such lectures, 
textbooks, library materials, or educational 
programs deal in any way with the subject of the 
origin of man, life , the earth, or the 
universe. When creation or evolution is taught, 
each shall be taught as a theory, rather than as 
proven scientific fact." §17:286.4. 
4. 
"Balanced treatment" means "providing whatever information 
and instruction in both creation and evolution models the 
classroom teacher determines is necessary and appropriate 
to provide insight into both theories in view for the 
textbooks and other instructional materials available for 
use in his classroom." §286 .3 {1). "Creation-science" 
means "the scientific evidences for creation and 
inferences from those scientific evidences." §286 .3 {2). 
Evolution-science" means "the scientific evidences for 
evolution and inferences from those scientific evidences." 
§2 86 • 3 { 3) • 
Although the Act mandates the teaching of the 
scientific evidences of both creation and evolution 
whenever either is taught, it does not define either term. 
"A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, 
5. 
unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as 
taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." 
Perrin v. United States, 444 u.s. 37, 42 (1979). ~ 
ictiomuy-, --rbe creation theory is defined as "Theology • 
••• The doctrine ascribing the origin of all matter and 
living forms as they now exist to distinct acts of 
creation by God." The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language 311 (New College Edition 1976). 
"Evolution" is defined as "Biology •••• The theory that 
groups of organisms, as species, may change with passage 
of time so that descendants differ morphologically and 
physiologically from their ancestors." Id., at 455. 
Thus, the Balanced Treatment Act mandates that public 
schools present the scientific evidences that support a 
theological theory of divine creation whenever they 
6 0 
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present the scientific evidences that suppor~ the 
A. 
biological theory of evolution. From the face of the 
statute, a purpose to advance a particular religious 
belief is apparent. 
A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate 
an act of a state legislature. The religious purpose must 
predominate. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 
2490 (1986); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 u.s. 668, 681, n. 6 
(1985). The Act contains a statement of purpose: to 
"protec [t] academic freedom." §2 86.2. This statement is 
puzzling, because "academic freedom" does not encompass 
the right of a legislature to structure the public school 
curriculum in order to advance a particular religious 
belief. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 u.s. 97, 106 (1969). 
When, as here, "both courts below are unable to discern an 
7. 
arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should 
hesitate to find one." Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 s. Ct. 
2479, 2495 (1985) (POWELL, J., concurring). Nevertheless, 
I read this statement as rendering the purpose of the 
statute at least ambiguous. Accordingly, I proceed to 
~ 
analyze the legislative history of the Act. 
1\ 
B 
In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate 
Bill 956 to the Louisiana legislature. The purpose of the 
bill was to "assure academic freedom" by "requiring the 
? 
' teaching of the theory of creation ex nihilo in all public --
schools where the theory of evolution is taught." 1 App. 
E-1. The bill defined the "theory of creation ex nihilo" 
as "the belief that the origin of the elements, the 
galaxy, the solar system, of life, of all the species of 
8. 
plants and animals, the origin of man, and the origin of 
all things and their processes and relationships were 
created ex nihilo and fixed by God." 1 App. E-la- E-lb. 
This theory was "referr[ed] to" by Senator Keith "as 
scientific creationism." 1 App. E-2. 
committee was studying scientific 
creationism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of 
the bill, requiring balanced treatment of "evolution-
science" and "creation-science." 1 App. E-108. This bill 
was based upon a "model act" supplied to Senator Keith by 
Paul Ellwanger. The model act was also the basis for a 
similar statute in Arkansas. See McLean v. Arkansas Board 
of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982). 
l~vk 




doctrine or materials," 1 App. E-302, it defined 
"creation-science" to include: 
"the scientific evidences and related inferences 
that indicate (1) Sudden creation of the 
universe, energy, and life from nothing; (2) 
The insufficiency of mutation and natural 
selection in bringin about development of all 
living kinds from a single organism; (3) 
Changes only within fixed limits or originally 
created kinds of plants and animals; (4) 
Separate ancestry for man and apes; (5) 
Explanation of the earth's geology by 
catastrophism including the occurrence of a 
worldwide flood; and (6) A relatively recent 
inception of the earth and living kinds." 1 
App. E-298. 
9. 
The District Court in McLean carefully examined this model 
act and concluded that "[b]oth [its] concepts and wording 
••• convey an inescapable religiosity." 529 F. Supp., at 
1265. The court found "[t]he ideas of [this section] not 
merely similar to the literal interpretation of Genesis; 
[but] identical and parallel to no other story of 
creation." Ibid. 
10. 
The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981. 
On May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee deleted, by 
amendment, the illustrative list of scientific evidences. 
The amendment was "intended to try to produce some good 
for the bill and not intended to try to gut it in any way, 
or defeat the purpose which Senator Keith introduced this 
bill. • 1 App. E-4T ore specifically, a committee 
member urged the deletion because he "had no knowledge as 
to whether this should be all inclusive list. Maybe there 
are some things that are not included on here that some 
person smarter than us would have thought of that should 
have been included, maybe there are some things in here 
that ought not have been included. I don't know. Whoever 
drafted the bill evidently had this list and put these in, 
11. 
;, ,., 
my amendments would strike those out. I don't think it 
does any violence to the bill." 1 App. E-438. 
~Because the amended version of the bill did not 
contain a definition of the scientific evidences 
supporting creation-science, it is necessary to lo~~ 
" 
~ legislative history to determine its meaning. The 
~im~e~i~~f the bill was Dr. Edward 
""" 
Boudreaux, a creation scientist. He explained the source 
of the creation-science theory: "[t]here are a number of 
people today in America alone numbering something like a 
thousand who are members of the Creation Research Society 
who hold doctorate and masters degrees in all areas of 
..;> 
I 
'i science and equally affiliates with the Institute of 
Creation Research." 2 App. E-503 - 504. Information on 
12. 
both of these organization is part of the legislative 
history. 
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate 
of the Christian Herita9e College in San Diego, 
California. The Institute was established to address the 
1. 
"urgent need for ou~ nation to return to belief in a 
personal, omnipotent Creator, who has a purpose for His 
creation and to whom all people must eventually give 
account." 1 App. E-197. A goal of the Institute is "a 
revival of belief in special creation as the true 
explanation of the origin of the world." Therefore, the 
Institute concentrates on the "development of new methods 
for teaching scientific creationism in public schools." 1 
App. E-197-199. The Creation Research Society is located 
in Ann Arbor, Michigan. A member must subscribe to the 
13. 
following statement of belief: "The Bible is the written 
work of God, and because it is inspired throughout, all of 
its assertions are historically and scientifically true." 
2 App. E-583. To study "creation-science" at the Society, 
a member must accept "that the account of origins in 
Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical 
truth." 2 App. E-5 83. 
c 
In this case even assuming that the Act on its face 
is ambiguous, I see no evidence in the legislative history 
that indicates an intent other than to promote religious 
belief. The legislative history of the Arkansas statute 
prohibiting the teaching of evolution examined in Epperson 
v. Arkansas, supra, at 97, was remarkably similar to the 
' ~. ... 
14. 
legislative history of the Balanced Treatment Act. There, 
~ the n:~~~~ 
"It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian 
conviction was and is the law's reason for 
existence. Its antecedent, Tennessee's 'monkey 
law,' candidly stated its purpose: to make it 
unlawful 'to teach any theory that denies the 
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in 
the Bible, and to teach instead that man has 
descended from a lower class of animals.' 
Perhaps the sensational publicity attendant upon 
the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to adopt less 
explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's 
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation 
of man' as taught in the Bible, but there is no 
doubt that the motivation for the law was the 
same: to suppress the teaching of a theory 
which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine 
creation of man." Id., at 109. 
Here, it is clear that religious belief is the 
Balanced Treatment's Act's "reason for existence." 
Although the Act does not contain explicit reference to 
its religious purpose, there is no indication in the 
legislative history that the deletion of "creation ex 




intended to alter the purpose for teaching creation-
science. Instead, the Act appears to have exactly the 
same religious purpose found to have been behind the 
Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act invalidated in McLean 
~ J..t.... ~ .._..H-.~  &t.-
to pl'emote the Genesis story of creation. This Court has 
'l 
recognized that "the place of the Bible as an instrument 
of religion cannot be gainsaid," Abington School District 
v. Schempp, 374 u.s. 203, 224 (1963), and "no legislative 
recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to 
that fact." Stone v. Graham, 449 u.s. 39, 41 (1980). 
Although the Louisiana legislature purported to add 
information to the school curriculum rather than detract 
from it as in Epperson, both legislatures acted with the 
unconstitutional purpose of structuring the public school 
16. 
curriculum to make it compatible with a particular 
religious belief: the "divine creation of man." 
That the statute is limited to the scientific 
evidences supporting the theory does not render the 
purpose of the statute secular. In reaching its 
conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional, the Court of 
Appeals did not "deny that the underpinnings of 
creationism may be supported by scientific evidence." 765 
F. 2d 1251, 1256 (1985). And there is no need to do so. 
Whatever the academic merit of particular subjects or 
theories, the Establishment Clause limits the discretion 
of state officials to pick and choose among them for the 
purpose of promoting a particular religious belief. The 




convince me that the Louisiana legislature exercised its 
discretion for this purpose in this case. 
II 
Despite the fact that I find Louisiana's Balanced 
Treatment Act unconstitutional, I adhere to the view "that 
the States and locally elected school boards should have 
the responsibility for determining the educational policy 
of the public schools." Board of Education v. Pico, 457 
u.s. 853, 893 {1982) {PCMELL, J., dissenting). In the 
context of a challenge under the Establishment Clause, 
interference with the decisions of these authorities is 
warranted only when no valid secular purpose for their 
judgment is evident. -- .-:-.-' 
( A statute does not violate the Establishment Clause 




tenets of some or all religions.'" Harris v. McRae, 448 
u.s. 297, 319 (1980) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
u.s. 420, 442 (1961)). Thus, a public school can teach 
subjects or particular theories that are consistent with 
religious beliefs. Similarly, a state legislature could 
require by statute that such subjects or even theories be 




It i -& -i~Yt~mph.asia e that .-t the Establishment 
does not prohibit general moral discourse in the 
schools. Certainly there are values that we shar 
as a Nation that are necessary and important for 
~ 
~ to learn at a young age in order to be produe~e member 
~ -r 
I ·'·A'Jlt L f- of soc1' ety v-· and personally fulfilled individuals. 
~ Court has noted, "[t] hat the Judeo-Christian religion 
rr1 ~? W'#, 





oppose stealing does not mean that a State or the Federal 
Government may not, consistent with the Establishment 
Clause, enact laws prohibiting larceny." Harris v. McRae, 
supra, at 319. I see no reason why school children should 






stealing as immoral and a violation of the rights of 
members of society. ... u1 ~ 
~ A,.. /;J;&JA-/./,4 J ../. . 1 
I ~-a-a: school childr~~can and should be 
properly informed of the religious heritage of our Nation. 
"The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly 
that there was a God and that the unalienable rights of 
man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their 
writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution 
itself." Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 




view, it would be tragic if school children were deprived 
of knowledge of this history due to the supposed 
constraints of the Establishment Clause. As this Court 
has recognized, the Bible, although an "instrument of 
religion," id., at 224, "may constitutionally be used in 
an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, 
comparative religion, or the like." Stone v. Graham, 
supra, at 42 (citing id., at 225) .2 The Establishment 
Clause prohibits the use of the Bible and other religious 
2state-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer 
courses integrating religious studies into the curriculum. 
Approximately half of the state-sponsored universities 
offer one or more courses involving religion. As an 
example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers 
seven courses: Introduction to Religion, Old Testament, 
New Testament, Faith and Doubt, Jesus in History and 
Tradition, Eastern Religions, and Philosophy of Religion. 
Many general teaching guides indicate that education as 
to the nature of various religious beliefs could be 
integrated into a secondary school curriculum in a manner 
consistent with the Constitution. See, e.g., c. Kniker, 
Teaching about Religion in the Public Schools (1985); The 
Religion in Elementary Social Studies Project, Final 
Report (Fla. State Univ. 1976); L. Karp, Teaching the 




documents only when the purpose of the use is clearly to 
a:_. h-~ 




In sum, I find the language and the 
'l 
history of the Balanced Tre~tment Ac~ 




. d. ~ h . 1n 1cate t at 1ts 
""'A 
Although the 
discretion of state and local authorities over public 
school curriculum is broad, "the First Amendment does not 
permit the State to require that teaching and learning 
must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any 
religious sect or dogma." Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 
106. Accordingly, I concur in the opinion and judment of 
22. 
the Court that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the 
Establishment Clause of the Constitution. 
? (j) 
No. 85-1513, Edwards v. Aguillard 
FIRST DRAFT 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I write separately to note certain aspects of the 
legislative history, and to ernphasize~he broad discretio~ 
accorded state and local school officials in the selection 
of the public school curriculum. 
I 
This Court has consistently applied the three-pronged 
test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (197~ 
1' 
determine whether a particular state action violates the 
Establishment Clause of the Constitution.! See, e.g., 
lAs the Court recognizes, ante, ~he one exception 
to this consistent applicatioJn~!on is Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983). 
(j) "f:c e..v..pt.Q.rl~~ 1'h«/ .-fd~J a._ '11u tr.,ur".i oru-''"" c/;MM.tr4.r 






Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, i es s. Ct. 3216t,? 
;. 
~( 1985) ("We have particularly relied on Lemon in 
every case involving the sensitive relationship between 
government and religion in the education of our 
children"). The first requirement of the Lemon test is 
that the challenged statute have a "secular legislative 
purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612. See 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 
773 (1973). If no 
can be identified, 







~'.,.,;c_/;;;) "The starting point in 
~~terpret&~ien of a statute 
every case involving 
is the language itself." Blue 
'• 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (197~ 
(POWELL, J., concurring). The Balanced Treatment for 
Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act (~ Act or 
,L\()1\. 
Balanced Treatment Act), 
provide~ 
La. Rev. Stat. §17:286.1 et 
"[P]ublic schools within [the] state shall give 
balanced treatment to creation-science and to 
evolution-science. Balanced treatment of these 
two models shall be given in classroom lectures 
taken as a whole for each course, in textbook 
materials taken as a whole for each course, in 
library materials taken as a whole for the 
sciences and taken a a whole for the humanities, 
and in other educational programs in public 
schools, to the extent that such lectures, 
textbooks, library materials, or educational / · · 
programs deal in any way with the subject of the ~ 
origin of man, lif~ the earth, or the 
universe. When creation or evolution is taught, 
each shall be taught as a theory, rather than as 





"Balanced treatment" means "providing whatever information 
and instruction in both creation and evolution models the 
classroom teacher determines is necessary and appropriate 
to provide insight into both theories in view 
textbooks and other instructional materials available for 
use in his classroom." §286.3(1). "Creation-science" 
,f,s k ~i ev> "-J 
mea1::uJ "bre scient1f 1c evidences for creation and 
inferences from those scientific evidences." §286.3(2). 
\\ 
~vol ution-science" means "the scientific evidences for 
evolution and inferences from those scientific evidences." 
§2 86 • 3 ( 3) • 
~~v~ 
Although the Act ~aftaaeee~e teaching of the 
DQSf' fU.. (?) 
scientific edgeftoes of both creation and evolution 
whenever either is taught, it does not define either term. 
"A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, 
5. 
unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as 
taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." 
J Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). -'Php 
I creation theory8i(?__defined as "Theology.Afi ••. The doctrine 
~ ~
ascribing the origin of all matter and living forms as 
they now exist to distinct acts of creation by God." The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 311 
(New College Edition 1976). "Evolution" is defined as 
"Biology •.•. The theory that groups of organisms, as 
species, may change with passage of time so that 
descendants differ morphologically and physiologically 
from their ancestors. " I d. , at 455.2 Thus, the Balanced 
Treatment Act mandates that public schools present the 
2other dictionary definitions will be added. 
6. 
scientific evidence~ort a theological theory of 
divine creation whenever they present the scientific 
evidence~t is thoug~o support the biological theory 
of evolution. From the face of the statute, a purpose to 
~<Particula5>religious belief is apparent. 
rn~~k; 
s· L fai:Jd: A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate 
an act of a state legislature. The religious purpose must ~uc~ 
d .!flZu · S. ~ , "' / ~cs; 
predominate. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 s. Ct. 247~ 
f <l98 ) ; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681, n. 6 
~). 
"protec[t] academic freedom." 
The Act contains a statement of purpose: to 
§286.2. This statement is 
~ 
puzzling, because ~'academic freedom "J does not encompass 
the right of a legislature to structure the public school 
' \ 
curriculum in order to advance a particular religious j 
belief. Ej1person v. Arkansas, 393 u.s. 97, 106 ( 196~ ;· 
~ JJ• cW' ~v yU' t~ t ~ J,~'-
r ~-vrcf t\. ~ 1 ~n.~ Bt-rbrw (,(. 
\)) ~1 {[-l,tv•HS~I\\-{c\ vV\ Jrv-
~h ) 'I "de • p-u.d O'V'- '' 
'· 
7. 
When, as here, "both courts below are unable to discern an 
arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should 
~J~¥:9 v. Jaff ree, S. C~, ____..., hesitate to find one." Wallace 
H 7 g, 24r"~(PCMELL, J., concurrin~ Nevertheless, 
I read this statement as rendering the purpose of the 
statute at least ambiguous. Accordingly, I proceed to 
review the legislative history of the Act. 
B 
In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate 
~~ 
The purpose of thel'( ~~ 
____.J<_ y ~ 
bill was to "assure academic f reedo~<:!!:?equi ring the fe,().! 
VoY 
Bill 956 to the Louisiana legislature. 
teaching of the theory of creation ex nihilo in all public J(l&L~~ 
~~~ 




E-1.3 The bill defined the "theory of creation ex nihilo" 
as "the belief that the origin of the elements, the 
galaxy, the solar system, of life, of all the species of 
plants and animals, the origin of man, and the origin of 
all things and their processes and relationships were 
created ex nihilo and fixed by God." ]: App("~lb. 
This theory was ~~~ena::r ' Keith -a!--
scientific creationism." 
3creation "ex nihilo" means creation "from nothing" and 
has been found to be an "inherently religious concept." 
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 
1266 (E.D. Ark. 1982). The District Court in McLean 
found: 
"The argument that creation from nothing in 
[section] 4 (a) ( 1) [of the substantially 
ieerttieel Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act] does 
not involve a supernatural deity has no 
evidentiary or rational support. To the 
contrary, 'creation out of nothing' is a concept 
unique to Western religions. In traditional 
western religious thought, the conception of a 
creator of the world is a conception of God. 
Indeed, creation of the world 'out of nothing' 
is the ultimate religious statement because God 
is the only actor." Id., at 1265. 
9. 
While a Senate committee was studying scientific 
creationism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of 
the bill, requiring balanced treatment of "evolution-
science" and "creation-science." 1 App. E-108. ~ 
was- bas.e upon a ""model act" supplied to Senator Keith by 
~nl Ellw~er. The model act was also the basis f 
nr~~ nucation, 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982). 
bill prohibited "instruction in any 
religious doctrine or materials," 1 App. E-302, it defined 
"creation- science" to include: 
"the scientifi ~ences and related inferences ~ 
that indicate ~~v}~~den creation of the ( / . c... 
~iverse, energy, and life from nothing; (f )h1 
/ ·ne insufficiency of mutation and natural ~ 
10. 
• • • convey 
1265. The 
merely similar to the literal interpretation of Genesis; 
[eyt~fi:> and parallel to no other story of 
creation." Ibid. 
The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981. 
~iLd fu_ fetfk 6i( 
On May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee{ael8ted, fP fo det!R_.fe 
amendJtreii the illustrative 1 ist of scientific evidences. 
11. 
jhe amendment was "intel'leeg to try to prod1:1se 
for the bill a f not intended to try to gut · 
c,,( 
or defeat the purpose which Senator Keith introduced~ 
{l r\ J \,(.;{ _) I I ~~U.-i 
\ 1. , ""'1 ." 1 A 432 r1 11101 t'~'"cc:_ ~ .x:.J. pp. E- I r- peO?ll:lS€ the amended version of the n> f'1....Q. 
-\1\~ ~(QY\\.R ~ f 1/ I ' 'J) .D I) ..... V-f{ ( (( ~tr I J l.f\ll It 
bill;~did not contain a definition of the scientific I A,rf' , E:4~ 
- - CZ ~d 1)_tu 0-;:- \,·)1 I( ·l~j o\'-' 




\ ~ r 1 I .., CU......W tL 
look -fu-rther- to the legisl-ative history to Nt 
w~~~ L ~ ~ incipal supporter o£ the bill was Dr. Edward 
~ I L~'1(' (' 
~~ -"'ifac~ ._______ 1o f ~\CL-i ~ fL(.,.t " "\--" 
~(f 'T ,_ a( 1l rl 1!;.,.. ~ 
&... clt(JAJ.~ Jl'f 4More specifically, a committee member urged 
0 the deletion because h~: ~ 
l£rtrfu.,~ "~no knowledge as to w ether this should be 
~~~ all-inclusive list. Maybe there are some things 
1~ u that are not included on here that some person smarter than us would have thought of that 
~ should have been included, maybe there are some 
- - _. things in here that ought not have been 
included. I don't know. Whoever drafted the 
bill evidently had this list and put these in, 
my amendments would strike those out. I don't 
think it does any violence to the bill." 1 App. 
E-438. 
who hold doctorate and masters degrees in all areas of 
r--cu.c -...Cr II X'eA t.e') 'hv ~(~ oC ~0 
II I - ' 0 '()· \l'l.~t~ ~ I tv' 6(: fi c;. tt/' 
science and [siel t equally affiliatee wiUr tne Institute of 
"" t.v I' u C. > 
Creation Research ' 2 App. E-503 - 504. Information on 
both of these organization is part of the legislative 
history. 
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate 
of the Christian Heritage College in San Diego, 
------California. The Institute was established to 
"urgent need for our nation to return to belief 
personal, omnipotent Creator, who has a purpose 
creation and to whom all people must eventually give 
Joel" ,{ ..





account." 1 App. E-197 • ...A goal of the Institute is"~ 
rev i~al of. bel i..ef: in special creation .. as the true 
explanation of the origin of the world. • f;:er ~e, the 
Institute oaneen~•ate~v:l~~of new methods 
for teaching scientific creationism in 
App. E-19~he Creation Research 
public schools." 1 
Society is located 
in Ann Arbor, Michigan. A member must subscribe to the 
following statement of belief: "The Bible is the written 
because it is inspired throughout, all of 
its assertions are historically and scientifically true." 
2 App. E-5 83. To stu~creation-science at the Society, 
a member must accept "that the account of origins in 
Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical 






~ \ ~ J./11 ·I wP ~ell c... 
To tbis em 8'J&R .c:::::;tb•t~~: 8-::a:t~~. ::J,,,.,II.S? 
~I 
N-LI ~\[ ~ ll& t '''-' 'or n (' J a , , +-
48 ambigaoas (0?~~ce ·n the legislat1ve history 
c{ ~ t el-(\ l V\/V\_,~ 11-* _J!_U:.. 1 ( 
that indicates an intent J~-than.. to promote religiou l 
belief-~ The legislative history of the Arkansas statute 
prohibiting the teaching of evolution examined in Epperson 
wv .J~ 
v. Arkansas, supra~at\lf7, was remarkably similar to the 
legislative history of the Balanced Treatment 
the Court found: 
"It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian 
conviction was and is the law's reason for 
existence. Its antecedent, Tennessee's 'monkey 
aw, candi y s a e 1 s p rp to make it 
IW~ 
unlawful 'to teach any theory that denies the 
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in 
the Bible, and to teach instead that man has ~ 
descended from a lower olas..i" of animals. 1 
Perhaps the sensational publicity attendant upon 
the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to adopt less 
explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's 
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation 
of man' as taught in the Bible, but there is no 
doubt hat the motivation for the law was the 
same: to suppress the teaching of a theory 
c , it was thought, 'denied' the~d~iv~· ~--------­




Here, it is clear that religious belief is the 
Balanced Treatment's Act's "reason for existence." 
Although 
((I \ a \ 
the Act~does not contain explicit reference to 
its religious purpose, there is no indication in the 
legislative history that the deletion of "creation ex 
nihilo" and the four primary tenets of the theory were 
intended to alter the purpose for teaching creation-
ct appears to have exactly the 
~CJw~ .. 
found to e ave bee;J;ehind the 
Arkansas alan~Treatm lftvaF1ea~~in~ean 
~ ~~~ the caching in the putdic &aaools of the 
15. 
C) 
Genesis story of creat1.on. This Court has recegnizea -that 
"the place of the B-ihl.e as an instrument of religion 
cannot b gainaaid," Abington School District v. Schempp, 
0 w J"\f \ ('l• 
374 ,..u ... s. 203, 224 (1963), and ~'no legislative recitation 
~ ~JLC~; ~ ~ S:_1V 
"OIL, lP )I ~0 





(~ cv~) rJo~U-~ ~ --
~~-~ ~~~~~,s ~a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact."~ 
~~v ~ ~ 
tf'-,_~ ~t-- ~~ •Stone v. Graham, 449 u.s. 39, 41 (1980) 1 Although the 
xvY \Y ~-
~~I ~ Louisiana legislature purported to add information to the 
~ ¥0 k 
\0 ~ ().VI"school curriculum rather than detract from it as in 
~~ ~~~ EE~rson, both legislatures acted with the 
~c ~ 
}J>'l\~ unconstitutional purpose of structuring the public school 
~~ 
if~~ curriculum to make it compatible with a particular 
'/".b/'c ~el igious belief: the "divine creation of man." 
~~I;~ -rl 
vr 
That the statute is limited to the scientific 
vtJ 
evidences supporting the theory does not render~ 
purpose of the sta~te secular. In reaching its 
conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional, the Cour;,f 
Appeals~ did ~ny that " not the underpinnings of v' 
creationism may be supported by scientific evidence." 765 




Whatever the academic merit of particular subjects or 
theories, the Establishment Clause limits the discretion 
of state officials to pick and choose among them for the 
purpose of promoting a particular religious 
t~r 
belief. The 
language of the statute and its legislative history 
convince me that the Louisiana legislature exercised its 
discretion for this purpose in this case. 
Deo}?ite the fagt Balanced 
Treatment Act unconstitutional, I adhere to the view "that 
the States and locally elected school boards should have 
the responsibility for determining the educational policy 
of the public schools." Board of Education v. Pico, 457 
U.S. 853, 893 (1982) (PC:WELL, J., dissenting). In the 
11. 
jhe amendment was "inteaded to try to p£Odl:lG8 
for the bill a f not intended to try to gut · 
C1\ r 
or defeat the purpose which Senator Keith introduced~ 
{I A " J \A. t II '?sit.< ... ( 
.J "IOit"llC.c:... 
ill." 1 App. E-432/ r-~eO?H~s€ the amended version of the rt> n...t2. 
t\1 ~ \--e(OY\\..e ~ r , J > .o 1 V-.6 u , c( ~lr ' 1 l_;\n 11 
bill;~did not contain a definition of the scientific I flr.-r:>, !::.4?$ 
.-. CZ «.. o 11--a u f __.. t\0.;' I \:' 1 d\'- . 
evidences s_upporting creation-science, ±t-i-s neees-sary- to ~ ~ 
"---"'"" 
{'>(L \ \ lr \ \ r 1 I ) 
look-further to the legislative history to determ ne i~ 
w~~~! ~ ~ incipal supporter o£ th~ bill was Dr. Edward 
~ I L~1'{4 C.f.. .' 
~~ _A,i#ac~ 1- --- 1ot t\CL.f 1.11-- i c\ '\--" 
~ ~ 'T t: ( tl " 1!.-r 
&.. cUCJA,I.~ 111 4More specifically, a committee member urged 
Q the deletion because h1~ 
f..t.fJtffu.,~ "~no knowledge as to w ether this should be 
~L~~ all-inclusive list. Maybe there are some things 
1~ u that are not included on here that some person smarter than us would have thought of that 
--- .... ._.-
should have been included, maybe there are some 
things in here that ought not have been 
included. I don't know. Whoever drafted the 
bill evidently had this 1 ist and put these in, 
my amendments would strike those out. I don't 
think it does any violence to the bill." 1 App. 
E-438. 
e Creation Research So~iety. 
who hold doctorate and masters degrees in all areas of 
r(U_(' c r It x~A (,l') tv ,e_ ( )'keA. 0 c -\v-.JO H \ 0 '() \I'Z.~t~ I '\k-R 6(: fl c; 6'cF science aRd [eie]~eqtlally affiliatee ~tne Institute of 
cv \' \A,_) c. > 
Creation Research ' 2 App. E-503 - 504. Information on 
both of these organization is part of the legislative 
history. 
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate 
of the Christian Heritage College in San Diego, -----California. The Institute was established to 
"urgent need for our nation to return to belief 
doe.c '{-
s~ 1>1 cJ 
the ~ 
~ c:;4M(, wt.v< 
7 
personal, omnipotent Creator, who has a purpose for His 
creation and to whom all people must eventually give 
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interference with the decisions of these authorities is 
warranted only when no valid secular purpose for their 
judgment is evident. A statute does not violate the 
Establishment Clause "because it 'happens to coincide or 
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.'" 
Harris v. McRae, 448 u.s. 297, 319 (1980) (quoting McGowan 
v. Maryland, 366 u.s. 420, 442 (1961)). Thus, a public 
(
school can teach subjects or particular theories that are 
consistent with religious beliefs. Similarly, a state 
legislature could require by statute that such subjects or 
even theories be taught, so long as 
~~ purpose for the enactment exists. 
As a matter of history, school children, of course, 
can and should be properly informed of the religious 
heritage of our Nation. "The fact that the Founding 
19. 
Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God and that 
the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is 
clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower 
Compact to the Constitution itself." Abington School 
District v. Schempp, supra, at 213. Our history affects 
and informs our present. In my view, it would be tragic 
if school children were deprived of knowledge of this 
history due to the supposed constraints of the 
Establishment Clause. As this Court has recognized, the 
Bible, although an "instrument of religion," id., at 224, 
"may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of 
history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or 
the like." Stone v. Graham, supr~, at 42 (citing id., at 
'· 
20. 
225} .5 The Establishment Clause prohibits the use of the 
Bible and other religious documents only when the purpose 
of the use is clearly to advance religious belief. 
III 
In sum, I find that the language and the legislative 
history of the Balanced Treatment Act indicate beyond 
question that its purpose is to advance a particular 
religious belief. Although the discretion of state and 
5state-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer 
courses integrating religious studies into the curriculum. 
Approximately half of the state-sponsored universities 
offer one or more courses involving religion. As an 
example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers 
seven courses: Introduction to Religion, Old Testament, 
New Testament, Faith and Doubt, Jesus in History and 
Tradition, Eastern Religions, and Philosophy of Religion. 
Many general teaching guides indicate that education as 
to the nature of various religious beliefs could be 
integrated into a secondary school curriculum in a manner 
consistent with the Constitution. See, e.g., C. Kniker, 
Teaching about Religion in the Public Schools (1985}; The 
Religion in Elementary Social Studies Project, Final 
Report (Fla. State Univ. 1976}; L. Karp, Teaching the 
Bible as Literature in the Public Schools (1973}. 
21. 
local authorities over public school curriculum is broad, 
"the First Amendment does not permit the State to require 
that teaching and learning must be tailored to the 
principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or 
dogma." Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 
Accordingly, I concur in the opinion and the 
Court that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the 
Establishment Clause of the Constitution. 
[p, 1-5 
i ,., 6. 
of evolution. "[C]oncepts concerning a supreme being 
of some sort are manifestly religious •••• These concepts 
do not shed that religiosity merely because they are 
presented as philosophy or as a science." Malnak v. Yogi, 
440 f. supp. 1284, 1322 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 
592 F. 2d 197 (CA3 1979). Thus, from the face of the 
statute a purpose to advance a religious belief is 
apparent. 
religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate 
of a state legislature. The religious purpose must 
predominate. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 u.s. 38, 56 
1};, I k v L\ l P5 c · J 
(1986); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 u.s. 668, 681, n. 6 
(1984). The Act contains a statement of purpose: to 
"protec[t] academic freedom." §286.2. This statement is 
puzzling, because the "academic freedom" of teachers to 
7. 
present information and students to receive it in public 
schools is circumscribed by the Establishment Clause. 
Thus, "academic freedom" does not encompass the right of a 
legislature to structure the public school curriculum in 
order to advance a particular religious belief. Epperson 
v. Arkansas, 393 u.s. 97, 106 (1968). Nevertheless, I 
read this statement as rendering the purpose of the 
statute at least ambiguous. Accordingly, I proceed to 
review the legislative history of the Act. 
B 
In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate 
Bill 956 to the Louisiana legislature. The purpose of the 
bill was to 11 assure academic freedom by requiring the 
teaching of the theory of creation ex nihilo in all public 
schools where the theory of evolution is taught. 11 1 App. 
8. 
E-1.2 The bill defined the 11 theory of creation ex nihilo 11 
as 11 the belief that the origin of the elements, the 
galaxy, the solar system, of life, of all the species of 
plants and animals, the origin of man, and the origin of 
all things and their processes and relationships were 
created ex nihilo and fixed by God. " 1 App. E-la- lb. 
This theory was referred to by Senator Keith as 
11 scientific creationism ... 1 App. E-2. 
f'vr~ , 
2creation 11 ex nihilo 11 ) means creation 11 from nothing 11 and 
has been found to be an 11 inherently religious concept. 11 
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 
1266 (E.D. Ark. 1982). The District court in McLean 
found: 
11 The argument that creation from nothing in 
[section) 4(a) (1) [of the substantially similar 
Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act] does not 
involve a supernatural deity has no evidentiary 
or rational support. To the contrary, 'creation 
out of nothing' is a concept unique to Western 
religions. In traditional western religious 
thought, the conception of a creator of the 
world is a conception of God. Indeed, creation 
of the world 'out of nothing' is the ultimate 
religious statement because God is the only 
actor. 11 Id., at 1265. 
9. 
While a Senate committee was studying scientific 
creationism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of 
the bill, requiring balanced treatment of "evolution-
science" and "creation-science." 1 App. E-108. Although 
the Keith bill prohibited "instruction in any religious 
doctrine or materials," 1 App. E-302, it defined 
"creation-science" to include: 
"the scientific evidences and related inferences 
that indicate (a} sudden creation of the 
universe, energy, and life from nothing; (b) 
the insufficiency of mutation and natural 
selection in bringing about development of all 
living kinds from a single organism; (c) 
changes only within fixed limits or originally 
created kinds of plants and animals; (d) 
separate ancestry for man and apes; (e) 
explanation of the earth's geology by 
catastrophism, including the occurrence of a 
worldwide flood; and (6} a relatively recent 
inception of the earth and living kinds." 1 
App. E-298 - 299. 
10. 
Significantly, the model act on which the Keith bill 
relied was also the basis for a similar statute in 
Arkansas. See McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 
F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982}. The District Court in 
McLean carefully examined this model act, particularly the 
section defining creation-science, and concluded that 
"[b]oth [its] concepts and wording ••• convey an 
inescapable religiosity ... Id., at 1265. The court found 
that "[t]he ideas of [this section] are not merely similar 
to the literal interpretation of Genesis~ they are 
identical and parallel to no other story of creation." 
Ibid. 
The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981. 
On May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee amended the 






evidences. Tll.e-amendment was "not intended to try to gut 
Senator Keith introduced [it]," 1 App. E-43 ( 
viewed as working •jany violence to the bill. u 1 App. E-
438. Instead, the concern~islator who 
--
e ame~hether this should be an all inclusive 
list." 1 App. E-438. 
The legislature then held hearings on the amended 
bill which became the Balanced Treatment Act under review. 
The principal creation-scientist to testify in support of 
the Act was Dr. Edward Boudreaux. He did not elaborate on 
the nature of creation-science except to indicate that the 
uscientific evidences" of the theory are "the objective 
information of science [that] point[s] to conditions of a 




however, that the recognized creation-scientists in the 
United States, who ~numbe[r] something like a thousand 
[and] who hold doctorate and masters degrees in all areas 
of science~ are affiliated with either or both the 
Institute of Creation Research and the Creation Research 
Society. 2 App. E-503 - 504. Information on both of 
these organization is part of the legislative history. 
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate 
of the Christian Heritage College in San Diego, 
California. The Institute was established to address the 
"urgent need for our nation to return to belief in a 
personal, omnipotent Creator, who has a purpose for His 
creation and to whom all people must eventually give 
account." 1 App. E-197. A goal of the Institute is "a 






explanation of the origin of the world.H Therefore, the 
Institute currently is working on the "development of new 
methods for teaching scientific creationism in public 
schools." 1 App. E-197- 199. The Creation Research 
Society (CRS) is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. A member 
must subscribe to the following statement of belief: "The 
Bible is the written word of God, and because it is 
inspired throughout, all of its assertions are 
historically and scientifically true." 2 App. E-583. To 
study creation-science at the CRS, a member must accept 
"that the account of origins in Genesis is a factual 
presentation of simple historical truth. 11 2 App. E-583.3 
3The District Court in McLean noted three 
other elements of the CRS statement of belief to 
which members must subscribe: 
(2) All basic types of living things, including 






When, as here, "both courts below are unable to 
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court 
normally should hesitate to find one." wallace v. 
Jaffree, supra, at 66 (POWELL, J., concurring). My 
examination of the language and the legislative history of 
the Balanced Treatment Act confirms that the intent of the 
a....p.~~ 
Louisiana legislature was to promote religious belief • 
.-\ 
(Footnote 3 continued from previous page) 
during Creation Week as described in Genesis. 
Whatever biological changes have occurred since 
Creation have accomplished only changes within 
the original created kinds. (3) The great 
Flood described in Genesis, commonly referred to 
as the Noachian Deluge, was an historical event, 
world-wide in its extent and effect. (4) 
Finally, we are an organization of Christian men 
of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our Lord 
and Savior. The account of the special creation 
of Adam and Eve as one man and one woman, and 
their subsequent Fall into sin, is the basis for 
our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all 
mankind. Therefore, salvation can come only 
thru [sic] accepting Jesus Christ as our 




l~ The legislative history of the Arkansas statute 
prohibiting the teaching of evolution examined in Epperson 
v. Arkansas, 393 u.s., at 97, was r~trmilar to 
A 
the legislative history of the Balanced Treatment Act. In 
Epperson, the Court found: 
uit is clear that fundamentalist sectarian 
conviction was and is the law's reason for 
existence. Its antecedent, Tennessee's •monkey 
law,• candidly stated its purpose: to make it 
unlawful •to teach any theory that denies the 
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in 
the Bible, and to teach instead that man has 
descended from a lower order of animals.• 
Perhaps the sensational publicity attendant upon 
the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to adopt less 
explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's 
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation 
of man• as taught in the Bible, but there is no 
doubt that the motivation for the law was the 
same: to suppress the teaching of a theory 
which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine 




Here, it is clear that religious belief is the 
Balanced Treatment's Act's Hreason for existence.H The 
tenets of creation-science parallel the Genesis story of 
Ali wit~ ~crftdnre.Hts, the Genes ts;>-
'~~ 
s a religious belief . b d 11¥0 
legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can 
4After hearing testimony from numerous experts, the 
District Court in McLean concluded: 
The parallels between [the definition section of 
the model act] and Genesis are quite specific: 
(1) "sudden creation ·from nothing 11 is taken from 
Genesis, 1:1-10; (2) destruction of the world by 
a flood of divine origin is a notion peculiar to 
Judeo-Christian tradition and is based on 
Chapters 7 and 8 of Genesis; (3) the term 
"kinds 11 has no fixed scientific meaning, but 
appears repeatedly in Genesis; (4) "relatively 
recent inception 11 means ·an age of the earth from 
6,000 to 10,000 years and is based on the 
genealogy of the Old Testament using the rather 
astronomical ages assigned to the patriarchs; 
(5) separate ancestry of man and ape focuses on 
the portion of the theory of evolution which 
Fundamentalists find most offensive, Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 u.s. 97 (1968). 11 529 F. Supp., at 




blind us to that fact.H Stone v. Graham, 449 u.s. 39, 41 
(1980}. Although the Act as finally enacted does not 
contain explicit reference to its religious purpose, there 
is no indication in the legislative history that the 
deletion of Hcreation ex nihiloH and the four primary 
tenets of the theory were intended to alter the purpose 
for teaching creation-science. Instead, the statements of 
purpose of the sources of creation-science in the United 
States make clear that their purpose is to promote a 
~ v-z.., 
religious belief. I~ no evidence in the legislative 
'\ 
history that the legislature's purpose was any different. 
The fact that the Louisiana legislature purported to add 
information to the school curriculum rather than detract 
from it as in Epperson does not affect my analysis. Both 




structuring the public school curriculum to make it 
compatible with a particular religious belief: the 
"divine creation of man." 
That the statute is limited to the scientific 
evidences supporting the theory does not render its 
purpose secular. In reaching its conclusion that the Act 
is unconstitutional, the Court of Appeals 11 did not deny 
that the underpinnings of creationism may be supported by 
scientific evidence." 765 F. 2d 1251, 1256 (1985). And 
there is no need to do so. Whatever the academic merit of 
particular subjects or theories, the Establishment Clause 
limits the discretion of state officials to pick and 
choose among them for the purpose of promoting a 
19. 
particular religious belief.S The language of the statute 
and its legislative history convince me that the Louisiana 
legislature exercised its discretion for this purpose in 
this case. 
II 
Even though I find Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act 
unconstitutional, I adhere to the view 11 that the States 
and locally elected school boards should have the 
Spor this reason, I ~~tA shntt crdo~he 
argument that the affidavits submitted in this case 
rendered the grant of summary judgment by the District 
Court erroneous. To preclude summary judgment, affidavits 
must raise a genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c). As I read the affidavits, they primarily 
purport to prove that a scientific basis for creation-
science exists. But this proof is not material to the 
legal issue of whether the legislature intended to promote 
religious belief in requiring that these scientific 
evidences be taught. To the extent that the affidavits 
express the opinion that creation-science is not 
religious, they do not put into issue the legislature's 
understanding of the nature of the theory. This intent is 
properly determined by examination of the language of the 





responsibility for determining the educational policy of 
the public schools ... Board of Education v. Pico, 457 u.s. 
853, 893 {1982) {POWELL, J., dissenting). A decision 
respecting the subject mat7'er to be taught in public 
schools does not violate the Establishment Clause simply 
because the material to be taught "'happens to coincide or 
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.' 11 
Harris v. McRae, 448 u.s. 297, 319 {1980) {quoting McGowan 
v. Maryland, 366 u.s. 420, 442 {1961)). In the context of 
a challenge under the Establishment Clause, interference 
with the decisions of these authorities is warranted only 
when no valid secular purpose for their judgment is 
evident. 
The history of the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment has been chronicled by this Court before in 
21. 
detail. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U.S. 1, 8-14 (1947); McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at_; 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 u.s. 421, ( 1962) • Therefore, 
only a brief review at this point is necessary. The early 
settlers of this country came to escape religious 
persecution in Europe in the form of forced support of 
state-established churches. The new Americans thus 
reacted strongly when they perceived the same type of 
religious intolerance emerging in this country. The 
reaction in Virginia, the home of many of the Founding 
Fathers, is instructive. George Mason's draft of th 
~ fJd. ~~,t 
Virginia Declaration of Rights, adopted ~n 177~ 
a guarantee of free exercise of religion. Eight years 
later, a provision prohibiting the establishment of 
religion became a part of Virginia 
22. 
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious 
Assessments, written in response to a proposal by Patrick 
Henry that all Virginia citizens be taxed to support the 
teaching of the Christian religion, spurred the 
legislature to consider and adopt Thomas Jefferson's Bill 
for Establishing Religious Freedom. See Committee for 
Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 770, n. 28. Both 
the guarantees of free exercise and against the 
establishment of religion were then incorporated into the 
federal Bill of Rights by James Madison, its drafter. 
While the "meaning and scope of the First Amendment" 
must be read "in light of its history and the evils that 
it was designed forever to suppress," Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 u.s., at 14-15, this Court has also 
recognized that 11 [t]his Nation's history has not been one 
23. 
;, ,., 
of entirely sanitized separation between Church and 
State." Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, 
at 760. "The fact that the Founding Fathers believed 
devotedly that there was a God and that the unalienable 
rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in 
their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the 
Constitution itself." Abington School District v. 
Schempp, supra, at 213.6 The Court has noted "an unbroken 
history of offical acknowledgement ••• of the role of 
fo 
religion in American life... Lynch v. Donnelly, 4~ u.s., ? 
at 674, and implied that these references to "our 
6John Adams wrote in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, 11 The 
Bible is the best book in the world. It contains more of 
my little philosophy than all the libraries I have seen; 
and such parts of it as I cannot reconclie to my little 
philosophy, I postpone for future investigation." 
Correspondence II 412 (Dec. 25, 1813). 
24. 
religious heritage 11 are constitutionally acceptable. Id., 
at 677. 
As a matter of history, school children, of course, 
can and should properly be informed of all aspects of this 
Nation's religious heritage. I would see no 
constitutional problem if school children were taught the 
nature of the Founding Father's religious beliefs and how 
these beliefs affected the attitudes of the times and the 
structure of our government. J.!~urseo/in comparative 
"1~~~~---..-( 
rel igion 1wonl d. al ~e -i:re-1 constitutionally appropriate. 7 In 
fact, since religion permeates our history, a familiarity 
with the nature 
understand many 
of religious beliefs is necessary to 
historical as well as contemporary events~ 
?The Encyclopedia of American 
describes 1,347 churches. ~ 
71 ~0-l 
Religions (2d ed. 1987) 
25. 
~ 
seale { the political 
---
( 
T~ xamp es on a worldwide 
controversies in Northern Ireland, the Middle East and 
India, cannot be understood properly 
without to the underlying religious beliefs and 
-~J 
view, it would be tragic if school 
ildren were deprived of a full and complete 
understanding of the history of this country and the world 
due to the supposed constraints of the Establishment 
Clause. 
also ~ ~lsi..ze that the 
1'/.c ,4--"~ 
Establishment Clause does not prohibit aGsol~~y the ~use 
of religious documents in public school education. 
Although this Court has recognized that the Bible is "an 
instrument of religion," Abington School District v. 
~ ~-.&...~-'1·-le... c.h•J-Schempp, supra, at 224, it has~ that the Bible 11 may 
1\ 
26. 
constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of 
history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or 
the like." Stone v. Graham, supra, at 42 (citing id., at 
225) .8 The book is, in fact, "the world's all-time best 
seller"9 with undoubted literary and historic value apart 
from its religious content. The Establishment Clause is 
properly understood to prohibit the use of the Bible and 
8state-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer 
courses integrating religious studies into the curriculum. 
Approximately half of the state-sponsored universities 
offer one or more courses involving religion. As an 
example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers 
seven courses: Introduction to Religion, Old Testament, 
New Testament, Faith and Doubt, Jesus in History and 
Tradition, Eastern Religions,- and Philosophy of Religion. 
Many general teaching guides indicate that education as 
to the nature of various religious beliefs could be 
integrated into a secondary school curriculum in a manner 
consistent with the Constitution. See, e.g., c. Kniker, 
Teaching about Religion in the Public Schools (1985); The 
Religion in Elementary Social Studies Project, Final 
Report (Fla. State Univ. · 1976); L. Karp, Teaching the 
Bible as ·Literature in the Public Schools (1973). 
9see N.Y. Times, §2, p. 24, col. 3 (May 10, 1981); 
McWhirter, 19 86 Guiness world Records 144 (the Bible is 




other religious documents in public school education only 
when the purpose of the use is clearly to advance 
religious belief. 
III 
In sum, I find that the language and the legislative 
history of the Balanced Treatment Act indicate beyond 
question that its purpose is to advance a particular 
religious belief. Although the discretion of state and 
local authorities over public school curricul~ is broad, 
t'\ 
11 the First Amendment does not permit the State to require 
that teaching and learning must be tailored to the 
0A4-'~~J 
principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or 
1\ 
dogma. 11 Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 106. 
Accordingly, I concur in the opinion and judgment of the 
2 8. 
Cou·rt that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the 








~~r ~ ~~ ~85-1513, Edwards v. A9uil1ard 
~ !-- IJ> ,-v'l -r--~ SECOND DRAFT yV 
5 ~ .v ~ ~ ~~~. """~~ 9·fl 
p.fl<' ,~&-~r·~~~~~ 
,.1 ~ j.., JUSTICE PCMELL, concurring. ~ / t)./"" 
I write separately to note certain aspects of the 
legislative history, and to emphasize that nothing in the 
Court's opinion diminishes the traditionally broad 
discretion accorded state and local school officials in 
the selection of the public school curriculum. 
I 
This Court has consistently applied the three-pronged 
test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1971) to 




Establishment Clause of the Constitution.! See, e.g., 
Grand Rapids ~chool District v. Ball, 473 u.s. 373, _ 
(1985) ("We have particularly relied on Lemon in every 
case involving the sensitive relationship between 
government and religion in the education of our 
children"). The first requirement of the Lemon test is 
that the challenged statute have a 11 secular legislative 
purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612. See 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 
773 (1973). If no valid secular purpose ~~the 
can be identified, then the statute violates the 
Establishment Clause. 
lAs the Court recognizes, ante, at , n. 4., the one 
exception to this consistent applicatic>r1of Lemon is Marsh 
v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983). 




~The starting point in every case involving 
construction of a statute is the language itself." Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 {1975) 
{POWELL, J., concurring). The Balanced Treatment for 
Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act {Act or 
Balanced Treatment Act), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §17:286.1 et 
seq. {West), provides in part: 
"[P]ublic schools within [the] state shall give 
balanced treatment to creation-science and to 
evolution-science. Balanced treatment of these 
two models shall be given in classroom lectures 
taken as a whole for each course, in textbook 
materials taken as a whole for each course, in 
library materials taken as a whole for the 
sciences and taken a a whole for the humanities, 
and in other educational programs in public 
schools, to the extent that such lectures, 
textbooks, library materials, or educational 
programs deal in any way with the subject of the 
origin of man, life, the earth, or the universe. 
When creation or evolution is taught, each shall 
be taught as a theory, rather than as proven 
scientific fact." §17:286.4.A • 
4. 
"Balanced treatment" means ~providing whatever information 
and instruction in both creation and evolution models the 
classroom teacher determines is necessary and appropriate 
to provide insight into both theories in view of the 
textbooks and other instructional materials available for 
USe in hiS ClaSSrOOm. II §286 .3 (1) • 11 CreatiOn-SCienCe 11 iS 
defined as "the scientific evidences for creation and 
inferences from those scientific evidences. 11 §286.3(2). 
1'Evolution-science" means "the scientific evidences for 
evolution and inferences from those scientific evidences." 
§2 86 • 3 ( 3) • 
Although the Act requires the teaching of the 
scientific evidences of both creation and evolution 
whenever either is taught, it does not define either term. 
"A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, 
I . 
5. 
unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as 
their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." 
Perrin v. United States, 444 u.s. 37, 42 (1979). ~ 
theory " a doctrine or theory of creation ~ (}) v 
holding that matter, the various forms of life, and the 
world were created by a transcendent God out of nothing." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 532 
(unabridged 1981). "Evolution" is defined as "the theory 
that the various types of animals and plants have their 
origin in other preexisting types, the distinguishable 
difference being due to modifications in successive 
generations." Id., at 789. Thus, the Balanced Treatment 
Act mandates that public schools present the scientific 
evidence to support a theory of divine creation whenever 
they present the scientific evidence to support the theory 
6. 
of evolution. H[C]oncepts concerning a supreme being 
of some sort are manifestly religious •••• These concepts 
do not shed that religiosity merely because they are 
presented as philosophy or as a science. 11 Malnak v. Yogi, 
440 f . Supp. 1284, 1322 (D.N.J. 1977), aff 1 d per curiam, 
592 F. 2d 197 (CA3 1979). Thus, from the face of the 
statute a purpose to advance a religious belief is 
apparent. 
A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate 
an act of a state legislature. The religious purpose must 
predominate. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 u.s. 38, 56 
(1986); id., at 64 (POWELL, J., concurring); Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 u.s. 668, 681, n. 6 (1984). The Act 
contains a statement of purpose: to uprotec[t] academic 
freedom.~ §286.2. This statement is puzzling, because 
7. 
the "academic freedom_. of teachers to present informatior 
and students to receive itA 0ubl~ is -J'e_: - ;I 
circumscribed by the Establishment Clause. 'l'htt~ 
~cademic freedom" does not encompass the right of a 0u-p ~ /(._ 
legislature to structure the public school curriculum in 
order to advance a particular religious belief. Epperson 
v. Arkansas, 393 u.s. 97, 106 (1968). Nevertheless, I 
read this statement as rendering the purpose of the 
statute at least ambiguous. Accordingly, I proceed to 
review the legislative history of the Act. 
B 
In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate 
Bill 956 to the Louisiana legislature. The purpose of the 
bill was to 11 assure academic freedom by requiring the 
teaching of the theory of creation ex nihilo in all public 
8 • 
schools where the theory of evolution is taught." 1 App. 
E-1.2 The bill defined the ~theory of creation ex nihilo~ 
as 11 the belief that the origin of the elements, the 
galaxy, the solar system, of life, of all the species of 
plants and animals, the origin of man, and the origin of 
all things and their processes and relationships were 
created ex nihilo and fixed by God." 1 App. E-la- lb. 
2creation 11 ex nihilo" -ef coat ~means creation 11 from 
nothing" and has been found to be an "inherently religious 
concept." McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. 
Supp. 1255, 1266 (E.D. Ark. 1982). '!'he District Court in 
McLean found: 
11 'l'he argument that creation from nothing in 
[section] 4(a) (1) [of the substantially similar 
Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act] does not 
involve a supernatural deity has no evidentiary 
or rational support. To the contrary, 'creation 
out of nothing' is a concept unique to Western 
religions. In traditional western religious 
thought, the conception of a creator of the 
world is a conception of God. Indeed, creation 
of the world 'out of nothing' is the ultimate 
religious statement because God is the only 
actor." Id., at 1265. 
9. 
This theory was referred to by Senator Keith as 
~•scientific creationism. u 1 App. E-2. 
While a Senate committee was studying scientific 
creationism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of 
the bill, requiring balanced treatment of 11 evolution-
science 11 and ~creation-science ... 1 App. E-108. Although 
the Keith bill prohibited 11 instruction in any religious 
doctrine or materials, 11 1 App. E-302, it defined 
11 creation-science 11 to include: 
11 the scientific evidences and related inferences 
that indicate (a} sudden creation of the 
universe, energy, and life from nothing; (b) 
the insufficiency of mutation and natural 
selection in bringing about development of all 
living kinds from a single organism; (c) 
changes only within fixed limits or originally 
created kinds of plants and animals; (d) 
separate ancestry for man and apes; (e) 
explanation of the earth's geology by 
catastrophism, including the occurrence of a 
worldwide flood; and (~ a relatively recent 
inception of the earth and living kinds. 11 1 
App. E-298 - 299. 
10. 
Significantly, the model act on which the Keith bill 
relied was also the basis for a similar statute in 
Arkansas. See McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 
F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982). The District Court in 
McLean carefully examined this model act, particularly the 
section defining creation-science, and concluded that 
h[b]oth [its] concepts and wording ••• convey an 
inescapable religiosity ... Id., at 1265. The court found 
that 11 [t]he ideas of [this section] are not merely similar 
to the literal interpretation of Genesis; they are 
identical and parallel to no other story of creation." 
Ibid. 
The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981. 
On May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee amended the 
Keith bill to delete the illustrative list of scientific 
11. 
evidences. According to the legislator who proposed the 
amendment, it was Hnot intended to try to gut [the bill] 
in any way, or defeat the purpose [for] which Senator 
Keith introduced [it],~· 1 App. E-432, and was not viewed 
as working "any violence to the bill.'• 1 App. E-438. 
Instead, the concern was "whether this should be an all 
inclusive list." 1 App. E-438. 
The legislature then held hearings on the amended 
bill which became the Balanced Treatment Act under review. 
The principal creation-scientist to testify in support of 
the Act was Dr. Edward Boudreaux. He did not elaborate on 
the nature of creation-science except to indicate that the 
Hscientific evidencesH of the theory are "the objective 
information of science [that] point[s] to conditions of a 
creator.H 2 App. E-501 - 502. He further testified~ 
12. 
~ that the recognized creation-scientists in the 
United States, who "numbe[r] something like a thousand 
[and] who hold doctorate and masters degrees in all areas 
of scienc~ are affiliated with either or both the 
) 
Institute of Creation Research and the Creation Research 
Society. 2 App. E-503 - 504. Information on both of 
these organization the legislative 
The Institute 
of the Christian Heritage College in San Diego, 
California. The Institute was established to address the 
"urgent need for our nation to return to belief in a 
personal, omnipotent Creator, who has a purpose for His 
creation and to whom all people must eventually give 
account. ·- 1 App. E-197. A goal of the Institute is 11 a 
revival of belief in special creation as the true 
13. 
explanation of the origin of the world." Therefore, the 
Institute currently is working on the 11 development of new 
methods for teaching scientific creationism in public 
schools.'' 1 App. E-197 - 199. The Creation Research 
Society (CRS) is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. A member 
must subscribe to the following statement of belief: "The 
Bible is the written word of God, and because it is 
inspired throughout, all of its assertions are 
historically and scientifically true. 11 2 App. E-583. To 
study creation-science at the CRS, a member must accept 
"that the account of origins in Genesis is a factual 
presentation of simple historical truth." 2 App. E-583.3 
3The District Court in McLean noted three 
other elements of the CRS statement of belief to 
which members must subscribe: 
All basic types of living things, including 
were made by direct creative acts of God 
(Footnote continued) 
c 
When, as here, ~both courts below are unable to 
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court 
normally should hesitate to find one." J wau:!': v. 
Jaffree, supra, at 66 (POWELL, J., concurring). My 
14. 
examination of the language and the legislative history of 
the Balanced Treatment Act confirms that the intent of the 
(Footnote 3 continued from previous page) 
during Creation week as described in Genesis. 
Whatever biological changes have occurred since 
Creation have accomplished only chan es within ] 
the original created kinds. The grea [ti 
Flood described in Genesis, commonly referred to 
as the Noachian Deluge, was an historical event, rr~·;] 
world-wide in its extent and effect. ("#-- (.!'" 
Finally, we are an organization of Christian men 
of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our Lord 
and Savior. The account of the special creation 
of Adam and Eve as one man and one woman, and 
their subsequent Fall into sin, is the basis for 
our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all 
mankind. Therefore, salvation can come only 
thru sic accepting Jesus Christ as our 
Savior. 29 F. Supp., at 1260, n. 7. 
i , I 
Louisiana legislature was to promote a particular 
15. 
religious belief. The legislative history of the Arkansas 
statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution examined in 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 u.s., at 97, was strikingly 
similar to the legislative history of the Balanced 
Treatment Act. In Epperson, the Court found: 
~It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian 
conviction was and is the law's reason for 
existence. Its antecedent, Tennessee's 'monkey 
law,' candidly stated its purpose: to make it 
unlawful 'to teach any theory that denies the 
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in 
the Bible, and to teach instead that man has 
descended from a lower order of animals.' 
Perhaps the sensational publicity attendant upon 
the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to adopt less 
explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's 
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation 
of man' as taught in the Bible, but there is no 
doubt that the motivation for the law was the 
same: to suppress the teaching of a theory 
which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine 
creation of man." Id., at 107-109 (footnotes 
omitted). --
16. 
Here, it is clear that religious belief is the 
Balanced Treatment's Act's Hreason for existence.H The 
tenets of creation-science parallel the Genesis story of 
creation,4 and this is a religious belief. ~No 
legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can 
blind us to that fact.H Stone v. Graham, 449 u.s. 39, 41 
4After hearing testimony from numerous experts, the 
District Court in McLean concluded: 
The parallels between [the definition section of 
the model act] and Genesis are quite specific: 
{1) usudden creation from nothing•• is taken from 
Genesis, 1:1-10; {2) destruction of the world by 
a flood of divine origin is a notion peculiar to 
Judea-Christian tradition and is based on 
Chapters 7 and 8 of Genesis; {3) the term 
"kinds•• has no fixed scientific meaning, but 
appears repeatedly in Genesis; {4) urelatively 
recent inceptionH means an age of the earth from 
6,000 to 10,000 years and is based on the 
genealogy of the Old Testament using the rather 
astronomical ages assigned to the patriarchs; 
{5) separate ancestry of man and ape focuses on 
the portion of the theory of evolution which 
Fundamentalists find most offensive, Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 u.s. 97 {1968)." 529 • Supp., at 
1265, n. 19 ~ 1~ 
(,.·~ tnt~ h *'~~ IMA.t~) 
i 
'I 
(1980). Although the Act as finally enacted does not 
17. 
contain explicit reference to its religious purpose, there 
is no indication in the legislative history that the 
deletion of ••creation ex nihilo" and the four primary 
tenets of the theory were intended to alter the purpose 
for teaching creation-science. Instead, the statements of 
purpose of the sources of creation-science in the United 
States make clear that their purpose is to promote a 
religious belief. There is no evidence in the legislative 
history that the legislature•s purpose was any different. 
The fact that the Louisiana legislature purported to add 
information to the school curriculum rather than detract 
from it as in Epperson does not affect my analysis. Both 
legislatures acted with the unconstitutional purpose of 
structuring the public school curriculum to make it 
\ 
·~ 
compatible with a particular religious belief: the 
11 divine creation of man. 11 
That the statute is limited to the scientific 
evidences supporting the theory does not render its 
18. 
purpose secular. In reaching its conclusion that the Act 
is unconstitutional, the Court of Appeals "did not deny 
that the underpinnings of creationism may be supported by 
scientific evidence ... 765 F. 2d 1251, 1256 {1985). And 
there is no need to do so. Whatever the academic merit of 
particular subjects or theories, the Establishment Clause 
limits the discretion of state officials to pick and 
choose among them for the purpose of promoting a 
19. 
particular religious belief.s The language of the statute 
and its legislative history convince me that the Louisiana 
legislature exercised its discretion for this purpose in 
this case. 
II 
Even though I find Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act 
unconstitutional, I adhere to the view "that the States 
and locally elected school boards should have the 
5For this reason, I reject the argument that the 
affidavits submitted in this case rendered the grant of 
summary judgment by the District Court erroneous. To 
preclude summary judgment, affidavits must raise a genui~e 
issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). As I rea ~ 
the affidavits, they primarily purport to ..PE;PVe that a 1> 
scientific basis for creation-science exil€s":" But this 
proof is not material to the 1 egal issue of whether the 
legislature intended to promote religious belief in 
requiring that these scientific evidences be taught. "'Pe-
,. -t-he ex-tent-tha-t the affidavits express the opinion that 
creation-science is not rel igious ,\1 they do not put into 
issue the legislature's understanding of the nature of the 
theory. This intent is properly determined by examination 
of the language of the Act and the legislative history 
contemporaneous with its enactment. 
20. 
responsibility for determining the educational policy of 
the public schools." Board of Education v. Pi co, 45 7 u.s. 
853, 893 {1982) {POWELL, J., dissenting). A decision 
respecting the subject matter to be taught in public 
schools does not violate the Establishment Clause simply 
because the material to be taught 11 'happens to coincide or 
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.'" 
Harris v. McRae, 448 u.s. 297, 319 {1980) {quoting McGowan 
v. Maryland, 366 u.s. 420, 442 {1961)). In the context of 
a challenge under the Establishment Clause, interference 
the decisions of these authorities is warranted only 
alid secular purpose for their judgment is 
evident. 
The history of the religion clauses of the First 
chronicled by this Court r in 
21. 
detail. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 ~~ 
u.s. 1, 8-14 (1947); ~cGowan v~Maryland, supra, at~ 
~ v. Vitale, 370 u.s. 421, (1962) -· ~----~~ 
only a brief review at this point is 
C~ ./.o~~)Ar'F~ .W..,444t~ 
religious 
persecutio~· support of 
) 
state-established churches. The new Americans thus 
reacted strongly when they perceived the same type of 
religious intolerance emerging in this country. The 
reaction in Virginia, the home of many of the Founding 
Fathers, is instructive. George Mason's draft of the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted by the House of 
Burgesses in 1776 
,) 
It contained a guarantee of free 
exercise of religion. Eight years later, a provision 




Virginia law when James Madison's Memorial and 
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, written in 
22 • 
response to a proposal by l'lltt ±7 that all Virginia 
citizens be taxed to support the teaching of the Christian 
religion, spurred the legislature to consider and adopt 
Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious 
Freedom. 
....... f.tf!. 
See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
~ 
770, n. 28. Both the guarantees of free 
exercise and against the establishment of religion were 
then incorporated into the federal Bill of Rights by ~~ames 
~ 
Madison~ts drafte~ ec J 
While the umeaning and scope of the First Amendment" 
must be read "in light of its history and the evils ~ 
it was designed forever to suppress," Everson v. Board of 
Education, this Court has also 
i , I 
23. 
recognized that "~on's history has not been one 
of entirely sanitized separation between Church and 
State ... Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, 
at 760. 11 The fact that the Founding Fathers believed 
devotedly that there was a God and that the unalienable 
rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in 
their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the 
Constitution itself." District v. 
~
Schempp, snpJT a~ 213 has noted ~an unbroken 
history of offical acknowledgement ••. of the role of 
religion in American life.'' Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 u.s., 
6John Adams wrote ~ a lett,Pto Thomas Jefferson, "The 
Bible is the best book in the world. It contains more of 
my little philosophy than all the libraM·es I have seen; 
and such parts of it as I cannot recon · to my 1 ittle 
.. ; Philosophy, _ I .-:;:-:;---r.ostpone for future investigation." 
x correspondenc~412 (Dec. 25, 1813). 
24. 
that these references to "our 
religious heritage" are constitutionally acceptable. Id., 
at 677. 
As a matter of history, school children r-of coors~ 
can and should properly be informed of all aspects of this 
Nation's religious heritage. I would see no 
constitutional problem if school children were taught the 
nature of the Founding Father's religious beliefs and how 
these beliefs affected the attitudes of the times and the 
structure of our government.? Courses in comparative 
religion of course are customary and constitutionally 
7There is an enormous variety of religions in the United 
States. The(!!! E ~ edia of American Religions ( 2d ed. 
1987) describe 1,34 churches. The United States Census 
Bureau groups aj or American religions into: Buddist 
Churches of America~ Eastern Churches~ Jews~ Old Catholic, 
Polish National Catholic, and Armenian Churches~ The Roman 
Catholic Church~ Protestants~ and Miscellaneous. 
Statistical Abstract of the United States 50 (106th ed. 
1986). 
25. 
appropriate.8 In fact, since religion permeates our 
history, a familiarity with the nature of religious 
as contemporary events.9 In addition, it 
that the Establishment Clause does not 
educational use of religious documents in public school 
tate-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer 
ourses integrating religious studies into the curriculum. 
pproximately half of the state-sponsored universities 
offer one or more courses involving religion. As an 
example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers 
seven courses: Introduction to Religion, Old Testament, 
New Testament, Faith and Doubt, Jesus in History and 
Tradition, Eastern Religions, and Philosophy of Religion. 
Many general teaching guides indicate that education a~ 
to the nature of various religious beliefs could be 
integrated into a secondary school curriculum in a manner 
consistent with the Constitution. See, e.g., c. Kniker, 
Teaching about Religion in the Public Schools (1985); The 
Religion in Elementary Social Studies Project, Final 
Report (Fla. State Univ. 1976); L. Karp, Teaching the 
Bible as Literature in the Public Schools (1973). 
9Exetmflle&t OR a 'i'Orldwt~e < :es a:Ji g i R eotlJ6i?.J;e~~/al 
t oversies in Northern Ireland, the MfOdle Eas~ and 
cannot be understood properly without reference 
to e underlying religious beliefs and the conflicts 
~--th_e~ to generate. 
I I 
26. 
education. Although this Court has recognized that the 
Bible is "an instrument of religion, .. Abington School 
District v. Schempp, supra, at 224, it also has made clear 
that the Bible "may constitutionally be used in an 
appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, 
at 225). The book is, in 
"the world's all-time best sellerulO with undoubted 
literary and historic value apart from its religious 
I 'i ()"':. 
~~ ~ 
fact, fS. { 
(.' 0'\1\..4 c. , 
~ .f,aoPt'-" 
/1 f3 f Cll ( t! 
content. The Establishment Clause is properly understood 
to prohibit the use of the Bible and other religious 
documents in public school education only when the purpose 
27. 
III 
In sum, I find that the language 
7 
history of the Balanced Treatment Act 
gue~ that its purpose is to advance a particular 
religious belief. Although the discretion of state and 
local authorities over public school curricula is broad, 
11 the First Amendment does not permit the State to require 
that teaching and learning must be tailored to the 
principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or 
dogma ... Epperson v. Arkansas, 106. 
Accordingly, I concur in the opinion 
Court that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the 
Establishment Clause of the Constitution. 
; ' 
------- To: The Chief Justice 1___. 1 1\ 
Justi<,:e Brennan ~~ 
Justic~ White 
J usti<,:~ Marshall t./ '1- /lJ 
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JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting. 
Even if I agreed with the questionable premise that legis-
lation can be invalidated under the Establishment Clause on 
the basis of its motivation alone, without regard to its effects, 
I would still find noTustification fortoday's de'cision. The 
Louisiana legislators who passed the "Balanced Treatment 
for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act" (Balanced 
Treatment Act), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:286.1-17:286.7 
(West 1982), each of whom had sworn to support the Con-
stitution, 1 were well aware of the potential Establishment 
Clause problems and considered that aspect of the legislation 
with great care. After seven hearings and several months of 
study, resulting in substantial revision of the original pro-
posal, they approved the Act overwhelmingly and specifically 
articulated the secular urpose they meant it to serve. Al-
thoug t e record con tams a undant evidence of the sincerity 
of that purpose, the Court today holds, essentially on the 
basis of "its visceral knowledge regarding what must have 
motivated the legislators," 778 F. 2d 225, 227 (CA5 1985) 
(Gee, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), that the members of 
the Louisiana Legislature knowingly violated their oaths and 
'Article VI, clause 3 of the Constitution provides that "the Members of 
the several State Legislatures . . . shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, 
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then lied about it. I dissent. Had requirements of the Bal-
anced Treatment Act that are not apparent on its face been 
clarified by an interpretation of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court, or by the manner of its implementation, the Act might 
well be found unconstitutional; but the question of its con-
stitutionality cannot rightly be disposed of on the gallop, by 
impugning the motives of its supporters. 
I 
This case arrives here in the following posture: The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court has never been given an opportunity to 
interpret the Balanced Treatment Act, State officials have 
never attempted to implement it, and it has never been the 
subject of a full evidentiary hearing. We can only guess at 
its meaning. We know that it forbids instruction in either 
"creation-science" or "evolution-science" without instruction 
in the other, § 17:286.4A, but the parties are sharply divided 
over what creation science consists of. Appellants insist 
that it is a collection of educationally valuable scientific data 
that has been censored from classrooms by an embarrassed 
scientific establishment. Appellees insist it is not science at 
all but thinly veiled religious doctrine. Both positions find 
considerable support in the legislative history. 
At least at this stage in the litigation, it is plain to me that 
we must accept appellants' view. To begin with, the statute 
itself defines "creation-science" as "the scientific evidences 
for creation and inferences from those scientific evidences." 
§ 17:286.3(2) (emphasis added). If, however, that definition 
is not thought sufficiently helpful, the means by which the 
Louisiana Supreme Court will give the term more precise 
content is quite clear-and again, at this stage in the litiga-
tion, favors the appellants' view. "Creation science" is un-
questionably a "term of art," see Brief for 72 Nobel Laure-
ates, 17 State Academies of Science, and 7 Other Scientific 
Organizations as Amicus Curiae 20, and thus, under Louisi-
ana law, is "to be interpreted according to [its] received 
85-1513-DISSENT 
EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD 3 
meaning and acceptation with the learned in the art, trade or 
profession to which [it] refer[s]." La. Civ. Code art. 15 
(West 1952). 2 The only evidence in the record of the "re-
ceived meaning and acceptation" of "creation science" is 
found in five affidavits filed by appellants. In those affida-
vits, two scientists, a philosopher, a theologian, and an 
educator, all of whom claim extensive knowledge of creation 
science, swear that it is essentially a collection of scientific 
data supporting the theory that the physical universe and life 
within it appeared suddenly and have not changed substan-
tially since appearing. See App. to Juris. Statement A19 
(Kenyon); id., at A36 (Morrow); id., at A41 (Miethe). These 
experts insist that creation science is a strictly scientific con-
cept that can be presented without religious reference. See 
id., at A19-A20, A35 (Kenyon); id., at A36, A37, A38 (Mor-
row); id., at A40, A41, A43 (Miethe); id., at A47, A48 (Most); 
id., at A49 (Clinkert). At this point, then, we must assume 
that the Balanced Treatment Act does not require the pres-
entation of religious doctrine. 
Nothing in today's opinion is plainly to the contrary, but 
what the statute means and what it requires are of rather lit-
tle concern to the Court. Like the Court of Appeals, 765 F. 
2d 1251, 1253, 1254 (CA5 1985), the Court finds it necessary 
to consider only the motives of the legislators who supported 
the Balanced Treatment Act, ante, at 6, 14, 17. Mter exam-
ining the statute, its legislative history, and its historical and 
social context, the Court holds that the Louisiana Legislature 
acted without "a secular legislative purpose" and that the Act 
therefore fails the "purpose" prong of the three-part test set 
' Thus the popular dictionary definitions cited by JuSTICE POWELL, 
ante, at 3 (POWELL, J., concurring), and appellees, see Brief for Appellees 
25, 26; Tr. of Oral Arg. 32, 34, are utterly irrelevant, as are the views of 
the school superintendents cited by the majority, ante, at 16, n. 17. Three 
quarters of those surveyed had "[n]o" or "[l]imited" knowledge of 
"creation-science theory," and not a single superintendent claimed "[e]x-
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forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612 (1971). As 
I explain below, infra, at -- - --, I doubt whether that I 
"purpose" requirement of Lemon is a proper interpretation of 
the Constitution; but even if it were, I could not agree with 
the Court's assessment that the requirement was not satis-
fied here. 
This Court has said little about the first component of the 
Lemon test. Almost invariably, we have effortlessly discov-
ered a secular purpose for measures challenged under the 
Establishment Clause, typically devoting no more than a sen-
tence or two to the matter. See, e. g., Witters v. Washing-
ton Dept. of Serv. for the Blind,- U. S. -,- (1986); 
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 383 
(1985); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 394-395 (1983); 
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116, 123-124 (1982); 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 271 (1981); Committee for 
Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 654, 657 (1980); 
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 236 (1977) (plurality opin-
ion); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 363 (1975); Committee 
for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 773 (1973); 
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472, 
479-480, n. 7 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 
678-679 (1971) (plurality opinion); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
supra, at 613. In fact, only once before deciding Lemon, and 
twice since, have we invalidated a law for lack of a secular 
purpose. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38 (1985); Stone 
v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968). 
Nevertheless, a few principles have emerged from our 
cases, principles which should, but to an unfortunately large 
extent do not, guide the Court's application of Lemon today. 
It is clear, first of all, that regardless of what "legislative pur-
pose" may mean in other contexts, for the purpose of the 
Lemon test it means the "actual" motives of those responsi-
ble for the challenged action. The Court recognizes this, see 
ante, at 5, as it has in the past, see, e. g., Witters v. Washing-
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ton Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, supra, at--; Wallace v. 
Jaffree, supra, at 56. Thus, if those legislators who sup-
ported the Balanced Treatment Act in fact acted with a "sin-
cere" secular purpose, ante, at 7, the Act survives the first 
component of the Lemon test, regardless of whether that 
purpose is likely to be achieved by the provisions they 
enacted. 
Our cases have also confirmed that when the Lemon Court 
referred to "a secular ... purpose," 403 U. S., at 612, it 
meant "a ~e~a.L.ml..!J2.0Se." The author of Lemon, writing 
for the court~, nas sara that invalidation under the purpose 
prong is appropriate when "there [is] no question that the 
statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious consid-
erations." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 680 (1984) 
(Burger, C. J.) (emphasis added); see also id., at 681, n. 6; 
Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 56 ("the First Amendment re-
quires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely moti-
vated by a purpose to advance religion") (emphasis added; 
footnote omitted). In all three cases in which we struck 
down laws under the Establishment Clause for lack of a secu-
lar purpose, we found that the legislature's sole motive was 
to promote religion. See Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 56, 
57, 60; Stone v. Graham, supra, at 41, 43, n. 5; Epperson v. 
Arkansas, supra, at 103, 107-108; see also Lynch v. Don-
nelly, supra, at 680 (describing Stone and Epperson as cases 
in which we invalidated laws "motivated wholly by religious 
considerations"). Thus, the majority's invalidation of the) 
Balanced Treatment Act is defensible only if the record indi-
cates that the Louisiana Legislature had no secular purpose. 
It is important to stress that the purpose forbidden by 
Lemon is the purpose to "advance religion." 403 U. S., at 
613; accord ante, at 6 ("promote" religion); Witters v. Wash-
ington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, supra, at-- ("endorse 
religion"); Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 56 ("advance reli-
gion"); ibid. ("endorse ... religion"); Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 788 (1973) ("'advanc-
85-1513-DISSENT 
6 EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD 
ing' ... religion"); Levitt v. Committee for Public Educa-
tion, 413 U. S. 472, 481 (1973) ("advancing religion"); Walz v. 
Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970) ("establishing, 
sponsoring, or supporting religion"); Board of Education v. 
Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 243 (1968) ("advancement or inhibition 
of religion") (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 
U. S. 203, 222 (1963)). Our cases in no way imply that the 
Establishment Clause forbids legislators merely to act upon 
their religious convictions. We surely would not strike down 
a law providing money to feed the hungry or shelter the 
homeless if it could be demonstrated that, but for the reli-
gious beliefs of the legislators, the funds would not have been 
approved. Also, political activism by the religiously moti-
vated is part of our heritage. Notwithstanding the major-
ity's implication to the contrary, ante, at 10-11, we do not 
presume that the sole purpose of a law is to advance religion 
merely because it was supported strongly by organized reli-
gions or by adherents of particular faiths. See W alz v. Tax 
Commission, supra, at 670; cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 
297, 319-320 (1980). To do so would deprive religious men 
and women of their right to participate in the political proc-
ess. Today's religious activism may give us the Balanced 
Treatment Act, but yesterday's resulted in the abolition of 
slavery, and tomorrow's may bring relief for famine victims. 
Similarly, we will not presume that a law's purpose is to 
advance religion merely because it "'happens to coincide or 
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions,"' Harris 
v. McRae, supra, at 319 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 
366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961)), or because it benefits religion, 
even substantially. We have, for example, turned back 
Establishment Clause challenges to restrictions on abortion 
funding, Harris v. McRae, supra, and to Sunday closing 
laws, McGowan v. Maryland, supra, despite the fact that 
both "agree[] with the dictates of [some] Judaeo-Christian re-
ligions," id., at 442. "In many instances, the Congress or 
state legislatures conclude that the general welfare of soci-
' . 
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ety, wholly apart from any religious considerations, demands 
such regulation." Ibid. On many past occasions we have 
had no difficult finding a secu ar purpose for governmental 
ac 10n ar more i"Kely to a vance re 1g1 n than the Balanced 
Treatment Act. See, e. g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 
394-395 (1983) (tax deduction for expenses of religious educa-
tion); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 236 (1977) (plurality 
opinion) (aid to religious schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 
U. S. 349, 363 (1975) (same); Committee for Public Educa-
tion v. Nyquist, supra, at 773 (same); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U. S. 602, 613 (1971) (same); Walz v. Tax Commission, 
supra, at 672 (tax exemption for church property); Board of 
Education v. Allen, supra, at 243 (textbook loans to students 
in religious schools). Thus, the fact that creation science co-
incides with the beliefs of certain religions, a fact upon which 
the majority relies heavily, does not itself justify invalidation 
of the Act. 
Finally, our cases indicate that even certain kinds of gov-
ernmental actions undertaken with the specific intention of 
improving the position of religion do not "advance religion" as 
that term is used in Lemon. 403 U. S., at 613; see Corpora-
tion of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, -- U.S. --, --
(1987). Rather, we have said that in at least two circum-
stances government must act to advance religion, and that in 
a third it may do so. 
First, since we have consistently described the Establish-
ment Clause as forbidding not only state action motivated by 
the desire to advance religion, but also that intended to "dis-
approve," "inhibit," or evince "hostility" toward religion, see, 
e. g., ante, at 5 ("disapprove") (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U. S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring)); Lynch 
v. Donnelly, supra, at 673 ("hostility"); Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 788 ("'inhibit[]'"); and since 
we have said that governmental "neutrality" toward religion 
is the preeminent goal of the First Amendment, see, e. g., 
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 382 
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(1985); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U. S. 
736, 747 (1976) (plurality opinion); Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 792-793; a state which dis-
covers that its employees are inhibiting religion must take 
steps to prevent them from doing so, even though its purpose 
would clearly be to advance religion. Cf. Walz v. Tax Com-
mission, supra, at 673. Thus, if the Louisiana Legislature 
sincerely believed that the State's science teachers were 
being hostile to religion, our cases indicate that it could act to 
eliminate that hostility without running afoul of Lemon's pur-
pose test. 
Second, we have held that intentional governmental ad-
vancement of religion is sometimes required by the Free Ex-
ercise Clause. For example, in Hobbie v. Unemployment 
Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U. S. -- (1987); Thomas v. 
Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U. S. ,707 (1981); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972); and Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), we held that in some circumstances 
states must accommodate the beliefs of religious citizens by 
exempting them from generally applicable regulations. We 
have not yet come close to reconciling Lemon and our Free 
Exercise cases, and typically we do not really try. See, 
e. g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 
supra, at--; Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 
supra, at 719-720. It is clear, however, that members of the 
Louisiana Legislature were not impermissibly motivated for 
purpose of the Lemon test if they believed that approval of 
the Balanced Treatment Act was required by the Free Exer-
cise Clause. -
We have also held that in some circumstances government 
may act to accommodate religion, even if that action is not 
required by the First Amendment. See Corporation of Pre-
siding Bishop v. Amos,-- U. S. --, -- (1987); Hobbie 
v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., supra, at--. 
"It is well established ... that '[t]he limits of permissible 
state accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive 
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with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise 
Clause."' Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, supra, 
at-- (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 673 
(1970)); see also Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, 453 
(1971). We have implied that voluntary governmental ac-
commodation of religion is not only permissible, but desir-
able. See, e. g., ibid. Thus, few would contend that Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which both forbids reli-
gious discrimination by private-sector employers, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), and requires them reasonably to ac-
commodate the religious practices of their employees, 
§ 2000e(j), violates the Establishment Clause, even though its 
"purpose" is, of course, to advance religion, and even though 
it is almost certainly not required by the Free Exercise 
Clause. While we have warned that "[a]t some point, ac-
commodation may devolve into 'an unlawful fostering of reli-
gion,"' Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, supra, at 
--(quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of 
Fla., supra, at --), we have not suggested precisely (or 
even roughly) where that "point" might be. It is possible, 
then, that even if the sole motive of those voting for the Bal-
anced Treatment Act was to advance religion, and its pas-
sage was not actually required, or even believed to be re-
quired, by either the Free Exercise or Establishment 
Clauses, the Act would nonetheless survive scrutiny under 
Lemon's purpose test. 
One final observation about the application of that test: Al-
though the Court's opinion gives no hint of it, in the past we 
have repeatedly affirmed "our reluctance to attribute uncon-
stitutional motives to the States."-" Mue"'ller v. 'A llen,- 463 
U. . 4 1 ; see a so Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 
688, 699 (1984) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). We "presume 
that legislatures act in a constitutional manner." Illinois v. 
Krull, 480 U. S. --, -- (1987); see also Clements v. 
Fashing, 457 U. S. 957, 963 (1982) (plurality opinion); 
Rostker v. Goldberg, supra, at 64; McDonald v. Board of 
. . .. 
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Election, 394 U. S. 802, 809 (1969). Whenever we are called 
upon to judge the constitutionality of an act of a state legisla-
ture, "we must have 'due regard to the fact that this Court is 
not exercising a primary judgment but is sitting in judgment 
upon those who also have taken the oath to observe the Con-
stitution and who have the responsibility for carrying on gov-
ernment."' Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 64 (1981) 
(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 
341 U. S. 123, 164 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
This is particularly true, we have said, where the legislature 
has specifically considered the question of a law's constitu-
tionality. I d. 
With the foregoing in mind, I now turn to the purposes un-
derlying adoption of the Balanced Treatment Act. __.... 
II 
A 
We have relatively little information upon which to judge 
the motives of those who supported the Act. About the only 
direct evidence is the statute itself and transcripts of the 
seven committee hearings at which it was considered. U n-
fortunately, several of those hearings were sparsely at-
tended, and the legislators who were present revealed little 
about their motives. We have no com_]p.ittee r.~grts, no 
fl.~ debates, no remarks inserted into the legislatiVe 
history, no statement from the Governor, and no post-
enactment statemen s or testimony rom the bill's sponsor or 
any other legislators. Compare Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U. S. 38, 43, 56-57 (1985). Nevertheless, there is ample evi-
dence that the majority is wrong in holding that the Balanced 
Treatment Act is without secular purpose. 
At the outset, it is important to note that the Balanced 
Treatment Act did not fly through the Louisiana Legislature 
on wings of fundamentalist religious fervor-which would be 
unlikely, in any event, since only a small minority of the 
State's citizens belong to fundamentalist religious denomina-
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tions. See B. Quirin, H. Anderson, M. Bradley, P. Goetting, 
& P. Shriver, Churches and Church Membership in the 
United States 16 (1982). The Act had its genesis (so to 
speak) in legislation introduced by Senator Bill Keith in June 
1980. After two hearings before the Senate Committee on 
Education, Senator Keith asked that his bill be referred to a 
study commission composed of members of both houses of the 
Louisiana Legislature. He expressed hope that the joint 
committee would give the bill careful consideration and de-
termine whether his arguments were "legitimate." 1 App. 
E29-E30. The committee met twice during the interim, 
heard testimony (both for and against the bill) from several 
witnesses, and received staff reports. Senator Keith intro-
duced his bill again when the Legislature reconvened. The 
Senate Committee on Education held two more hearings and 
approved the bill after substantially amending it (in part over 
Senator Keith's objection). After approval by the full Sen-
ate, the bill was referred to the House Committee on Educa-
tion. That committee conducted a lengthy hearing, adopted 
further amendments, and sent the bill on to the full House, 
where it received favorable consideration. The Senate con-
curred in the House amendments and on July 20, 1981, the 
Governor signed the bill into law. 
Senator Keith's statements before the various committees 
that considered the bill hardly reflect the confidence of a man 
preaching to the converted. He asked his colleagues to 
"keep an open mind" and not to be "biased" by misleading 
characterizations of creation science. I d., at E33. He also 
urged them to "look at this subject on its merits and not on 
some preconceived idea." ld., at E34; see also 2 App. E491. 
Senator Keith's reception was not especially warm. Over 
his strenuous objection, the Senate Committee on Education 
voted 5-1 to amend his bill to deprive it of any force; as 
amended, the bill merely gave teachers permission to bal-
ance the teaching of creation science or evolution with the 
other. 1 App. E442-E461. The House Committee restored 
• 
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the "mandatory" language to the bill by a vote of only 6-5, 2 
App. E626-E627, and both the full House (by vote of 52-35), 
id., at E700-E706, and full Senate (23-15), id., at 
E735-E738, had to repel further efforts to gut the bill. 
The legislators understood that Senator Keith's bill in-
volved a "unique" subject, 1 App. E106 (Rep. M. Thompson), 
and they were repeatedly made aware of its potential con-
stitutional problems, see, e. g., id., at E26-E28 (McGehee); 
id., at E38-E39 (Sen. Keith); id., at E241-E242 (Rossman); 
id., at E257 (Probst); id., at E261 (Beck); id., at E282 (Sen. 
Keith). Although the Establishment Clause, including its 
secular purpose requirement, was of substantial concern to 
the legislators, they eventually voted overwhelmingly in 
favor of the Balanced Treatment Act: The House approved it 
71-19 (with 15 members absent), 2 App. E716-E722; the Sen-
ate 26-12 (with all members present), id., at E741-E744. 
The legislators specifically designated the protection of "aca-
demic freedom" as the ·purpose of the Act. La. Rev. Stat. 
§ 17:286.2 (West 1982). We cannot accurately assess 
whether this purpose is a "sham," ante, at 7, until we first 
examine the evidence presented to the Legislature far more 
carefully than the Court has done. 
Before summarizing the testimony of Senator Keith and his 
supporters, I wish to make clear that I by no means intend to 
endorse its accuracy. But my views (and the views of this 
Court) about creation science and evolution are (or should be) 
beside the point. Our task is not to judge the debate about 
teaching the origins of life, but to ascertain what the mem-
bers of the Louisiana Legislature believed. The vast major-
ity of them voted to approve a bill which explicitly stated a 
secular purpose; what is crucial is not their wisdom in believ-
ing that purpose would be achieved by the bill, but their sin-
cerity in believing it would be. 
Most of the testimony in support of Senator Keith's bill 
came from the Senator himself and from scientists and 
educators he presented, many of whom enjoyed academic 
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credentials that may have been regarded as quite impressive 
by members of the Louisiana Legislature. To a substantial 
extent, their testimony was devoted to lengthy, and, to the 
layman, seemingly expert scientific expositions on the origin 
of life. See, e. g., 1 App. Ell-E18 (Sunderland); id., at 
E50-E60 (Boudreaux); id., at E86-E89 (Ward); id., at 
E130-E153 (Boudreaux paper); id., at 321-326 (Boudreaux); 
id., at E423-E428 (Sen. Keith). These scientific lectures 
touched upon, inter alia, biology, paleontology, genetics, as-
tronomy, astrophysics, probability analysis, and biochem-
istry. The witnesses repeatedly assured committee mem-
bers that "hundreds and hundreds" of highly respected, 
internationally renowned scientists believed in creation sci-
ence and would support their testimony. See, e. g., id., at 
E5 (Sunderland); id., at E76 (Sen. Keith); id., at E100-E101 
(Reiboldt); id., at E327-E328 (Boudreaux); 2 App. 
E503-E504 (Boudreaux). 
Senator Keith and his witnesses testified essentially as set }A 
forth in the following numbered paragraphs: Y 1 
(1) There are two and only two scientific explanations for 
the beginning of -=-e ution an crea ion sc e ce. 1 
App. E6 (Sunderland); id., at E34 (Sen. Keith); id., at E280 
(Sen. Keith); id., at E417-E418 (Sen. Keith). Both are bona 
fide "sciences." /d., at E6-E7 (Sunderland); id., at E12 
(Sunderland); id., at E416 (Sen. Keith); id., at E427 (Sen. 
Keith); 2 App. E491-E492 (Sen. Keith); id., at E497-E498 
(Sen. Keith). Both posit a theory of the origin of life and 
subject that theory to empirical testing. Evolution posits 
that life arose out of inanimate chemical compounds and has 
gradually evolved over millions of years. Creation science 
posits that all life forms now on earth appeared suddenly and 
relatively recently and have changed little. Since there are 
·only two possible explanations of the origin of life, any evi-
3 Although creation scientists and evolutionists also disagree about the 
origin of the physical universe, both proponents and opponents of Senator 
Keith's bill focused on the question of the beginning of life. 
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dence that tends to disprove the theory of evolution necessar-
ily tends to prove the theory of creation science, and vice-
versa. For example, the abrupt appearance in the fossil 
record of complex life, and the extreme rarity of transitional 
life forms in that record, are evidence for creation science. 1 
App. E7 (Sunderland); id., at E12-E18 (Sunderland); id., at 
E45-E60 (Boudreaux); id., at E67 (Harlow); id., at 
E130-E153 (Boudreaux paper); id., at E423-E428 (Sen. 
Keith). 
(2) The body of scientific evidence supporting creation sci- ~ 
ence is as strong as that supporting evolution. In fact, it 
may be stronger. !d., at E214 (Young statement); id., at 310 
(Sen. Keith); id., at E416 (Sen. Keith); 2 App. E492 (Sen. 
Keith). The evidence for evolution is far less compelling 
than we have been led to believe. Evolution is not a scien-
tific "fact," since it cannot actually be observed in a labora-
tory. Rather, evolution is merely a scientific theory or 
"guess." 1 App. E20-E21 (Morris); id., arE'B'5(Ward); id., 
at ElOO (Reiboldt); id., at E328-E329 (Boudreaux); 2 App. 
E506 (Boudreaux). It is a very bad guess at that. The sci-
entific problems with evolution are so serious that it could ac-
curately be termed a "myth." 1 App. E85 (Ward); id., at 
E92-E93 (Kalivoda); id., at E95-E97 (Sen. Keith); id., at 
E154 (Boudreaux paper); id., at E329 (Boudreaux); id., at 
E453 (Sen. Keith); 2 App. E505-E506 (Boudreaux); id., at 
E516 (Young). 
(3) Creation science is educationally valuable. Students 
exposed to it better understand the current s ate of scientific 
evidence about the origin of life. 1 App. E19 (Sunderland); 
id., at E39 (Sen. Keith); id., at E79 (Kalivoda); id., at E308 
(Sen. Keith); 2 App. E513-E514 (Morris). Those students 
even have a better understanding of evolution. 1 App. E19 
(Sunderland). Creation science can and should be presented 
to children without any religious content. I d., at E 12 (Sun-
derland); id., at E22 (Sanderford); id., at E35-E36 (Sen. 
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Keith); id., at E 101 (Reiboldt); id., at E279-E280 (Sen. 
Keith); id., at E282 (Sen. Keith). 
(4) Although creation science is educationally valuable and 
strictly scientific, it is now being censored from or misrepre-
sented in the public schools. I d., at E 19 (Sunderland); id., 
at E21 (Morris); id., at E34 (Sen. Keith); id., at E37 (Sen. 
Keith); id., at E42 (Sen. Keith); id., at E92 (Kalivoda); id., at 
E97-E98 (Reiboldt); id., at E214 (Young statement); id., at 
E218 (Young statement); id., at E280 (Sen. Keith); id., at 
E309 (Sen. Keith); 2 App. E513 (Morris). Evolution, in 
turn, is misrepresented as an absolute truth. 1 App. E63 
(Harlow); id., at E74 (Sen. Keith); id., at E81 (Kalivoda); id., 
at E214 (Young statement); 2 App. E507 (Harlow); id., at 
E513 (Morris); id., at E516 (Young). Teachers have been 
brainwashed by an entrenched scientific establishment com-
posed almost exclusively of scientists to whom evolution is 
like a "religion." These scientists discriminate against cre-
ation scientists so as to prevent evolution's weaknesses from 
being exposed. 1 App. E61 (Boudreaux); id., at E63-E64 
(Harlow); id., at E78-E79 (Kalivoda); id., at E80 (Kalivoda); 
id., at E95-E97 (Sen. Keith); id., at E129 (Boudreaux paper); 
id., at E218 (Young statement); id., at E357 (Sen. Keith); id., 
at E430 (Boudreaux). 
(5) The censorshi of creation science has at least two 
harmful effects. irst, it epnves s u ents of knowledge of 
one of the two scientific explanations for the origin of life and 
leads them to believe that evolution is proven fact; thus, their 
education suffers and they are wrongly taught that science 
has proven their religious beliefs false. Second, it violates 
the Establishment Clause. The United States Supreme 
Court has held that secular humanism is a religion. I d., at 
E36 (Sen. Keith) (referring to Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 
488, 495, n. 11 (1961)); id., at E418 (Sen. Keith); 2 App. E499 
(Sen. Keith). Belief in evolution is a central tenet of that re-
ligion. 1 App. E282 (Sen. Keith); id., at E312-E313 (Sen. 
Keith); id., at E317 (Sen. Keith); id., at E418 (Sen. Keith); 2 
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App. E499 (Sen. Keith). Thus, by censoring creation sci-
ence and instructing students that evolution is fact, public 
school teachers are now advancing religion in violation of the 
Establishment Clause. 1 App. E2-E4 (Sen. Keith); id., at 
E36-E37, 39 (Sen. Keith); id., at E154-E155 (Boudreaux 
paper); id., at E281-E282 (Sen. Keith); id., at E313 (Sen. 
Keith); id., at E315-E316 (Sen. Keith); id., at E317 (Sen. 
Keith); 2 App. E499-E500 (Sen. Keith). 
Senator Keith repeatedly and vehemently denied that his 
purpose was to advance a particular religious doctrine. At 
the outset of the first hearing on the legislation, he testified, 
"We are not going to say today that you should have some 
kind of religious instructions in our schools. . . . We are not 
talking about religion today .... I am not proposing that we 
take the Bible in each science class and read the first chapter 
of Genesis." 1 App. E35. At a later hearing, Senator Keith 
stressed that "to . . . teach religion and disguise it as 
creationism . . . is not my intent. My intent is to see to it 
that our textbooks are not censored." I d., at E280. He 
made many similar statements throughout the hearings. 
See, e. g., id., at E41; id., at E282; id., at E310; id., at E417; 
see also id., at E44 (Boudreaux); id., at E80 (Kalivoda). 
We have no way of knowing, of course, how many legisla-
tors believed the testimony of Senator Keith and his wit-
nesses. But in the absence of evidence to the contrary,4 we 
'Although appellees and amici dismiss the testimony of Senator Keith 
and his witnesses as pure fantasy, they did not bother to submit evidence 
of that to the District Court, making it difficult for us to agree with them. 
The State, by contrast, submitted the affidavits of two scientists, a philoso-
pher, a theologian, and an educator, whose academic credentials are rather 
impressive. See App. to Juris. Statement A17-A18 (Kenyon); id., at A36 
(Morrow); id., at A39-A40 (Miethe); id., at A46-A47 (Most); id., at A49 
(Clinkert). Like Senator Keith and his witnesses; the affiants swear that 
evolution and creation science are the only two scientific explanations for 
the origin of life, see id., at A19-A20 (Kenyon); id., at A38 (Morrow); id., 
at A41 (Miethe); that creation science is strictly scientific, see id., at A18 
(Kenyon); id., at A36 (Morrow); id., at A40-A41 (Miethe); id., at A49 
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have to assume that many of them did. Given that assump-
tion, the Court today plainly errs in holding that the Louisi-
ana Legislature passed the Balanced Treatment Act for ex-
clusively religious purposes. 
B 
Even with nothing more than this legislative history to go 
on, I think it would be extraordinary to invalidate the Bal-
anced Treatment Act for lack of a valid secular purpose. 
Striking down a law approved by the democratically elected 
representatives of the people is no minor matter. "The car-
dinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to 
destroy. We have repeatedly held that as between two pos-
sible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be 
unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to 
adopt that which will save the act." Labor Board v. Jones & 
Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1, 30 (1937). So, too, it seems to me, 
with .discerning statutory purpose. Even if the legislative 
history were silent or ambiguous about the existence of a sec-
ular purpose-and here it is not-the statute should survive 
Lemon's purpose test. But even more validation than mere 
(Clinkert); that creation science is simply a collection of scientific data that 
supports the hypothesis that life appeared on earth suddenly and has 
changed little, see id., at A19 (Kenyon); id., at A36 (Morrow); id., at A41 
(Miethe); that hundreds of respected scientists believe in creation science, 
see id., at A20 (Kenyon); that evidence for creation science is as strong as 
evidence for evolution, see id., at A21 (Kenyon); id., at A34-A35 (Kenyon); 
id., at A37-A38 (Morrow); that creation science is educationally valuable, 
see id., at A19 (Kenyon); id., at A36 (Morrow); id., at A38-A39 (Morrow); 
id., at A49 (Clinkert); that creation science can be presented without reli-
gious content, see id., at A19 (Kenyon); id., at A35 (Kenyon); id., at A36 
(Morrow); id., at A40 (Miethe); id., at A43-A44 (Miethe); id., at A47 
(Most); id., at A49 (Clinkert); and that creation science is now censored 
from classrooms while evolution is misrepresented as proven fact, see id., 
at A20 (Kenyon); id., at A35 (Kenyon); id., at A39 (Morrow); id., at A50 
(Clinkert): It is difficult to conclude on the basis of these affidavits-the 
only substantive evidence in the record-that the laymen serving in the · 
Louisiana Legislature must have disbelieved Senator Keith or his 
witnesses. 
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legislative history is present here. The Louisiana Legisla-
ture explicitly set forth its secular purpose ("protecting aca-
demic freedom") in the very text of the Act. La. Rev. Stat. 
§ 17:286.2 (West 1982). We have in the past repeatedly re-
lied upon or deferred to such expressions, see, e. g., Commit-
tee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 654 (1980); 
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 363, 367-368 (1975); Com-
mittee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 773 
(1973); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 
472, 479-480, n. 7 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 
672, 678-679 (1971) (plurality opinion); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U. S. 602, 613 (1971); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 
u. s. 236, 243 (1968). 
The Court seeks to evade the force of this expression of 
purpose by stubbornly misinterpreting it, and then finding 
that the provisions of the Act do not advance that misinter-
preted purpose, thereby showing it to be a sham. The Court 
first surmises that "academic freedom" means "enhancing the 
freedom of teachers to teach what they will," ante, at 6--
even though "academic freedom" in that sense has little scope 
in the structured elementary and secondary curriculums with 
which the Act is concerned. Alternatively, the Court sug-
gests that it might mean "maximiz[ing] the comprehensive-
ness and effectiveness of science instruction," ante, at 9-
though that is an exceeding strange interpretation of the 
words, and one that is refuted on the very face of the statute. 
See § 17:286.5. Had the Court devoted to this central ques-
tion of the meaning of the legislatively expressed purpose a 
small fraction of the research into legislative history that pro-
duced its quotations of religiously motivated statements by 
individual legislators, it would have discerned quite readily 
what "academic freedom" meant: students' freedom from in-
doctrination. · The legislature wanted to ensure that stu-
dents would be free to decide for themselves how life began, 
based upon a fair and balanced presentation of the scientific 
evidence-that is, to protect "the right of each [student] vol-
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untarily to determine what to believe (and what not to be-
lieve) free of any coercive pressures from the State." Grand 
Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 385 (1985). 
The legislature did not care whether the topic of origins was 
taught; it simply wished to ensure that when the topic was 
taught, students would receive "'all of the evidence.'" 
Ante, at 7 (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 60). 
As originally introduced, the "purpose" section of the Bal-
anced Treatment Act read: "This Chapter is enacted for the 
purposes of protecting academic freedom . . . of students . . . 
and assisting students in their search for truth." 1 App. 
E292 (emphasis added). Among the proposed findings of 
fact contained in the original version of the bill was the fol-
lowing: "Public school instruction in only evolution-science 
. . . violates the principle of academic freedom because it de-
nies students a choice between scientific models and instead 
indoctrinates them in evolution science alone." I d., at E295 
(emphasis added). Senator Keith unquestionably under-
stood "academic freedom" to mean "freedom from indoctrina-
tion." See id., at E36 (purpose of bill is "to protect academic 
freedom by providing student choice"); id., at E283 (purpose 
of bill is to protect "academic freedom" by giving students a 
"choice" rather than subjecting them to "indoctrination on 
origins"). 
If one adopts the obviously intended meaning of the statu-
tory terms "academic freedom," there is no basis whatever 
for concluding that the purpose they express is a "sham." 
Ante, at 7. To the contrary, the Act pursues that purpose 
plainly and consistently. It requires that, whenever the 
subject of origins is covered, evolution be "taught as a the-
ory, rather than as proven scientific fact" and that scientific 
evidence inconsistent with the theory of evolution (viz., "cre-
ation science") be taught as well. La. Rev. Stat.. Ann. 
§ 17:286.4A (West 1982). Living up to its title of "Balanced 
Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act," 
§ 17.286.1, it treats the teaching of creation the same way. 
. ' 
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It does not mandate instruction in creation science, 
§ 17:286.5; forbids teachers to present creation science "as 
proven scientific fact," § 17:286.4A; and bans the teaching of 
creation science unless the theory is (to use the Court's ter-
minology) "discredit[ed] ' . . . at every turn'" with the 
teaching of evolution. Ante, at 9 (quoting 765 F. 2d, at 
1257). It surpasses understanding how the Court can see in 
this a purpose "to restructure the science curriculum to con-
form with a particular religious viewpoint," ante, at 13, "to 
provide a persuasive advantage to a particular religious doc-
trine," ante, at 12, "to promote the theory of creation science 
which embodies a particular religious tenet," ante, at 13, and 
"to endorse a particular religious doctrine, ante, at 14. 
The Act's reference to "creation" is not convincing evi-
dence of religious purpose. The Act defines creation science 
as "scientific evidence[]," § 17:286.3(2) (emphasis added), and 
Senator Keith and his witnesses repeatedly stressed that the 
subject can and should be presented without religious con-
tent. See supra, at --. We have no basis on the record 
to conclude that creation science need be anything other than 
a collection of scientific data supporting the theory that life 
abruptly appeared on earth. See n. 4, supra. Creation sci-
ence, its proponents insist, no more must explain whence life 
came than evolution must explain whence came the inanimate 
materials from which it says life evolved. But even if that 
were not so, to posit a past creator is not to posit the eternal 
and personal God who is the object of religious veneration. 
Indeed, it is not even to posit the "unmoved mover" hypothe-
sized by Aristotle and other notably nonfundamentalist phi-
losophers. Senator Keith suggested this when he referred 
to "a creator however you define a creator." 1 App. E280 (em-
phasis added). 
The Court cites three provisions of the Act which, it ar-
gues, demonstrate a "discriminatory preference for the 
teaching of creation science" and no interest in "academic 
freedom." Ante, at 8. First, the Act prohibits discrimina-
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tion only against creation scientists and those who teach cre-
ation science. § 17:286.4C. Second, the Act requires local 
school boards to develop and provide to science teachers "a 
curriculum guide on presentation of creation-science." 
§ 17:286.7 A. Finally, the Act requires the governor to des-
ignate seven creation scientists who shall, upon request, as-
sist local school boards in developing the curriculum guides. 
§ 17:286. 7B. But none of these provisions casts doubt upon 
the sincerity of the legislators' articulated purpose of "aca-
demic freedom"-unless, of course, one gives that term the 
obviously erroneous meanings preferred by the Court. The 
Louisiana legislators had been told repeatedly that creation 
scientists were scorned by most educators and scientists, 
who themselves had an almost religious faith in evolution. 
It is hardly surprising, then, that in seeking to achieve a bal-
anced, "nonindoctrinating" curriculum, the legislators pro-
tected from discrimination only those teachers whom they 
thought were suffering from discrimination. (Also, the leg-
islators were undoubtedly aware of Epperson v. Arkansas, 
393 U. S. 97 (1968), and thus could quite reasonably have 
concluded that discrimination against evolutionists was al-
ready prohibited.) The two provisions respecting the devel-
opment of curriculum guides are also consistent with "aca-
demic freedom" as the Louisiana Legislature understood the 
term. Witnesses had informed the legislators that, be-
cause of the hostility of most scientists and educators to cre-
ation science, the topic had been censored from or badly mis-
represented in elementary and secondary school texts. In 
light of the unavailability of works on creation science suit-
able for classroom use (a fact appellees concede, see Brief for 
Appellees 27, 40) and the existence of ample materials on 
evolution, it was entirely reasonable for the Legislature to 
conclude that science teachers attempting to implement the 
Act would need a curriculum guide on creation science, but 
not on· evolution, and that those charged with developing the 
guide would need an easily accessible group of creation scien-
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tists. Thus, the provisions of the Act of so much concern to 
the Court support the conclusion that the Legislature acted 
to advance "academic freedom." 
The legislative history gives ample evidence of I 
it of the Balanced Treatment Act s articu ated urpose. 
a r witness urge t e egis ators to sup ort the 
Act so that students would not be "indoctrinated" but would 
instead be free to decide for themselves, based upon a fair 
presentation of the scientific evidence, about the origin of 
life. See, e. g., 1 App. E18 (Sunderland) ("all that we are 
advocating" is presenting "scientific data" to students and 
"letting [them] make up their own mind[s]"); id. , at E 19-E20 
(Sunderland) (Students are now being "indoctrinated" in evo-
lution through the use of "censored school books . .. . All that 
we are asking for is [the] open unbiased education in the 
classroom ... your students deserve."); id., at E21 (Morris) 
("A student cannot [make an intelligent decision about the or-
igin of life] unless he is well informed about both [evolution 
and creation science]."); id., at E22 (Sanderford) ("We are 
asking very simply [that] ... creationism [be presented] ... 
alongside . . . evolution and let people make their own 
mind[s] up."); id., at E23 (Young) (the bill would require 
teachers to live up to their "obligation to present all theories" 
and thereby enable "students to make judgments them-
selves"); id., at E44 (Boudreaux) ("Our intention is truth and 
as a scientist, I am interested in truth."); id., at E60-E61 
(Boudreaux) ("[W]e [teachers] are guilty of a lot of brain-
washing .... We have a duty to ... [present the] truth" to 
students "at all levels from gradeschool on through the col-
lege level."); id., at E79 (Kalivoda) ("This [hearing] is being 
held I think to determine whether children will benefit from 
freedom of information or if they will be handicapped educa-
tionally by having little or no information about creation."); 
id., at E80 (Kalivoda) ("I am not interested in teaching reli-
gion in schools. . . . I am interested in the truth and [stu-
dents] having the opportunity to hear more than one side."); 
·~ 
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id., at E98 (Reiboldt) ("The students have a right to know 
there is an alternate creationist point of view. They have a 
right to know the scientific evidences which support[] that al-
ternative."); id., at E218 (Young statement) (passage of the 
bill will ensure that "communication of scientific ideas and 
discoveries may be unhindered"); 2 App. E514 (Morris) 
("[A]re we going to allow [students] to look at evolution, to 
look at creationism, and to let one or the other stand or fall on 
its own merits, or will we by failing to pass this bill ... deny 
students an opportunity to hear another viewpoint?"); id., at 
E516-E517 (Young) ("We want to give the children here in 
this state an equal opportunity to see both sides of the theo-
ries."). Senator Keith expressed similar views. See, e. g., 
1 App. E36; id., at E41; id., at E280; id., at E283. 
Legislators other than Senator Keith made only a few 
statements providing insight into their motives, but those 
statements cast no doubt upon the sincerity of the Act's artic-
ulated purpose. The legislators were concerned primarily 
about the manner in which the subject of origins was pre-
sented in Louisiana schools-specifically, about whether 
scientifically valuable information was being censored and 
students misled about evolution. Representatives Cain, 
Jenkins, and F. Thompson seemed impressed by the scien-
tific evidence presented in support of creation science. See 2 
App. E530 (Rep. F. Thompson); id., at E533 (Rep. Cain); id., 
at E613 (Rep. Jenkins). At the first study commission hear-
ing, Senator Picard and Representative M. Thompson ques-
tioned Senator Keith about Louisiana teachers' treatment of 
evolution and creation science. See 1 App. E71-E74. At 
the close of the hearing, Representative M. Thompson told 
the audience: 
"We as members of the committee will also receive from 
· the staff information of what is currently being taught in 
the Louisiana public schools. We really want to see [it]. 
I . . . have no idea in what manner [biology] is presented 
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eluded in the public school[s]. We want to look at what 
the status of the situation is." 1 App. E104. 
Legislators made other comments suggesting a concern 
about censorship and misrepresentation of scientific informa-
tion. See, e. g., Id., at E386 (Sen. McLeod); 2 App. E527 
(Rep. Jenkins); id., at E528 (Rep. M. Thompson); id., at 
E534 (Rep. Fair). 
It is undoubtedly true that what prompted the Legislature 
to direct its attention to the misrepresentation of evolution in 
the schools (rather than the inaccurate presentation of other 
topics) was its awareness of the tension between evolution 
and the religious beliefs of many children. But even appel-
lees concede that a valid secular purpose is not rendered im-
permissible simply because its pursuit is prompted by con-
cern for religious sensitivities. Tr. of Oral Arg. 43, 56. If a 
history teacher falsely told her students that the bones of 
Jesus Christ had been discovered, or a physics teacher that 
the Shroud of Turin had been conclusively established to be 
inexplicable on the basis of natural causes, I cannot believe 
(despite the majority's implication to the contrary, see ante, 
at 13) that legislators or school board members would be con-
stitutionally prohibited from taking corrective action, simply 
because that action was prompted by concern for the reli-
gious beliefs of the misinstructed students. 
In sum, even if one concedes, for the sake of argument, 
that a majority of the Louisiana Legislature voted for the 
Balanced Treatment Act partly in order to foster (rather 
than merely eliminate discrimination against) Christian fun-
damentalist beliefs, our cases establish that that alone would 
not suffice to invalidate the Act, so long as there was a genu-
ine secular purpose as well. We have, moreover, no ade-
quate basis for disbelieving the secular purpose set forth in 
the Act itself, or for concluding that it is a sham enacted to 
conceal the legislators' violation of their oaths of office. I am 
astonished by the Court's unprecedented readiness to reach 
such a conclusion, which I can only attribute to an intellectual 
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predisposition created by the facts and the legend of Scopes 
v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S. W. 363 (1927)-an instinctive 
reaction that any governmentally imposed requirements 
bearing upon the teaching of evolution must be a manifesta-
tion of Christian fundamentalist repression. In this case, 
however, it seems to me the Court's position is the repressive 
one. The people of Louisiana, including those who are 
Christian fundamentalists, are quite entitled, as a secular 
matter, to have whatever scientific evidence there may be 
against evolution presented in their schools, just as Mr. 
Scopes was entitled to present whatever scientific evidence 
there was for it. Perhaps what the Louisiana Legislature 
has done is unconstitutional because there is no such evi-
dence, and the scheme they have established will amount to 
no more than a presentation of the Book of Genesis. But we 
cannot say that on the evidence before us in this summary 
judgment context, which includes ample uncontradicted tes-
timony that "creation science" is a body of scientific knowl-
edge rather than revealed belief. Infinitely less can we say 
(or should we say) that the scientific evidence for evolution is 
so conclusive that no one could be gullible enough to believe 
that there is any real scientific evidence to the contrary, so 
that the legislation's stated purpose must be a lie. Yet that 
illiberal judgment, that Scopes-in-reverse, is ultimately the 
basis on which the Court's facile rejection of the Louisiana 
Legislature's purpose must rest. 
Since the existence of secular purpose is so entirely clear, 
and thus dispositive, I will not go on to discuss the fact that, 
even if the Louisiana Legislature's purpose were exclusively 
to advance religion, some of the well established exceptions 
to the impermissibility of that purpose might be applicable-
the validating intent to eliminate a perceived discrimination 
against a particular religion, to facilitate its free exercise, or 
to accommodate it. See supra, at --. I am not in any 
case enamored of those amorphous exceptions, since I think 
them no more than unpredictable correctives to what is (as 
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the next Part of this opinion will discuss) a fundamentally un-
sound rule. It is surprising, however, that the Court does 
not address these exceptions, since the context of the legisla-
ture's action gives some reason to believe they may be 
applicable. 5 
· Because I believe that the Balanced Treatment Act had a 
secular purpose, which is all the first component of the 
Lemon test requires, I would reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and remand for further consideration. 
III 
I have to this point assumed the validity of the Lemon 
"purpose" test. In fact, however, I think the pessimistic 
evaluation that the CHIEF JUSTICE made of the totality of 
Lemon is particularly applicable to the "purpose" prong: it is 
"a constitutional th th has no b sis in the history of lJ If/( 
the amen ment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to app y and 
-------' 
5 As the majority recognizes, ante, at 12, Senator Keith sincerely be-
lieved that "secular humanism is a bona fide religion," 1 App. E36; see also 
id., at E418; 2 App. E499, and that "evolution is the cornerstone of that 
religion," 1 App. E418; see also id., at E282; id., at E312-E313; id., at 
E317; 2 App. E499. The Senator even told his colleagues that this Court 
had "held" that secular humanism was a religion. See 1 App. E36, id., at 
E418; 2 App. E499. (In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 495, n. 11 
(1961), we did indeed refer to "Secular Humanism" as a "religion[].") Sen-
ator Keith and his supporters raised the "religion" of secular humanism 
not, as the majority suggests, to explain the source of their "disdain for the 
theory of evolution," ante, at 12, but to convince the Legislature that the 
State of Louisiana was violating the Establishment Clause because its 
teachers were misrepresenting evolution as fact and depriving students of 
the information necessary to question that theory. 1 App. E2-E4 (Sen. 
Keith); id., at E36-E37, E39 (Sen. Keith); id., at E154-E155 (Boudreaux 
paper); id., at E281-E282 (Sen. Keith); id., at E317 (Sen. Keith); 2 App. 
E499-E500 (Sen. Keith). The Senator repeatedly urged his colleagues to 
pass his bill to remedy this Establishment Clause violation by ensuring 
state neutrality in religious matters, see, e. g., 1 App. E36; id., at E39; id., 
at E313, surely a permissible purpose under Lemon. Senator Keith's ar-
gument may be questionable, but nothing in the statute or its legislative 
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yields unprincipled results." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 
38, 112 (1985) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
Our cases interpreting and applying the purpose test have 
made such a maze of the Establishment Clause that even the 
most conscientious governmental officials can only guess 
what motives will be held unconstitutional. We have said 
essentially the following: Government may not act with the 
purpose of advancing religion, except when forced to do so by 
the Free Exercise Clause (which is now and then); or when 
eliminating existing governmental hostility to religion (which 
exists sometimes); or even when merely accommodating gov-
ernmentally uninhibited religious practices, except that at 
some point (it is unclear where) intentional accommodation 
results in the fostering of religion, which is of course uncon-
stitutional. See supra, at --. 
But the difficulty of knowing what vitiating purpose one is 
looking for is as nothing compared with the difficulty of 
knowing how or where to find it. For while it is possible to 
discern the objective "purpose" of a statute (i. e., the public 
good at which its provisions appear to be directed), or even 
the formal motivation for a statute where that is explicitly set 
forth (as it was, to no avail, here), discerning the subjective 
motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, al-
most always an impossible task. The number of possible 
motivations, to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even fi-
nite. In the present case, for example, a particular legisla-
tor need not have voted for the Act either because he wanted 
to foster religion or because he wanted to improve education. 
He may have thought the bill would provide jobs for his dis-
trict, or may have wanted to make amends with a faction of 
his party he had alienated on another vote, or he may have 
been a close friend of the bill's sponsor, or he may have been 
repaying a favor he owed the Majority Leader, or he may 
have hoped the Governor would appreciate his vote and make 
a fundraising appearance for him, or he may have been pres-
sured to vote for a bill he disliked by a wealthy contributor or 
'· ~ 
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by a flood of constituent mail, or he may have been seeking 
favorable publicity, or he may have been reluctant to hurt the 
feelings of a loyal staff member who worked on the bill, or he 
may have been settling an old score with a legislator who op-
posed the bill, or he may have been mad at his wife who op-
posed the bill, or he may have been intoxicated and utterly 
unmotivated when the vote was called, or he may have acci-
dentally voted "yes" instead of "no," or, of course, he may 
have had (and very likely did have) a combination of some of 
the above and many other motivations. To look for the sole 
purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for 
something that does not exist. 
Putting that problem aside, however, where ought we to 
look for the individual legislator's purpose? We cannot 
of course assume that every member present (if, as is un-
likely, we know who or even how many they were) agreed 
with the motivation expressed in a particular legislator's pre-
enactment floor or committee statement. Quite obviously, 
"[ w ]hat motivates one legislator to make a speech about a 
statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to 
enact it." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 384 
(1968). Can we assume, then, that they all agree with the 
motivation expressed in the staff-prepared committee re-
ports they might have read-even though we are unwilling to 
assume that they agreed with the motivation expressed in 
the very statute that they voted for? Should we consider 
post-enactment floor statements? Or post-enactment testi-
mony from legislators, obtained expressly for the lawsuit? 
Should we consider media reports on the realities of the legis-
lative bargaining? All of these sources, of course, are emi-
nently manipulable. Legislative histories can be contrived 
and sanitized, favorable media coverage orchestrated, and 
post-enactment recollections conveniently distorted. Per-
haps most valuable of all would be more objective indica-
tions-for example, evidence regarding the individuallegisla-
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tors' religious affiliations. And if that, why not evidence 
regarding the fervor or tepidity of their beliefs? 
Having achieved, through these simple means, an assess-
ment of what individual legislators intended, we must still 
confront the question (yet to be addressed in any of our cases) 
how many of them must have the invalidating intent. If a 
state senate approves a bill by vote of 26 to 25, and only one 
of the 26 intended solely to advance religion, is the law uncon-
stitutional? What if 13 of the 26 had that intent? What if 
three of the 26 had the impermissible intent, but three of the 
25 voting against the bill were motivated by religious hostil-
ity or were simply attempting to "balance" the votes of their 
impermissibly motivated colleagues? Or is it possible that 
the intent of the bill's sponsor is alone enough to invalidate 
it-on a theory, perhaps, that even though everyone else's 
intent was pure, what they produced was the fruit of a forbid-
den tree? 
Because there are no good answers to these questions, this 
Court has recognized from Chief Justice Marshall, see 
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 130 (1810), to Chief Justice 
Warren, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383-384 
(1968), that determining the subjective intent of legislators is 
a perilous enterprise. See also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 
U. S. 217, 224-225 (1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 
97, 113 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). It is perilous, I might 
note, not just for the judges who will very likely reach the 
wrong result, but also for the legislators who find that they 
must assess the validity of proposed legislation-and risk the 
condemnation of having voted for an unconstitutional meas-
ure-not on the basis of what the legislation contains, nor 
even on the basis of what they themselves intend, but on the 
basis of what others have in mind. 
Given the many hazards involved in assessing the subjec- \' 
tive intent of governmental decisionmakers, the first prong of 
Lemon is defensible, I think, only if the text of the Establish-
ment Clause demands it. That is surely not the case. The 
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Clause states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion." One could argue, I suppose, that 
any time Congress acts with the interj,t of advancing religion, 
it has enacted a "law respecting an establishment of religion"; 
but far from being an unavoidable reading, it is quite an un-
natural one. I doubt, for example, that the Clayton Act, 15 
U. S. C. §§ 12 et seq., could reasonably be described as a "law 
respecting an establishment of religion" if bizarre new his-
torical evidence revealed that it lacked a secular purpose, 
even though it has no discernible nonsecular effect. It is, in 
short, far from an inevitable reading of the Establishment 
Clause that it forbids all governmental action intended to ad-
vance religion; and if not inevitable, any reading with such 
untoward consequences must be wrong. 
In the past we have attempted to justify our embarrassing 
Establishme~t Clause jurisprudence 6 on the ground that it 
"sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility." Com-
6 Professor Choper summarized our school aid cases thusly: 
"[A] provision for therapeutic and diagnostic health services to parochial 
school pupils by public employees is invalid if provided in the parochial 
school, but not if offered at a neutral site, even if in a mobile unit adjacent 
to the parochial school. Reimbursement to parochial schools for the ex-
pense of administering teacher-prepared tests required by state law is 
invalid, but the state may reimburse parochial schools for the expense of 
administering state-prepared tests. The state may lend school textbooks 
to parochial school pupils because, the Court has explained, the books can 
be checked in advance for religious content and are 'self-policing'; but the 
state may not lend other seemingly self-policing instructional items such as 
tape recorders and maps. The state may pay the cost of bus transporta-
tion to parochial schools, which the Court has ruled are 'permeated' wjth 
religion; but the state is forbidden to pay for field trip transportation visits 
'to governmental, industrial, cultural, and scientific centers designed to en-
rich the secular studies of students."' Choper, The Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 673, 
680-681 (1980) (citations omitted). 
Since that was written, more decisions on the subject have been ren-
dered, but they leave the theme of chaos securely unimpaired. See, e. g., 
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U. S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids School District v. 
Ball, 473 U. S. 373 (1985).-
r 
85-1513--DISSENT 
EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD 31 
mittee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 662 
(1980). One commentator has aptly characterized this as "a 
euphemism . . . for ... the absence of any principled ration-
ale." Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 673, 681 
(1980). I think it time that we sacrifice some "flexibility" for 
"clarity and predictability." Abandoning Lemon's purpose 
test-a test which exacerbates the~ree 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, has no basis in the lan-
guage or history of the amendment, and, as today's decision 
shows, has wonderfully flexible consequences-would be a 
good place to start. 
~
